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Abstract
Within the EU region the EU member states, by discarding their right to exercise fiscal 
and monetary policy independently, have signed up to a set of rules and regulations that will 
eventually lead to European and Monetary Union (EMU). These set of rules as reflected by 
both the Maastricht criteria as well as the Stability and Growth Pact, contain no reference to 
either the unacceptable levels of European unemployment or the balance o f trade position. 
The ensuing wave of criticism directed at the motivation as well as the rationale behind such a 
stringent set o f rules and regulations has caused a lot o f uncertainty to emerge as to what the 
future of such an economic venture would be.
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the existing problem of European 
unemployment within the new economic environment that emerged after the demise of 
Bretton Woods and most crucially after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Further, it 
develops an alternative demand-based macroeconomic framework on the basis of which the 
undertaken econometric analysis provides evidence in support o f our approach. In particular, 
by examining the way macroeconomic policy has evolved after the demise of Bretton Woods 
and questioning the premise with which the new economic orthodoxy has established its 
authority in euroland, we review the current position of EMU countries in relation to the 
convergence criteria. It is argued that the deflationary bias in conjunction with the 
institutional arrangements peculiar to an independent European central bank (ECB) 
undermine the potential o f future economic policies to deal with persistent levels of 
unemployment. Moreover, it is sustained that the absence of a strategy tailored to stimulate 
economic activity together with the underlying deflationary nature implied by convergence 
criteria, may be potential factors that contribute to the perpetuation of high levels of 
unemployment. Lack of demand in conjunction with the prevalent instability in the labour 
markets have harmed productive efficiency and most importantly the creation of additional 
capacity on which employment could be encouraged. Therefore, a case for policies designed 
to boost aggregate demand is made.
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In pursuing our objective, a post Keynesian macroeconomic framework provides the 
theoretical underpinnings on which the empirical investigation is based. On the 
methodological front, panel data analysis is applied to EU countries. The results obtained 
suggest that unemployment in Europe is a by-product of economic policies devoid of any 
measures to affect demand as well as supply factors. Moreover, on the basis of the evidence, 
the deflationary bias that characterises the EU economies especially after the ratification of 
the Maastricht treaty appears to have dampened economic activity and hence employment in 
most EU member states.
Some further investigation into the rationale behind the introduction of the Stability 
Pact yields additional evidence casting considerable doubts on two of the most fundamental 
reasons put forward in defence of the Stability pact, namely the fear for interest rate spillovers 
across the EU economies and the significant role of national savings in conditioning 
investment.
Finally a concluding chapter provides some alternative policy recommendations.
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Introduction
Primarily, the aim of this thesis is to highlight the incompatibility between the 
monetarist model upon which EMU is based and the alternative theoretical macroeconomic 
framework grounded in theories akin to the Keynesian-Kaleckian tradition. In this sense 
this study could be seen as an endeavour to identify a number o f important themes, such as 
the relationship between effective demand and unemployment, which reflect the essence of 
the post Keynesian thought. In view of the lamentably little empirical evidence regarding 
this aforementioned relationship we provide significant econometric results using panel 
data analysis. The empirical evidence generated buttresses the hypothesis that deflationary 
policies such as the ones implied by the Maastricht convergence criteria can have adverse 
effects on effective demand and through this on EU employment. Hence, the deflationary 
bias of the convergence criteria in conjunction with the contractionary nature of the 
economic policy that is currently pursued within the EU region are bound to exacerbate 
rather than provide a solution to the problem of unemployment. Furthermore, this study by 
critically reviewing and comprehensively testing two of the main arguments put forward in 
defence of the stability pact provides empirical evidence suggesting that the 
implementation o f such a stringent rules and regulations have to be carefully reconsidered. 
In essence, the contribution of this thesis is o f great significance as it advances our 
understanding o f the channels through which macroeconomic policy affects European 
unemployment.
Over the last 20 years a rising pattern in European unemployment has been 
observed in nearly all EU member states. The discernible shift in the emphasis of
macroeconomic policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, towards combating inflation, 
rather than maintaining full employment, represented a watershed in international economic 
policy. Inevitably, the employment situation around the globe, and specifically in most 
countries of the European Union, has deteriorated, reaching alarming proportions. On the 
face of these new developments, arguably precipitated by the prevalence of the emerging 
economic orthodoxy, a number of issues concerning the underlying economic as well as 
social instability, have yet to be dealt with.
The dominance of the free-market consensus has caused a structural change in the 
model of economic development in the EU. The new economic orthodoxy asserts that 
there is no essential role that the state or the public sector can play in galvanising 
economic activity. In this theoretical context, the state should step aside and let the 
market forces create the economic conditions conducive to economic growth; there is no 
essential role for active macro-policies in stimulating employment and output. At present, 
the EU’s policy agenda is closely aligned with the one proposed by the neoliberal school 
of thought and conforms to its priorities: deregulation, privatisation, balanced budgets 
and disinflation by means of monetary restrictions.
Economic policy, particularly in the EU, has suffered many setbacks and 
restrictions. A clear example of the current practice is its reliance upon monetary tests of 
convergence rather than examining real variables of output growth and rates of 
unemplojdnent. Despite the accreditation that the EMU project has been given by many 
economists (see for example Artis and Winkler 1997), the associated rules, implied by both 
the Maastrict Treaty and the Stability pact, include a set o f restrictions upon discretionary
fiscal policy through the implementation o f maximum permitted budget deficits backed by 
the possibility of levying fines on defiant economies. The exercise o f monetary policy has 
been entrusted to an independent central bank whose sole objective is to secure stable 
prices through the use of a single economic policy instrument, a common interest rate. 
Choosing the control of inflation as the main policy objective implies that there is no room 
for an explicit employment policy. As a result, the dogmatic implementation of doctrines of 
purely monetarist nature has crippled macroeconomic policy causing countries within the 
EU to suffer prolonged periods of slow growth and high levels of unemployment (Grieve- 
Smith 1995; Michie 1995; Eisner 1995; Eichengreen 1992; Grahl 1997).
Currently, economic policy has been heavily influenced by the notion that low 
levels o f unemployment will cause inflation to accelerate, the so-called NAIRU (Friedman 
1968; Phelps 1968, 1994). In spite of being heavily criticised by even mainstream 
economists (see for example Henry, Karanassou and Snower 2000), the concept of the 
natural rate of unemployment is embraced by academics and it certainly motivates the 
conduct o f economic policy day to day throughout the capitalist world. Some even equate 
the natural rate with full employment and vigorously argue that governments should 
seriously consider factors such as the level of benefits for those who are out of work, if they 
want to reduce the actual level below it. The natural rate hypothesis has increased attention 
given to active labour market policies. The extent to which such a notion influences 
economic policy around the globe is evident in OECD’s recommendations for nations to 
make their labour markets more flexible. They even provide estimates showing that, for 
instance, the UK’s natural rate has fallen below that of other European nations as a result of
policies designed to deregulate the labour market.
According to this framework, persistence in unemployment is put down to labour 
market rigidities, which together with poor education and motivation, insufficient 
information about available vacancies to workers, are preventing the unemployed from 
getting work (Layard & Nickell, 1986; Layard & Jackman, 1991; Blanchard & Diamond 
1989; Mortensen 1986; Pissarides 1986). This policy stance is fundamentally based on the 
notion that variations in unemployment are the outcome of optimal decisions made by both 
job-seekers and job-suppliers in efficient markets. In this context, there is no room for 
active employment policy since it disrupts the functioning of the markets.
In the course o f the analysis it has emerged that an alternative body of literature 
proposes a policy prescription that revolves around the adoption of traditional Keynesian 
fiscal and monetary policies of which their effectiveness in alleviating social-economic 
problems such as unemployment was tested in the past (Arestis 1992; Arestis & Marshal 
1995; Sawyer 1992, 1995; Davidson 1998; Glyn & Rowthom 1995; Michie & Wilkinson 
1995; Eatwell 1995; Baimbridge et al. 2000). More specifically, in the 1950s, it is argued 
that the achievement o f sustained economic growth, and full employment was thought to be 
a by-product o f active Keynsian-type policies aimed at boosting the components of 
effective demand. Nonetheless, after the collapse of the economic regime established at 
Bretton Woods, the proponents of neoliberalism were swift to characterize these policies as 
ineffectual. Vigorous attempts made, predominantly, by alternative economic nexuses to 
restore, and effectively revitalize the significant role that Keynsian-type macroeconomic 
policies can play in stimulating effective demand, (and thereby, economic growth), have 
been given a cursory glance by policymakers.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 1 traces the macroeconomic 
path along which most o f the European economies have been precariously keeping their 
balance, especially since the demise of Bretton Woods. The analysis undertaken in this 
chapter explores the way capitalism has evolved into an economic system, in which 
macroeconomic policy ceases to serve as a useful tool for managing economic activity 
(Sawyer 1999; Epstein & Schor 1986; Strange 1986; Minsky 1986; Kurzer 1992; Hutton 
1995; Ingham 1984). Further, it examines the effects of high returns on financial 
investment, and speculative behaviour in the currency markets on real interest rates and 
most crucially, on economic performance. Fundamental questions regarding the extent to 
which the new fínancial environment has stifled the dynamics of productive investment as 
well as the extent to which public deficits unleash speculative runs against the currency, are 
also firmly elaborated.
The imposing fashion by which the neoliberal consensus established its authority 
over the European edifice is the subject of chapter 2. More specifically, by expanding on 
the nature of the Maastricht convergence criteria, this chapter calls into question the 
credibility of these rules in promoting conditions for full employment. Furthermore, it 
criticizes the nature of the convergence rules, in that they totally disregard the discernible 
impact of the provisions on real variables, such as employment, rates of growth, and 
balance o f payments. A preliminary econometric analysis, in conjunction with the 
exposition of the way in which, some significant macroeconomic variables behaved prior 
to, as well as after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, purports to gain further insight 
into the impact of the convergence rules on European economies. On the whole, this 
chapter provides evidence in favour of the alternative literature which questions the validity
of the convergence rules as means of promoting economic stability and most crucially, 
employment creation within the EU region.
In chapter 3, prior to embarking on the main empirical investigation, a discussion 
of the econometric methodology to be applied as well as the fundamental hypothesis to be 
tested, takes place. Through the construction of a model, heavily influenced by the post 
Keynesian tradition, the existing relationships between the prospective variables to be 
included in the regression model are illustrated. For the econometric investigation panel 
data analysis is applied to 13 EU countries for the period 1961 to 1998. In view of the 
very few econometric studies undertaken to capture the impact that macro-policy and 
distributional variables exert on European unemployment, we feel that this part
contributes to the existing literature considerably.
Chapter 4, in view of the lamentably little attention in the literature that the 
relationship between capital formation and unemployment has been given, attempts to 
throw some light on the neglected issue. Amongst the exceptions who have written on 
capital stock and employment are Bean (1989, 1994), Bean and Gavosto (1990), Carlin and 
Soskice (1990) Malinvaud (1980) Rowthom (1977, 1995) The ingrained notion that 
investment has no long-run effect on unemployment and most crucially that the problem of 
job creation is a matter of encouraging more employment on the existing capital stock has 
influenced economic policy for more than 20 years now (see for eg. Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman 1991). By focusing on the channels through which demand-side as well as supply- 
side policies impact on capital stock and through this on unemployment we argue that the 
neoliberal spirit by which macroeconomic policy has been conducted since the 1970s may
have contributed to the augmentation of the number o f people out of work. In this context, 
the application o f panel data analysis to EU countries provide evidence as well as 
contribute to the existing literature by testing the underlying hypothesis and effectively 
gauging the extent to which the emergence of the new economic orthodoxy in Europe may 
be held responsible for the dire state that European labour markets are in.
Further to the evidence generated in the preceding chapters, the need for some 
additional probing into the restrictive nature of the European economic policy, as reflected 
by the successor o f the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability Pact, is envisaged. To this effect, 
chapter 5 engages in a more comprehensive analysis as to where the rationale behind the 
introduction of such a set of stringent regulations embodied in the Stability Pact, derives 
from. In pursuing this objective, two of the most fundamental reasons: -(i) the prevention 
of interest rates spillovers that will result from irresponsible budgetary policies in the EU, 
and (ii) the significant role of national savings in conditioning investment and therefore 
economic growth - both put forward in defence of the Pact, after being vigorously debated, 
they have been put to the test. In this direction the econometric methodology adopted - a 
series of Granger causality tests, as well as a vector autoreggression (VAR) analysis both 
applied to a number of EU countries - contributes immensely to the understanding of the 
economic practices employed by the advocates of EMU to justify the introduction of a 
stringent set of rules embodied in the Stability pact and more significantly, casts some light 
on the very controversial relationship between investment and saving.
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes as well as offers some concluding thoughts and 
policy recommendations.
Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Policy in The "Leaden Age" in
Europe
1.1 Introduction
Arguably, the demise of the economic regime established at Bretton Woods ushered 
in an era of volatile economic activity and poor economic performance, namely the “leaden 
age'”. In spite of its infancy, the emerging economic system was quick to assert its 
authority by demolishing the then existing economic establishment, only to replace it with a 
system founded on ‘free-market’ economic structures.
In this chapter an exploration of the new liberal thinking will be pursued in an 
attempt to provide a more lucid idea of the policies implied by the emerging consensus as 
well as the extent to which the EU economies have been affected by the new economic 
principles. More specifically, section 1.2 very briefly exposes the key mechanism that gave 
the Bretton Woods regime the means to tackle international problems. In section 1.3, an 
elaboration on the shift in economic policy across most of EU member states after the 
collapse of Bretton Woods will provide a further understanding o f the repercussions that 
such a shift had on EU economic performance. This is further investigated in section 1.4, 
where the policy ramifications resulting from the prevalence of the neoliberal thinking in 
Europe, are assessed. More specifically, we focus on issues relating to industrial capacity
and manufacturing, the role of the financial system and that of effective demand. These 
provide the reasons why, despite its apparent failure to address the soaring problem of 
European unemployment, the emerging doctrine insists on adopting a policy mix devoid of 
any effective employment measures. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Bretton Woods and Economic Sustainability.
The golden age was a model of social market economy that focused on promoting 
co-operation both at international level between nation states and at national level between 
workers, employers, and governments^. The co-operative social and economic environment 
of the golden age, in a regulated national and international economy, provided the 
necessary long-term stability required for high rates of private investment, which in turn 
made possible high rates of productivity growth" .^ Real wages rose in step with productivity 
and the share of profits in national income remained more or less stable during this period. 
In so far as the system was working it had a strong positive feedback mechanism, 
generating high rates of growth of production, consumption and employment.
During the golden age, the problem of the balance of payments surpluses and 
deficits between nation states was indeed resolved by high rates o f growth of world 
demand, output, and employment. Eatwell (1997) argues that the Bretton Woods system 
worked not because of macroeconomic coordination but because of a framework of 
circumstances which permitted governments to pursue national macroeconomic policies 
without too much fear of international financial disruption^.
The achievement of stable exchange rates was the main concern o f the Bretton 
Woods regime. A modified gold standard formation was set up in an attempt to reduce the
deflationary pressures that had become a feature both of attempts to restore pre-war gold 
standard and the successive international crisis as it broke up during and after the 1931 
slump. To this end, the system provided that exchange rates could be changed where there 
was agreed to be a structural imbalance in a country’s balance of payments^. It also 
accepted in principle that creditor as well as debtor countries had an obligation to ensure 
the necessary adjustments. Countries faced with difficulties in the balance of payments 
could turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for some assistance. Subject to these 
provisos, however, a basic feature of this system was that demand management should be 
employed to remedy short-term imbalances. The most important achievement of the system 
was the promotion of co-operation as the means of dealing with the evolving problems of 
international payment. It was a regime in which fiscal policy tended to take precedence 
over monetary policy as the major instrument of macroeconomic policy.
The fixed exchange rate regime re-established at Bretton Woods eventually broke 
up, however, in the early 1970s when there was a general move towards sporadic floating 
rates^. Since then, the approach entailing coordination between countries to tackle 
international economic problems has given way to free market ideology.
1.3 Liberal thinking and economic performance in Europe.
A browse through history suggests that the process of liberalization of capital 
movements started with the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime and the introduction of 
flexible exchange rates in the early 1970s. Alongside it a novel term, ‘globalization’, came 
to dominate the economic environment around the world. Inevitably, a growing debate 
over the virtues of liberalization and globalization started to take up a substantial space on
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the agenda of governments in most industrial countries. The question whether liberalization 
and globalization* promote faster economic growth, both in rich and poor countries has 
undoubtedly been in the forefront of the debate.
The notion that countries should reduce the role of the state and enhance that of the 
market has been one of the most distinctive features o f the new economic establishment^. 
Such a belief, for instance, can be detected in Mr. Lawson’s*® lecture in June 1984 where 
he expressed his belief in several of the basic tenets of monetarism. In particular, he 
emphatically stated that government measures to reduce unemployment should steer clear 
of demand management and concentrate instead on measures to promote price flexibility 
and the functioning of the markets. Moreover, it is often suggested that open trade leads to 
convergent rates o f economic growth and that open economies successfully avoid balance 
of payments crisis* *.
The authoritarian way by which the neoliberal school o f thought commenced its 
campaign for a free market orientated economy was seen as a major threat to the welfare of 
the European economies per se. Among a number of scholars who did not subscribe to the 
neoliberal dogma, Ajit Singh(1997) maintains that “it is not that liberalization and 
globalization promote economic growth, but rather faster growth of production and 
employment are essential for sustaining the new liberal economic order’’(p. 13). In addition, 
he observes that liberalization and globalization are to be held responsible for the slowing 
down of economic growth in developing countries. Deregulation of domestic financial 
markets might be another key factor that contributed to the establishing of this new state of 
affairs*^ The flirtation with monetarism in the 1980s has given rise to a new orthodoxy 
supported by a number of finance ministers and bankers throughout Europe. The essential
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features of the new monetarism can be summarized as follows: the state should be deprived 
of the responsibility for formulating*^ economic policy; inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon and can be controlled through monetary policy; interest rates should be used 
to control inflation, preferably by an independent bank; the focus of the government should 
be on how to balance the budget rather than to influence demand; the level of 
unemployment fluctuates around a supply determined equilibrium (NAIRU); it is the 
imperfections in the labour market that have to be dealt with, if unemployment is to be 
reduced. In achieving macroeconomic equilibrium, contemporary orthodoxy regards the 
fight against inflation as the key objective of economic policy. In this context, public deficit 
and national debt have been branded as inflationary which have to be reduced promptly.
Table 1. Gross Government Debt (growth rates).
COUNTRIES 1961-72 1973-78 1979-91 1992-98
Germany 9.1 16.4 10.0 10.5
France N/A 17.8 11.6 10.4
Italy 15.4 25.6 19.5 6.9
Netherlands 6.7 9.9 9.9 3.1
Belgium 8.7 12.7 12.2 3.3
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A N/A
U.K 5.4 14.0 7.2 11.3
Ireland N/A 27.7 15.2 2.8
Denmark N/A N/A 12.6 4.1
Spain N/A 28.5 25.3 11.6
Greece 20.2 26.4 34.4 13.9
Portugal 9.6 37.2 30.6 6.1
Sweden 9.1 14.9 14.6 9.3
Finland 9.2 18.4 15.9 19.1
Austria 7.3 23.0 11.2 7.6
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
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Chart (a). Gross Government Debt.
1961-1972 1973-78 1979-1991 1992-1998
Chart (b). Gross Government Debt.
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Table 1 in conjunction with charts (a), and (b), shows the pattern as well as the path 
that the growth rate of government debt within the EU region has followed. More
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specifically, the upward trend that the growth rate of government debt exhibited over the 
first two periods, reflects the expansionary nature of economic policies adopted by the 
majority of EU member states. Over the two remaining periods the picture changes 
dramatically. The chief reason for such a shift could be attributed to the introduction of 
restrictive policies aimed predominantly at reducing budget deficits through public 
spending cuts. As we can observe, such cutbacks in spending are more pronounced in the 
relatively less developed economies (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
The new orthodoxy was embraced by those who wanted to restrict the role of the 
state, and its consolidation in the economic spectrum was only a matter of time. As a 
result, a new consensus was established throughout the European countries. Placing 
reliance on interest rates as means of conducting macroeconomic policy has become 
common practice in a number of countries in Europe. The stock of money is seen as 
exogenous to the private sector but subject to change by the authorities or the supply of
m oney 'being  manipulated by interest rates. International pressure‘s to increase'”, rather 
than to lower, rates comes from every direction (Homer & Sylla 1983). Furthermore, the 
globalization of financial markets has given monetary policy a consistently deflationary
15 .16
bias.
The 1980s and 1990s have been marked not only by slower economic growth but by
a much more unstable growth. Advances in technology, rather than the current economic 
regime, are believed to be held responsible for the poor economic performance in recent 
years'^. The view that the pace of technological progress is a major threat to job creation 
has been paramount in a number of studies across the globe. However, emerging evidence 
for industrial countries refutes such contentions. As Boltho and Glyn (1995) stress, the
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reason for much higher unemployment in the post-1980s period is not ‘jobless growth’, but 
rather a much slower rate of economic growth. Furthermore, in so far as technological 
changes take place, productivity picks up as the new techniques reduce the labour input 
required per unit output**.
Leading academics of the subject such as Professor Freeman (1989) suggests that 
the rapid advances in information and communication technology in fact constitute a new 
technological paradigm. This is not only because these innovations have led to the 
introduction of new products, but, more importantly, because they have the potential of 
reducing costs o f production and raising productivity in most existing industries. Therefore 
these technological changes are regarded as constituting a far-reaching technical revolution. 
Thus, as far as ‘the supply side’ is concerned, the new information technology ‘provides’ an 
enormous potential for increasing production*’. However, the slow rate o f growth of real 
demand and output over the last fifteen years has caused this potential not to be realized.
1.4 The failure of monetarism and its impact on employment.
The most conspicuous failure of the liberal economy in the recent decades has been
f^\
with respect to employment . Monetarist and free-market thinking was established as the 
predominant economic consensus and in effect begun to dominate economic policy within 
the Euroland. The notion that inflation could be avoided by controlling the money supply 
was not a sufficient answer to the soaring problem of unemployment. In addition, 
deregulation o f labour markets added to, rather than mitigated, the problem.
After enjoying more or less full employment during the 1950s and 1960s, leading 
European countries were faced with the spectre of mass unemployment in the 1980s and
15
1990s. Table 1.1 and chart (c) demonstrate the extent to which the unemployment rate in 
European countries has increased from a little over 3 per cent in the 1960s to nearly 10 per 
cent in the 1990s.
Table 2 Standardized unemployment rates, 1964-1998 (average annual % changes)
1964-73 1974-79 1980-89 1990-98
Germany 1.1 3.2 5.9 4.9
UK 3.0 5.0 10.0 9.1
Total G7 3.1 5.0 6.8 6.4
Total EU 15 2.7 4.7 9.3 9.2
Source: OECD (1995). Historical Statistics (Paris).
Chart ( c ). Standardized Unemployment Rates.
1964-1973 1974-1979 1980-1989 1990-1998
It is interesting to note that even at times when inflation was brought under control 
the problem of unemployment was still there, gathering momentum. Grieve-Smith (1992)
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ascribes the latter firstly, to the fact that political attitudes had become more tolerant than to 
unemployment and secondly, to the irreversibility of rising unemployment when on the 
ascent. Moreover, high unemployment does not necessarily lead to government losing 
elections^*. In 1974, Kalecki warned that, “The assumption that a government will 
maintain full employment in a capitalist economy, if it only knows how to do it, is 
fallacious.”
An upward trend in involuntary unemployment and lower effective demand was a 
prevalent feature of the 1980s. Structural changes in international financial relationships 
and their consequent impact on the structure of domestic macroeconomic policies share the 
blame for the slowdown in the growth of demand . The ensuing deep depression m the 
early 1980s reduced investment in productive industries and impeded its recovery by 
dampening expectations. The ability o f the economy to generate full-employment effective 
demand was further weakened by a redistribution of income from the poor, most of whose 
income is consumed, to the rich who save a high proportion of their income and who have a 
relatively high import propensity^^.
Abundant undervalued labour '^* has allowed firms to compensate for organizational 
and managerial inadequacies, delay the scrapping o f obsolete capital equipment, and 
engage in destructive price competition. Tarling and Wilkinson (1997), and Grieve-Smith 
(1992) point out that the absence o f wage discipline means that technologically and 
managerially backward firms can survive, and this helps prevent more progressive firms 
from expanding their share of the market. As a result, the average level of productivity 
drops and a slower rate of introduction and diffusion o f new techniques and products 
occurs.
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Inequality^^ and poverty have detrimental effects on the balance of payments 
constraint, since resources are transferred to those with a higher propensity to import 
(Borooah, 1988). It is well-known that a great deal of the share of the income of the 
working poor is met not by the employers but by the govemment^^. As a result, there is a 
considerable increase in the burden on public expenditure. Growing poverty and cutbacks 
in welfare^^ provisions have aggravated social trends towards, for example, more single­
parent families, and have increased the incidence of destitution in such households. 
Moreover, emerging evidence o f a strong relationship between unemployment (poverty, 
social exclusion) and rising crime , (declining physical and psychological health ), 
suggests that the more the problem of unemployment remains untreated the more 
detrimental to members of society it becomes.
1.4.1 Financial system and industry: A lesson still to be learnt.
The collapse of Bretton Woods laid the foundations for a financial system that was 
left to its own devices; a system under which exchange as well as credit controls were 
abolished, and restrictions on cross market access for financial institutions were scrapped^®. 
Short-term interest rates provided the platform on which monetary policy was conducted 
and monetarism was established as the predominant doctrine.
Governments nowadays tailor policies to suit the interests of the financial sector. A 
credible government is one that pursues ‘market friendly’ policies, policies in accordance 
with what markets perceive as ‘sound’. Any divergence from monetary targets has to be 
met with harsh financial costs, which in turn will result in a major financial crisis. In other
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words, what actually determines the credibility of a government is the way that the 
speculative markets work.
In the 1960s, the way in which the international framework was managed 
encouraged the implementation of expansionary full employment policies as well as the 
adoption o f measures to boost investment. Conversely, in the 1980s full employment 
policies gave way to policies favouring deregulation^' and financial stability, which has led 
to investment being choked off by sky-high interest rates^^.
The notion that an economy’s level o f saving can have a profound impact on the 
pursuit of full employment, dominated economic analysis during the 1930s. The 
emergence o f Keynes’s ‘General Theory’ put an end to such claims, by setting in its place 
the argument, as Joan Robinson put it that ‘firms are free, within wide limits, to accumulate 
as they please, and the rate of saving of the economy as a whole accommodates itself to the 
rate of investment that they decree’ (1962, pp.82-3).
According to the Keynesian doctrine, stimulating investment, rather than seeking to 
increase the available pool of saving, is conducive to raising the level o f output and 
employment. Even when policy focuses on financial markets and practices, the primary 
concern is not on saving behaviour , but rather on encouraging the channeling of funds 
towards productive activity and away from speculation (Pollin 1996).
The role of the financial system in any national economy is to “transform savings 
and investment and to allocate those funds among competitive users’’(Zysman 1983; 57). It 
is important that the relationship between the financial institutions and industry is such that 
both contribute to rebuilding industrial capacity and to creating full employment. The 
savings that the financial system generates should be allocated to companies on favourable
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terms to enable them to engage in investment activities. Capacity cannot expand nor output 
increase unless the latter argument holds. The European experience suggests that the 
conditions upon which the financial institutions have made capital available to industry 
over the years have been rather punitive^^. As a result, companies are faced with one of the 
highest costs of capital in the world '^ .^
Immediate profitability is the key word that provides the impetus for the financial 
system to pursue its objectives'^. “The privatization of risk imposed substantial strains on 
the domestic and international system. The need to absorb and cover foreign exchange risk 
demanded the creation o f new financial instruments, which in turn required the removal of 
many of the regulatory barriers which limited the possibilities o f laying off risk, and a 
restructuring of financial institutions.”(Eatwell 1995, p. 278).
The instability in interest rates observed in domestic money markets has a negative 
effect on policy. More specifically, it jeopardizes any future co-operation between 
countries to fight unemployment as, with exchange rates fluctuating, the distribution of the 
gains of such a concerted strategy is highly uncertain. Nowadays, there is much less 
economic co-operation^^ between leading industrial countries. As a result, the financial 
markets have come to dominate. Moreover, the deflationary policies that these markets 
favour has caused the European economy to contract. Far more weight has been given to 
the perceived dangers of inflation^^ than to the need to obtain full utilization of resources. 
Even when the financial markets have sometimes been expansionary^*, their bandwagon 
and herd characteristics generate considerable instability for the real economy. According 
to Ajit Singh (1997) unrestricted^^ capital movements provide enormous scope for
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destabilizing speculation, which in turn leads to high volatility o f both monetary and real 
variables.
Investment is inclined to be affected by fluctuations o f financial variables. In 
particular, investment is discouraged directly by the rising cost o f capital, which is in part 
caused by volatility in financial variables. In addition, the overall uncertainty that 
increasingly characterizes the economic environment and the greater fluctuations in the
components of final demand, have a negative effect on the corporate inducement to
invest40
As Stiglitz (1994) has noted, unregulated financial markets are particularly prone to 
problems o f co-ordination failure. Liberalized global financial markets have injured the 
economy in a number of interrelated ways. Moreover, the speed at which international 
financial transactions have grown is rather alarming'**. Zysman (1983) maintained that a 
‘capital-market’ dominated market system, similar to that of Great Britain, in which 
‘financial institutions tend to manage portfolios of stocks, spreading their risks across 
companies that they nurture through hard times’ (p.63). Substantial evidence points 
towards a short-term focus on dividends and capital returns rather than on investment plans 
that will bear fhiit in the long run'*^ .
Despite the continual endeavour o f the state to promote economic growth by using 
various policies, its attempt to reform and come up with an effective industrial policy has 
been subverted by the fact that the state ‘has never controlled the channels o f borrowing 
and lending that would facilitate the selective manipulation of credit allocation by the state’ 
(Zysman'*^ 1983: 197).
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Minsky'^ (1986) argues that, when an economy shows signs of recovery and full 
employment, ‘euphoric expectations’ take hold. It is then that the financial structure 
becomes increasingly fragile, as the growth rate of debt exceeds that o f profits - for a given 
distribution of income between wages and profits, profit opportunities are constrained by 
the growth o f productivity - whereas the extension of credit is not so constrained. An 
economy dominated by free capital markets, where government intervention is non­
existent, is characterized by speculative^^ financial behaviour. Once the cycle has peaked, 
debt deflation and depression set in, which in turn create the condition for a return to 
financial robustness and recovery"^ .^
Hutton (1995) contends that the fundamental weakness of the British system is the 
fact that high cost o f capital and fears of inadequate return in the UK have acted as the 
most effective deterrent to long-term industrial investment. Ingham (1984) posits that the 
City’s commercial interests revolve around the “short term gains to be made in the trading 
of productive assets -  in particular through take-overs and mergers -  and not in the long 
term profitability of those units of industrial capital whose shares are bought and sold"^ ’^’
(pp. 62).
1.4.2 Effective demand: A key factor to redressing the balance.
Since 1960, European Union employment has increased by only 10 per cent, as 
opposed to an 80 per cent and 40 per cent increase in North America and Japan 
respectively. Evidently, the high rates of labour-force growth in North America and Japan 
have been matched by high rates of job creation. Of course, comparing rates of job creation 
does not mean much, as it would have been impossible for the European Union to create as
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many jobs as North America, simply because the European rate o f population growth was 
so much lower. The fundamental question is not why European job creation has been low 
in absolute terms, but why job creation in Europe did not keep pace with its rate of 
population growth.
There are, o f course, a wide variety of factors that may affect these trends, including 
the age structure of the population, government employment schemes, ‘labour-hoarding’, 
and employment in the ‘black economy’. Eatwell (1995) argued, that whilst these effects 
may have some influence, the most important determinant of the common experience of 
growing unemployment has been the slow-down in the growth o f aggregate demand in the 
1980s throughout the G7'‘®. Moreover, he highlights the importance of labour-market 
policies by stating that “it is the impact of labour-market policies which determine whether 
there is any employment in excess if that which might be expected from the growth of 
effective demand’’(Eatwell 1997: p.78 ).
During the ‘Great Depression’ government intervention was a key element in the 
fight against unemployment. In the post-war era, the promotion of full employment was 
seen as an incessant endeavour to implement macroeconomic policies designed to manage 
aggregate demand. It is common knowledge in the circles of economists that Keynes'*^ and 
Kalecki^® independently came up with the principle of effective demand. Their discovery^' 
was based on the notion that the economy would not necessarily generate full employment 
of all resources. According to their theory, the reason for this was not some market 
imperfection, such as rigidity of prices or wages, but rather, insufficient effective demand. 
In other words, in capitalist economies, there is not market mechanism that could guarantee
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full employment. Full employment is not feasible, unless some exogenous injection of 
demand is provided.
Unlike the labour-market flexibility approach, the demand growth strategy is a 
positive-sum game which benefits the rich as well as the poor countries. Thus, full 
employment in OECD countries and faster economic growth will help developing countries 
in several ways. Specifically, poor countries will gain from an acceleration in OECD 
growth through much the same channels by which they were disadvantaged by slower 
economic growth in industrial countries after the golden age. Faster OECD growth will 
have a positive effect on the demand for products of poor countries as well as on the terms 
of trade. It may also result in greater capital flows, both private and public from the rich to 
the poor countries. Other things being equal, all this should lead to faster growth of output 
and employment in developing economies.
The industrial world is faced with the problem of the creation of sufficient jobs with 
rising real wages. Solutions to the problem can be envisaged only if there is a sustained 
trend increase in the rate of growth of output and productivity^^ in these economies^^. The 
main concern is how to bring about a sustained rise in the rate o f growth o f real aggregate 
demand without risking unacceptable inflation.
Currently, policies to fight unemployment that favour labour-market flexibility 
seem to be the reason behind the dismal failure of the economy to deliver. The intellectual 
basis o f this approach is rooted in the concept of NAIRU^^. The main cause of 
unemployment in terms of this theory lies in rigidities in the labour market and the 
provisions o f the welfare state, which make it unattractive for people to seek work. (Layard 
& Nickell, 1986; Layard, 1991).^^ Hence increasing market flexibility can be achieved
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through means such as deregulation, reduction of trade-union power, and the pruning^^ of 
the welfare state. In addition the whole concept o f the NAIRU, which can be detected in the 
works o f Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1968), encouraged the idea that 
policy should be directed to establishing a minimum level of unemployment so that 
inflation^^ remains unchanged - in other words, forget about the achievement o f full 
employment.
Recent OECD analyses of changes in structural unemployment in the 1990s draw 
attention to the implausibility of the rigidities story explanation. As Table 1 (see Appendix) 
demonstrates, according to the OECD, the non-accelerating-inflation-rate o f unemployment 
(NAIRU) rose in most European countries in the 1990s. In some instances, the increases 
were large. Between 1990 and 1997, the estimated NAIRU, for example, increased 5.8 
percentage points in Finland, 3.5 percentage points in Sweden, and 2.7 percentage points in 
Germany (OECD 1998, p. 9).) Yet, by the OECD’s own assessment (OECD 1998), the 
1990s were a period during which nearly all European nations reduced labor market 
rigidities. As labor market rigidities have not increased during the 1990s, they cannot 
possibly explain the dramatic increases in unemployment over the last decade.
As Ajit Singh (1997) claims, the facts concerning inter-temporal variations in 
unemployment rates and real wages in industrial countries are much more easily explained 
by variations in the rate of growth of real demand^* rather than by the NAIRU^’ approach. 
Drawing on the latter, Galbraith (1997) believes that “the case for basing anti-inflationary
policy primarily around the rate of unemployment was never persuasive........... One need
not object to the NAIRU as a purely mathematical construct. After all, a steady inflation 
unemployment rate is merely an implication of models specified in a certain way” (p.l06).
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An alternative view, conceptualized by Keynes, is that a firm will expand its output 
only if  it can be sure that it will be able to sell it. Keynes tried to conceptualise the involved 
uncertainty that money conveyed, by relating the demand for money as a store o f value to 
uncertainty about future and showed how these features of the world in which we live 
affect investment, which is therefore subject to fluctuations: “It is not surprising that the 
volume of investment, thus determined, should fluctuate widely from time to time. For it 
depends on two sets of judgements about the future, neither of which rests on an adequate 
or secure foundation - on the propensity to hoard and on opinions of the future yield of 
capital assets” (C.W. XIV: 118).
The fact that capitalists engage in production activity in order to make profits, 
constitutes a fundamental reason why entrepreneurs can decide to keep money idle and the 
economy can experience unemployment^. The system’s degree o f liquidity preference is 
ostensibly, immediately, and directly related to entrepreneurs’ expectation of profit, which
is the driving force in a capitalist economy.
Employment will expand only if there is an increase in real demand^’ and output, 
not just because there is a cut in wages^^. In the same line of argument, a reduction in 
wages^^ in a closed economy could, in principle, reduce real aggregate demand through its 
adverse effects on business expectations and investment; hence the overall consequence
may be a fall rather than a rise in employment^.
It is lack o f demand rather than the need to cut the price of labour that inhibits the 
growth of output and employment. By lowering wages, purchasing power and costs are 
reduced at the same rate. Thus, it leaves unemployment intact. However, what is true 
about keeping real wages down is the fact that we can improve our competitive position
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and thus increase, for example, UK employment (at the expense o f others). Grieve-Smith 
(1996), as well as Grahl (1997), argue that practices o f the kind should focus on exchange 
rate policy rather than pay-bargaining one^^.
1.4.3 Manufacturing. Is there still hope?
In Europe, manufacturing employment has been dwindling alarmingly^. More 
specifically, over the period 1976-86 the decline in manufacturing employment in EC 
accounts for a fall o f almost 5.5 million jobs. The promotion o f free-market orientation 
policies by European governments has taken its toll. Currently, attempts to restore 
competitiveness through product and labour deregulation have exacerbated the problem. 
Policies targeting the expansion of demand for manufacturers as well as industrial policies 
to improve competitiveness are conspicuous by their absence. Under-investment in 
manufacturing is a potential reason behind the rise in unemployment. Such a process of 
deindustrialization^^ could have detrimental effects on the entire European economic life 
leading to additional hardships for its population.
In the UK, the fact that 1980s growth was skewed towards services, particularly 
financial services, raises the question of whether manufacturing matters after all. For Kitson 
and Michie (1996) the answer is ‘yes, it does matter’. Their affirmative answer is based on 
the notion that the UK economy requires a large and competitive manufacturing sector in 
order to generate sufficient exports to pay for necessary imports. Moreover, both healthy 
manufacturing and reliable services are conducive to economic prosperity.
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It is interesting to note that the decline in manufacturing, and particularly 
manufacturing employment, and the corresponding relative growth of services, is a 
predominant feature in both slow - and fast - growing countries (see Petit 1986).
Trying to establish the causes o f this rapid decline in manufacturing employment, a 
number of studies, including those by Fuchs (1968), Baumol (1967), Saxenhouse (1985) 
and Summers (1985), arrived at the conclusion that productivity^^ differences are the main 
source of the decline in manufacturing employment, although others, such as Marquand 
(1979), dispute that services have lower productivity^’. Furthermore, the relative decline in 
manufacturing and the relative growth of services stems from the changing structure of 
demand as income increases^®. Another explanation for the relative decline^' in 
manufacturing is the changing source of service provision^^, with activities that were 
previously undertaken by firms increasingly being contracted out.
Although Kaldor (1972) retracted a previously held view that employment in 
services may restrict the labour supply for manufacturing^^ in favour o f a demand 
constraint one, he retained the idea that services were not as dynamic as manufacturing^"*. 
This was rooted in the views of Lewis (1954), Cornwall (1977), and others, that 
‘manufacturing is an engine of growth’.
The extension of the market for manufactured products would lead through the 
benefits o f economies of scale to increased competitive advantage and hence to increased 
economic growth. This will have a positive effect on the expansion of the service sector, in 
terms o f both output and employment. Nonetheless, should full employment be attained, 
there must be sufficient demand for manufactured products.
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A more comprehensive analysis of the channels through which employment in 
manufacturing has been affected will be conducted the following chapters.
1.5 Concluding remarks.
Economies throughout Europe have failed to deliver the prosperous economic future 
that the architects o f the current economic systems had initially pledged to deliver. After 
the fixed exchange rate mechanism, established at Bretton Woods, had broken down, the 
world economy reverted to the prewar state o f chronic mass unemployment. The 
prevalence of monetarist and free-market thinking among the political leadership of the 
industrial nations effectively ruled out any major structural reforms in the management of 
the world economy. Indulging in neoliberal-type policies to expand productive capacity and 
stir the economy towards recovery has been once again an elusive objective.
Over the past two decades the commitment to full employment has been abandoned 
and mass unemployment has manifested itself as being an integral part o f the capitalist 
world. The adoption of tighter fiscal and monetary policies to combat inflation caused 
unemployment to reach unprecedented levels, which in turn has caused a number of social 
problems such as the growth of poverty, homelessness to grow at a prodigious rate. As a 
result, Europe’s economic and political stability has been under threat.
In the 1990s, the ‘globalization o f finance’ started pushing its roots even deeper into 
the economic world. Maintaining sound finance was the main preoccupation of many 
governments around the globe. The only way to achieve such an objective was through the 
implementation of deflationary policies, of which the economic repercussions have been 
acute.
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In Europe, industrial competitiveness has been sacrificed to inappropriate or 
inflexible exchange rate policies. In the 1980s, when demand was well below full 
employment levels, capacity throughout the EU was eroded by closures and inhibitions on 
investment in additional capacity. NAIRU^^, the idea of an inverse^^ causal relationship 
between levels of unemployment and price inflation, is now so firmly entrenched that 
central bankers look with deep suspicion at any downward movement of unemployment, 
from any level, as signaling potential inflation and the need to increase interest rates.
In short, it has become rather apparent that the austere economic conditions 
experienced by the EU population over the last decades has been the result of tight 
economic policies implemented by the proponents of the free-market orthodoxy. Pursuing 
an alternative agenda, in which demand side policies topped the priorities, might be a 
policy option whose fruits are waiting to be reaped.
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Notes:
* The term “leaden age”, which has been borrowed from Pollin (1997-1998), essentially, 
signifies the poor economic performance and financial instability that has permeated the 
capitalist economies for the past three decades.
In this context unemployment is perceived as the efficient outcome of market activity. 
Unemployment is at its natural rate when people’s expectations about wages and prices are 
correct. It is only when people’s expectations about wage and price movements are 
incorrect that unemployment deviates from its natural rate (for a more comprehensive 
^a lysis  see Lucas (1972,1975); Phelps, (1994); Friedman (1968)).
This new co-operative model arose partly out of the punitive experience of the Great 
Depression. It also owed a great deal to the particular historical conjuncture which 
prevailed at the end of World War II in Europe, which involved a tension between the 
liberal economic order represented by the USA and the controlled planned economy 
represented by the Soviet Union.(See further Singh 1995b).
Internally, the long period of full employment increased the power of workers and their 
successfrl wage demands undermined the social compromise with employers. Similarly, 
international co-ordination became much more difficult with the relative economic decline 
over time o f the USA. The continuation of the golden age would have required institutional 
reforms to address those difficulties. However, after the second oil shock of the late 1970s, 
instead of seeking such renewal of the golden age model, the governments of industrial 
countries led by the USA and the UK turned decisively towards the alternative model of 
market supremacy and o f external and internal liberalization and globalization.
As it finally emerged, the Bretton Woods agreements, still had a deflationary bias. 
However, because of the activities o f the USA government, this bias did not turn out to be a 
problem during the golden age. The USA provided adequate liquidity to the international 
economy to permit high rates of growth of world demand and output. This was done in the 
early post-war years through the Marshall Plan and subsequently through American 
m i l i t ^  expenditures and foreign investment abroad. The latter policies, however, 
contributed to the persistent US balance of payments deficits in the 1960s, which ultimately 
led to the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 with the ending of the gold 
convertibility by the USA government.
However, the Bretton Woods regime did not eliminate foreign exchange crises. 
Speculation against currencies expected to devalue were still present; as well as 
deflationary policies prescribed, by the IMF, for countries in difficulties.
For Grieve-Smith (1997), the break up of the Bretton Woods regime was a consequence 
o f firstly, the lack o f intergovernmental consensus on changes in the exchange rates when 
the existing structure is no longer appropriate and secondly, the growing importance of 
capital movements in affecting exchange rates. Moreover, Grahl (1997) perceives, firstly 
the position o f the US as the centre o f the system and secondly the increasing constraints on
national policy as two major forces which subverted the arrangements established at 
Bretton Woods.
* Braunstein and Epstein (1999) invoke Milberg’s (1998)defmition o f ‘globalization’ -  
globalization is the deepening of international economic relations -  to argue that it is 
erroneous to see “globalization as synonymous with marketization and economic
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liberalization. Economic liberalization is one form globalization can take, and indeed, that 
is precisely its form in the current era -  globalization is occurring in a neoliberal regime” 
(p .ll5).
 ^Free and flexible internal and external markets for goods, services and capital are thought 
to be the best vehicles for achieving an efficient allocation of resources, promoting 
competitiveness and technical progress, and hence economic growth. The role of the state 
in this analysis is confined to providing a stable macroeconomic environment and creating 
conditions for private enterprise and competitive markets to operate effectively.
The British chancellor of the exchequer at the time.
See World Bank (1991). For a critical analysis o f the World Bank see for example Singh 
(1994,1995a) and Fishlow (1994).
By 1980, leading industrial countries had abolished all exchange controls and there was a 
more or less free movement of capital between them. Although liberalization has not 
encompassed free international movement of labour, it is significant that there has been 
considerable deregulation of the domestic labour markets in many industrial countries in 
the 1980s. This has involved reductions in welfare entitlements, diminution of trade union 
rights, de-indexation of wages, etc. Again, the speed and degree of labour market 
deregulation has varied between industrial countries.
The rationale behind this belief lies in the notion that governments tend to foster policies 
that have stimulating short-term effects.
Arestis, McCauley & Sawyer (1999) argue that the notion of using interest rates to 
manipulate the supply o f money may be flawed. In particular they sustain that banks can 
play a significant role in affecting the supply of money. The most obvious route that money 
enters the system is through its creation by banks as a response to demand for loans (credit) 
by the private sector.
A case in point is when UK was in the ERM.
Sawyer (1999) argues that “these high interest rates can be seen to have resulted from the 
general pursuit of tight monetary policies in a context o f at least quasi-independent interest 
rate determination where relative interest rates (between countries) have an impact on the 
pattern of exchange rates” (p.2)
 ^Although the average rate of economic growth has halved in the recent period compared 
with the golden age, productivity growth in this period has fallen even more sharply. As a 
consequence, the employment elasticity of growth has risen, not fallen, i.e. a 1 per cent 
increase in GDP growth leads to a greater increase in employment now than during the 
1960s (Boltho and Glyn 1995).
1 R Since average productivity has fallen, rather than risen, the pace of achieved technical 
progress has been slower rather than faster than before.
 ^Freeman et al. (1995) show that those countries in East Asia that have grown very fast in 
the recent period are the only ones which have been able to use the new technology at all 
effectively.
' i n There is however a silver lining in the economic record recently. Despite the 
acceleration of inflation in the 1970s, triggered by the first oil shock, the inflation rate in 
industrial countries is now as low as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. The economic policies
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of 1980s and 1990s can be credited with containing price increases and bringing inflation 
down to its golden age levels.
One reason for this must be that while initially increases in unemployment may be spread 
fairly widely across the community, eventually they become concentrated on the most 
disadvantaged and least vocal sections of society. Higher unemployment remained 
acceptable to what J.K. Galbraith has called ‘the ‘Contented Majority’, at least until they 
become a prey to general and pervasive insecurity.
Of course this slow-down in the growth of demand has also been attributed to a number 
of other factors such as the growing profit squeeze at the end of 1960s, the impact on the 
growth of demand o f the rise in raw material prices, etc. A more comprehensive analysis 
can be found in ‘The rise and Fall of the Golden Age’ in S.Marglin and J.Schor (eds.). The 
Golden Age Of Capitalism; Reinterpreting the Post-war Experience.
An extensive analysis of how aggregate demand is adversely affected by shifts in the 
distribution of income can be found in Kalecki (1942) -  Kaldor (1955/56).
"^^ The growing availability of undervalued labour and high unemployment create the 
environment in which entrepreneurship takes the form of cutting pay, worsening the 
employment conditions, and the exploitation of low-paid labour. This can be expected to 
crowd out the ‘high road’ to competitiveness requiring product and process innovation and 
a highly skilled, well motivated and co-operative work-force. The earliest analysis of the 
role o f unemployment as a tool to discipline workers and in effect reduce their power can 
be found in Marx’s notion of the reserve army o f labour. The surplus of unemployed 
workers served the ftmction of holding down wages.
Emerging evidence suggests that the gap between the less well off and the most 
prosperous has widened (Symes 1997, Fagerberg and Vespagen 1996).
Astonishingly enough, while nations and their politicians seem to feel sorry about 
unemployment, and proclaim themselves passionately mobilized against it, economic 
organizations such as the OECD responsible for promoting economic growth and economic 
stability publish reports claiming that "to obtain a given adjustment of labour costs, a higher 
level of conjectural unemployment will be necessary"(OECD, Jobs Study, Paris, June 
1994).
At this point it is worth noting the vigor with which economic organizations such as the 
World Bank pursue policies that aim at reducing the period of the benefit payments: "...the 
eagerness of the workforce to accept low-paid jobs depends partly on the relative 
generosity of unemployment benefits. All countries should reduce the period of benefit 
payments when it is too long, or tighten up the conditions which benefit is granted (World 
Bank, World Department Report: Workers in an Integrating World; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). Moreover, in the same line o f argument Gary Becker, winner of 
the Nobel Prize for Economics, deplores the generous nature of the welfare benefits 
disbursed by certain European governments, which like France have extravagantly raised 
the minimum wage of 37 francs {=£3.70}. For more on the generosity of unemployment 
benefits see also Snower (1997).
Abel and Bemanke (1998) found that an increase in unemployment of 1 percentage point 
that lasts for 6 years is correlated with 3,300 new prison inmates. For more on the 
relationship between unemployment and crime see also Freeman (1996). Phelps (1985)
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attributes such a rise in criminal activity, especially in the USA, to the short period that an 
unemployed person is entitled to unemployment benefit. However he is swift to criticize the 
unacceptably lengthy periods for which a European citizen can claim unemployment 
benefit.
Abel and Bemanke (1998) found that an increase in unemployment of 1 percentage point 
that lasts for 6 years is correlated with 20,000 more deaths from heart disease, 4,000 new 
admissions to mental hospitals, 920 suicides and 650 homicides.
Felix (1997-8) posits that international capital mobility is incompatible with full 
employment and economic growth.
Coackley & Harris (1992) argue that deregulation in financial markets laid the 
foundations for Thatcher’s economic policy. A policy that sought to promote international 
competitiveness of the City, and to boost its profitability against other financial centres, so 
as to enable it to take the lead in a financial world that was fast changing under the impact 
of internationalisation.
“Since modem capital markets came into existence, there have been such high long-term 
interest rates as we recently have had all over the world” (Homer & Sylla 1983, p.4).
However, this is not the case for Germany.
This is directly attributable to the domination of the UK’s financial system by the 
interests o f the City of London which allocates finance on the basis o f prices established in 
competitive capital markets, dominated by the desire for liquidity, that is, “the ability to be 
able to reverse a lending or investment decision, and return to the status quo ante o f holding 
cash” (Hutton 1995, p.l32).
Such behaviour has affected a great deal the FOREX markets. It is estimates that before 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime about 90 per cent o f all foreign exchange 
transactions targeted trade and long-term investment. The picture nowadays has a totally 
different composition. In particular, more than 90 per cent of the financial transactions are 
speculative. Such a shift in the financial mood is bound up with the abandonment of fixed 
exchange rates. A fixed exchange rate regime such as Bretton Woods provided a 
remarkable stability.
There is still the IMF, but its role has long been restricted to monitoring and disciplining 
the Third World. Leading industrial countries, which have effectively been outside the 
IMF disciplines, only occasionally and episodically co-operate on an ad hoc basis.
Eatwell (1995) outlines the process by which such market psychology becomes 
predominant. This is of course the Keynesian view of price formation on the foreign- 
exchange market.
For a more detailed approach see Rodrik (1994) and Krugman (1995).
Arguably, the economic crisis experienced by the East and South East Asian countries 
(July 1997-February 1998), is ascribed to the liberalization of the global financial markets, 
and particularly to the deregulation of the capital account which many Asian countries had 
undertaken previously. For more on the possible causes o f the Asian crisis see Krugman 
(1998); IMF (1997); Stiglitz (1998a); Palley (1999).
Despite the rise in profits in the 1980s and booming stock markets, the trend rate of 
growth of investment in industrial countries since 1980 has been about half of what it was
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in the golden age. The fluctuations in interest and foreign exchange rates are by themselves 
likely to have been signiflcant in this outcome.
According to Felix (1997-8), 'international flnancial transactions have grown thirty times 
as fast as the growth in international trade' (Davidson, 1998. p.819). According to Michie 
(1999) the effect of the growth of speculative capital movements on exchange rates has 
been disastrous to global economies. The introduction of measures, such as a Tobin tax or 
other forms of financial regulation, are therefore needed to redress the balance.(Arestis and 
Sawyer (1997).
A ^
Such an institutional arrangement contrasts sharply with the ‘credit market’ - based 
systems which had prevailed in Japan, France, and Germany prior to the 1980s wave of 
financial innovation and deregulation. In these systems, financial firms interacted closely 
with non-fmancial firms and the state in forging commitments to long-term investment 
projects.
 ^ Zysman’s analysis is founded upon the identification o f three distinct types of financial 
systems, namely a system based on capital markets with resources allocated by prices 
established in competitive markets, a credit based system with prices administered by 
government, and a credit-based system dominated by financial institutions (1983: 55).
 ^ According to Minsky & Whelan (1996-97) “stable exchange rates; an accommodative 
mono-reserve set-up; and an international lender of last resort”, are conducive to a healthy 
financial system (p .l6 6 ).
As Forrester (1999) points out, "derivatives, which are now invading the economy,
reduce it to casino games or bookmakers' practices........... Now this new form of economy
no longer invests: it bets" (p.80).
Minsky’s position is perfectly consistent with that of Schumpeter and Marx; depressions 
are functional: they are a destructive but necessary mechanism -  the ‘slaughtering of capital 
values’ as Marx put it -  that returns financial structures to balance.
In 1994, for example, the London Stock Exchange did provide a record £11.6 billion of 
new funding for companies, but this pales into insignificance compared to its £607 billion 
turnover in British and Irish shares and the £717 billion turnover in overseas equities 
(Guardian, 31 Jan. 1994).
In a study on the Swedish unemployment, Meidner (1998) ascribes the alarmingly high 
levels o f unemployment to the lack of policies to boost demand.
Joan Robinson’s conviction that Keynes should have started from Marx derived from her 
comparison between Keynes’ and Kalecki’s theories of effective demand. She held that 
Kalecki offered more general and more robust results than Keynes because he had the 
advantage of being little influenced by orthodox economies and well acquainted with Marx. 
One of the factors that, for Joan Robinson, made Kalecki’s theory o f effective demand 
more satisfactory than Keynes’ was that the former started from the Marxian schemes of 
reproduction.
Kalecki’s contribution was largely ignored, especially in the mainstream, while those of 
Keynes were sanitised and introduced into the orthodoxy in a rather 'bastardised' version 
with the emphasis on market imperfections. Despite the similarities o f their conclusions as 
to the inability o f market economies to generate full employment, Keynes and Kalecki 
emerged from entirely different backgrounds and from very different intellectual traditions.
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At the time, their discovery was contrary to all previous economic thought with the 
possible exception of Marx and the heretical under-consumptionists.
Borooah (1996) stresses the importance of productivity growth by illustrating how a 
country could secure an increase in real wages equal to the its rate of productivity growth 
without any loss of competitiveness.
See further Boltho and Glyn (1995): Singh (1995b).
Several economists have, however, observed that the NAIRU analysis is incompatible 
with some of the most important stylized facts about both labour market characteristics and 
outcomes in industrial countries during this century. In the highly regulated golden age, 
when labour markets were characterized by far greater rigidities than they have been in the 
1980s and 1990s, leading European countries enjoyed more or less full employment with 
moderate inflation for more than two decades. By contrast, in the recent period these 
countries have been afflicted with mass unemployment. These are quite the reverse of the 
outcomes which the NAIRU theory would predict for the two periods. Similarly, Matthews 
and Bowen (1998) observe that real product wages rose more slowly and there was greater 
labour flexibility in the 1930s in the UK as compared with the golden age, and yet the 
former period witnessed mass unemployment and the latter full employment.
The importance of education and training has recently been emphasized by endogenous 
growth models where the growth rate of productivity is associated with the level of 
education. An educated and motivated work-force is able to facilitate the development of, 
adapt more easily to, and exploit more fully new processes and techniques of production 
(Römer, 1986; 1990, Lucas, 1988).
Madsen (1998) applied a model developed by Layard and Nickell (1986), which explains 
movements in unemployment rates largely by changes in labor market rigidity, to the 
unemployment path in OECD nations over the period from 1960 to 1993. The study found 
that the coefficients o f the variables measuring the generosity of unemployment benefits 
were insignificant and that the model could explain less than 20% of the increase in 
unemployment in the OECD over this period.
Despite the fact that real growth in the USA hit 4.5 percent in the last quarter in 1994 and 
unemployment dipped to 5.4 percent in December, the Federal Reserve decided on the first 
of February to increase interest rates for the seventh time within a space of one year. 
Evidently, the reason behind such a decision was to control inflation. (For a more 
comprehensive analysis on issues concerning the NAERU see Eisner 1995; Galbraith 1997).
The main reason for full employment with rising real wages in the golden age was that 
real demand in industrial countries was increased at a rate of nearly 5 per cent per annum, 
almost twice the trend rate of growth in the 1980s and 1990s. At an intellectual level, the 
main weakness of the NAIRU approach is that it is rooted in microeconomics and is based 
on a partial equilibrium approach.
Ormerod (1994), comes up with some interesting results, regarding the correlation of 
inflation and unemployment. In his study, out of the nine countries concerned (Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands), in only three(Germany, 
Japan and the Netherlands) does the correlation have the postulated negative sign and only 
in the first two of those is the correlation significant at the 5% level. In the other six 
countries, the point estimate of the correlation is actually positive and in Sweden and the
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US this positive correlation is in fact significant at the 5% level. The results are very 
similar regardless of whether the unemployment rate itself or its log was used. Conversely, 
the simple correlation between the change in inflation and the change in the log o f the 
unemployment rate gives a negative sign in all nine countries, five o f  which are significant 
at the 5% level. The aforementioned empirical work by Ormerod raises serious doubts not 
only about the stability of any negative relationship between inflation and unemployment 
but also about the very existence itself of any such relationship over time.
^  Sardoni (1997) attempts to gain an insight into the complex relationship between the 
decisions that drive entrepreneurs to invest and produce, and the demand for money. 
Sharing the same view as Keynes, he perceives the rate o f interest as exogenously 
determined by given money supply and the liquidity preference of the public; this along 
with entrepreneurs’ long term expectations, determines the level of investment, output and 
employment. “The demand for idle money is no longer directly related to entrepreneurs’ 
expectations concerning profits but to the speculative motive, i.e. the object of securing 
profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth’’(C.W. VII: 
170).
Coen & Hickman (1988) argue that “the extent of recent output gaps in the European 
countries, together with the observation that real wages may not be much altered by 
demand management, lead us to conclude that there is substantial room for demand 
expansion to reduce unemployment..... ’’(p.l93)
^^Scarth (1996) demonstrates graphically how a wage cut causes income to be redistributed 
from labour to capitalists. If capitalists have a lower propensity to consume than workers, 
the demand for goods shifts further to the left, leading to further declines in output and 
employment.
According to the Keynesian theory, there is one important mechanism whereby the 
deflation caused by the reduction in wages may lead to increased employment, via the 
influence on the interest rate. The reduction in prices will lead to a reduction in nominal 
income, which reduces the transactions demand for money. This will reduce the rate of 
interest. With a given marginal efficiency of capital schedule, this will lead to an increase 
in investment, thereby increasing employment. This mechanism which is known as the 
Keynes effect, allows a reduction in money wages to have a positive influence on 
employment. “It is therefore on the effect of a falling wage - and price- level on the 
demand for money that those who believe in the self-adjusting quality of the economic 
system must rest the weight o f their argument’’ (C.W. VII:266).
However, Keynes warns that there are serious limitations to this adjustment mechanism. 
First, quantity of money should be fixed and not endogenously determined as a function of 
the level of wages, economic activity or prices. Second, the mechanism can be seen as the 
same as using monetary policy to expand the money supply, which would be a preferable 
option. “In any case both are limited, in that a moderate change may prove inadequate, 
whilst an immoderate one, might shatter confidence even if it were practicable” (C.W. 
VII:267). In other words, the marginal efficiency of capital schedule is unlikely to remain 
stable during the deflationary process.
^  See also Michie and Wilkinson (1995) on this point.
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In the situation where virtually all industrial countries are suffering from heavy 
unemployment, such beggar-my-neighbour policies do not represent an acceptable solution. 
Exchange rate adjustments should be limited to the needs o f the balance of payment and not 
regarded as a means of exporting unemployment.
The share of employment in manufacturing fell in the decade 1976-86 from 22.8% to 
19.1% in the US, from 25.5% to 24.7% in Japan and from 28.9% to 24.4% for the EC. Out 
of all o f the EU countries only Greece and Portugal avoided a fall in manufacturing 
employment, with the UK experiencing the most extreme cut.
There has been a lot o f effort lavished in trying to establish the determinants of 
deindustrialization. Is it the shift in consumption patterns or the differential productivity 
growth that have to be investigated, should some illuminating evidence come to light? 
Michie and Wilkinson (1994) assert that manufacturing employment in the EU region on 
no account must it be ascribed to shifts in consumption patterns nor to other sector’s 
requirement for labour. They argue that the loss in manufacturing jobs has been 
accompanied by an increasingly adverse balance o f trade in manufactures and by a rise in 
unemployment. In the same line of argument, Ajit Singh (1987) stresses that a balance of 
payments constraint is the result of the distribution o f output between sectors. Therefore, 
relative shares of output and employment even in absolute levels can get affected.
When the concept of disguised unemployment (defined as low productivity employment 
as compared to manufacturing productivity) is employed to estimate the unemployment we 
end up with totally different result, due in the main to the fact that, in general, employment 
growth is not in the manufacturing sectors but in services whose productivity lags that in 
manufacturing (Robinson 1937; Eatwell 1995).
There are substantial difficulties in measuring productivity in services, as in most cases 
no physical output is produced.
It has been argued that, as their income elasticity of demand is greater than one, the 
growth in demand for services will exceed the growth of income. Gershuny (1978), for 
example, pointed out that in Britain wealthier households spent a greater proportion of their 
income on services; such relationships, however, seem to be unstable over time and suffer 
from definitional problems, as much o f this service expenditure is on associated goods. 
Fuchs (1986) argued that the income elasticity of demand services was only slightly greater 
than that for other products and was not a major explanation of the growth o f the service 
sector. Similarly, Baumol et al. (1989) reject the demand explanation for the USA, as 
during the past few decades manufacturing output has risen as fast as output of services.
An interesting approach to the declining trend in manufacturing is offered by Wood 
(1994) where he elaborates on the notion that there is a shift of manufacturing investment 
from North (developed countries) to South (developing countries) due to che^q) labour.
Fuchs (1968) found that changes in intermediate service production in the USA 
accounted for 10 per cent o f the total expansion of service sector employment.
Hence his advocacy for Selective Employment Tax.
For Kaldor (1972), manufacturing acts as an engine of growth as it exhibits increasing 
returns while services are characterized by constant returns. This proposition may be too 
simplistic as increasing returns are likely to exist in services (despite problems of 
measurement). This does not, however, diminish the importance o f the cumulative
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causation analysis for understanding the diverging economic performance and prospects of 
different countries.
n c
NAIRU thereby becomes a mechanism by which expected inflation is converted into 
actual unemployment by policy intervention. For more on issues concerning the NAIRU as 
a reference point, see Karanassou & Snower (1997); Adams & Coe (1990); Gordon (1988).
Eisner (1995) produced evidence suggesting that the whole NAIRU concept might be 
fundamentally flawed. More specifically, his findings point towards a different relationship 
according to which reductions in unemployment below the NAIRU equilibrium point, 
cause inflation to follow suit.
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Chapter 2
European Unemployment in View of The 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria
2.1 Introduction.
Despite the commitment of EU member states to the goal of economic and 
monetary union (EMU), a debate over the matter continues to rage. For the entire of the EU 
region the convergence criteria implied by the Maastricht Treaty are the sole source of 
economic policy targets. The strict deficit and debt restrictions provide a new 
contractionary framework on the basis o f which national budgets are not allowed to be used 
as means of offsetting distortions within the EU. In the absence of an effective employment 
policy a number of commentators have been swift to speculate on the future of such 
economic venture. “The problems arising from unemployment are not only economic 
problems of inefficiency arising from wastage of human resources, rising public sector 
deficits and possible monetary instability arising from this but also an increase in social 
tension and social cost in terms of ill health, increasing poverty, family and community 
breakdown, and arguably increasing crime levels” (Symes 1995, p.l).
This chapter focuses on issues relating to European unemployment in view of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. More specifically, in section 2.2, we very briefly present
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some previous plans, made by EU countries, for monetary integration and identify the 
major reason why the member states proceeded to ratify the Maastricht treaty. Section 2.3 
touches on the controversy surrounding the credibility of the convergence criteria in 
promoting conditions for full employment. Arguably, the growing polarisation of the 
debate over such a venture has caused a lot of speculation to emerge. For the lingering 
doubters the single currency will have an adverse effect on the economic life of all member 
states; a European super-state endowed with enormous powers will impose a crippling 
burden of regulatory and other costs on Europe’s economies; economic problems such as 
unemployment, which has been plaguing the lives of millions of people across Europe, will 
persist due to the restrictive policies that are required to meet the criteria set by the 
Maastncht treaty and to advance to the ultimate objective. On the other hand, many of its 
proponents regard EMU as conducive to the creation o f a stronger EU with greater 
economic, political and social cohesion. They maintain that without such a union, 
European economies will remain divided and weak, unable to compete internationally with 
the low-wage economies of Asia or with the large high-wage economy of USA.
In section 2.4, a close look at some statistical tables, illustrating the behaviour of
some significant economic variables over the period 1960-998, enables us to visualise the
extent to which the deflationary policies that were implemented by all member states have
affected their economies. Section 2.5 attempts to gain a further insight into the European
Central Bank (ECB) and its endowed power to set monetary policy. In section 2.6 the
reasons why fiscal policy is still a policy instrument that can be used to eliminate
unemployment are spelled out. In section 2.7 a preliminary empirical exposition of some
regression results provides some indicative evidence of the extent to which the policies
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implied by the convergence criteria have influenced a number of economic indicators 
before and after the ratification o f the Maastricht treaty, while finally, section 2.8 provides 
some concluding remarks..
2.2 Maastricht Treaty: Working towards monetary stabilisation in Europe.
After the collapse of Bretton Woods, countries within the European Community 
started making plans for monetary integration in Europe. With this objective in mind the 
first steps for a coherent economic policy in Europe were made. Inevitably, a series of 
plans followed. The Werner* Plan (1970) which proved to be a rather theoretical proposal, 
was superseded by an attempt to stabilise intra-European exchange rates, known as the 
“Snake ”. However, by the late 1970s monetary stability proved elusive mainly due to the 
upward pressure of the D-mark. As a result the European Monetary System (EMS) 
emerged, together with one of its most important elements: the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). The basic motivation for it was the demise of Bretton Woods, the failure of the 
dollar as an international standard, and the emergence in Germany of a “new national 
monetary self-interest in the goal of external stability” (Dyson 1994, p.98). The declared 
objective was to “create a zone o f monetary stability in Europe” by stabilising exchange 
rates^; there was no mention of monetary union. Despite the unprecedented prestige that 
ERM enjoyed over the years, a series o f exchange rates crises shook the foundations of the 
system and provided the platform on which the credibility of the system was questioned'*.
In 1989 the Delors Report argued that a set of binding fiscal rules, limiting the size
and financing of fiscal budgets should be put in place if a monetary union was to be
envisaged. What followed was the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty ( December 1991)
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by all member states, which, on the basis o f ERM, made full monetary union the central
goal o f the EU’. To this effect, the Maastricht Treaty set up a number o f  prerequisites
designed to limit access to countries that fulfilled some particular financial and economic
criteria. These criteria have come in for a lot o f criticism by a number of economists. As a
result, questions regarding the future o f such a venture have arisen causing a great deal o f 
speculation to emerge.
In particular, the target figures- a rate o f  inflation within 1.5 percent o f  the three best 
performing states, a budget deficit not greater that 3 per cent o f  GDP, total public debt^ not 
greater than 60 per cent o f  GDP, and long term interest rates not to exceed the average o f  
the three best performing states by more than 2 percentage points - ratified by the 
Maastricht treaty have created a wave o f uncertainty felt by all European Countries’. Is it
the nature of these conditions or is it the outcome of the policies implemented to meet these 
criteria that have stirred such concern?
2.3 Convergence criteria and credibility.
Advancing towards an era where the seeds of globalisation have started to take root, in 
Europe the economic policy alternative appears to he revolving around the convergence 
criteria ratified by the Maastricht. The contractionary postulates -  strict deficit and debt 
restrictions -  that such a venture involves have wiped out any hope of resorting to a 
corresponding expansion of the EU budget to offset contractionary effects and resulting 
distortions within the Community. Moreover, rigidity in the labour markets has been 
regarded as the main cause o f the upward trend o f unemployment over the recent decades, 
and the blame for it is thus put on the unemployed, the employed and the unions*.
44
Arguably, in the EU the introduction o f such a stringent set o f convergence rules may 
be put down to the accreditation that those rules received by the prevailing neoliberal 
economic dogma. One could therefore anticipate the emergence o f an economic 
environment that conforms to the main postulates of neoliberalism, namely, the restriction 
of the role of the state in the economy, a fiscal restructuring in favour of firms and higher 
income groups, continuous increases in the share of profits in national income, 
abandonment of all restrictions to the free international circulation of capital, and further 
deregulation of labour markets^.
It would be of great interest to note that the current European economic regime does not 
consider unemployment to be a problem that has to be fought with the highest priority; it is 
regarded as a side effect to be treated with social policy. The deflationary risks that the 
Maastricht rules entail are rather alarming. Governments have to foster austerity measures 
which, according to emerging evidence, will exacerbate unemployment, deficits and social 
tensions. Public deficits increase because of falling tax revenue: this is followed by tax 
increases and/or further cuts in public expenditure with an ensuing fall in effective demand, 
lower employment, lower income and tax revenue, higher deficits etc., thus continuing the 
vicious circle.
A common line of argument criticises the Maastricht Treaty for defining convergence in
largely nominal, rather than real variables. This criticism draws heavily on the notion that
participation in a single European currency should occur only amongst countries that
exhibit a high degree of real convergence, defined in terms o f productivity levels, real
living standard, real growth rates and unemployment rates*®. Amongst a number of
economists who share the latter view, Boltho (1998), underlines the need for including a
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target rate of unemployment in the criteria. However, the problem with this argument is 
that it would rule out any monetary unions, including existing ones (Currie 1996).
The deficit/debt provisions*’ as well as their successor - the Stability and Growth Pact - 
effectively block the use of capital markets to finance the costs o f transition, forcing the 
costs onto taxpayers, and destroying new jobs in the process. Buiter et al (1993), argue that 
these “fiscal rules are badly motivated, poorly designed, and apt to lead to unnecessary 
hardship if pursued mechanically”(p.87).
The fostering o f a single currency by EU countries clearly removes the possibility of 
variations in the value of domestic currency. However, the exchange rate instrument*^ may 
still be a potentially useful tool, even in conditions of great openness, provided it is not 
used too frequently and is accompanied by incomes policies. Changes in the exchange rate 
can allow a country to offset differential shocks and differences in economic performance. 
Goodhart (1990), stresses the importance that fiscal policy assumes once the exchange rate 
ceases to exist. He asserts that it is the only means that individual countries are left with, to 
influence their own macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, fears o f ramifications for the 
entire economy, should the exchange rate be set incorrectly, have haunted the headquarters 
of Europe’s economic bodies. Arestis and Sawyer (1996) contend that the prospective 
exchange rate should be compatible with a sustainable trade position and full employment. 
In particular, an overvalued entry exchange rate by a country experiencing high 
unemployment means a prolonged period of recession.
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2.4 Maastricht vs. European unemployment.
Most European countries have signed up to the Maastricht Treaty, which requires some 
degree o f fiscal contraction. Emerging evidence, in the form of projections undertaken by 
various economic institutions, suggests that meeting the deficit as well as the debt criteria 
by 1999 could result in a reduction in total EU employment, whereas abandoning the 
Maastricht fiscal criteria and reverting to previous levels of government deficits could raise 
EU employment’ .^ Barrel, Morgan and Pain (1995) contend that economic growth will 
remain quite low, reflecting the impact of tighter fiscal policies and budgetary pressures 
arising from high levels of unemployment*'^. It is interesting to note that after Maastricht a 
poor economic performance has permeated all EU member states. Table 1 exposes the 
trend around which the growth rate of GDP has fluctuated before and after 1992.
Table 1. GDP, growth rates (averages).
COUNTRIES 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germany 4.5 4.2 2.5 1.5 4.6 1.7
France 5.7 5.1 3.2 1.8 2.7 1.6
Italy 5.3 4.9 3.7 2.3 2.7 1.1
Netherlands 4.5 5.2 3.0 1.1 3.0 2.5
Belgium 4.7 5.0 3.0 1.4 2.6 1.5
Luxembourg 3.2 4.2 2.3 2.2 5.9 4.6
U.K 2.9 2.7 2.2 1.2 2.6 2.2
Ireland 3.3 5.4 5.2 2.6 4.1 6.4
Denmark 4.6 3.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.3
Spain 8.5 6.1 3.6 1.0 3.9 1.7
Greece 7.8 7.7 4.4 1.5 2.2 1.6
Portugal 6.0 7.0 3.8 2.0 4.3 2.0
Sweden 4.7 3.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4
Finland 4.5 5.2 2.2 4.0 3.9 3.6
Austria 4.3 5.0 2.9 1.9 2.9 1.7
USA 5 .2 3 .2 3 .4 2 .3 2 .4 2 .6
C a n a d a 5 .8 4 .5 4 .4 2 .6 2 .6 2 .5
J apan 9 .4 9 .7 3 .9 3 .5 4 .5 0 .8
O E C D 5.2 4 .6 3 .4 2 .7 3 .5 1 .9
co u n tries
Source; OECD, Economic Outlook.
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The growth rates of GDP for all 15 countries suggest that a substantial effort had 
been made to sustain economic growth during the first two periods. Public expenditure- 
type policies were the chief reason behind such achievement. After that, a spell of 
economic slow-down'^ (1973-78, 1979-91) gave way to a period of short-lived economic 
growth. Then the ratification of the Maastricht treaty heralded a period of low growth, 
mainly due to the policies implied by its target figures’ .^ Likewise, the trend around which 
the growth rates of GDP fluctuated in the rest of the OECD countries as well as in Canada 
and Japan separately, resembles the one that characterizes the EU economies, i.e. a constant 
decline’ .^
In the USA's case however, the growth rate o f GDP appears to be exhibiting a rather 
different pattern. While in the first three periods the growth rate o f GDP was declining, in 
the following periods, measures to ensure the stabilization and ultimately the growth of the 
USA economy were put in place; hence the upward trend in the period 1979 - 1998.
Buiter, Corseti and Roubini (1993) provide a summary of two earlier studies’* by 
Giovannini & McKibbin and the IMF’  ^ in 1992, according to which a large output fall 
which was due to the reduction in inflation to German levels and high interest rates, will 
lead to a ‘mild’ recession.
In the 1960s, there was general agreement on the priority to be given to full
employment policies. After that period, and at least until the mid-1980s, most European
countries experienced a rather strong upward trend in unemployment^®. Then
unemployment fell sharply following the boom in the late-1980s, rose again during the
recession in the early-1990s, and is now falling again. A representation o f that behaviour
can be observed by simply looking at table 2 below, which documents the average
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unemployment rates over a period o f time (1961-1998) for all 15 countries. A pattern of 
the fluctuation of this trend is also provided (see relevant figures in Appendix).
Such a pattern reinforces the notion that a recession is superseded by a boom, in 
which case job losses while during the downturn are not fully restored once the economy 
picks up again. The ensuing results is what many economists call ‘hysteresis’^’; an 
inevitable augmentation of the base of the labour force that is out of work.
Table 2 also exemplifies the extent of the unemployment rate before and after the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
Table 2. Unemployment Rate(averages).
Countries 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germanv 0.7 1.0 3.1 5.5 7.2 9.6
France^* 1.6 2.5 4.1 7.6 9.8 11.9
Italy 3.6 4.1 4 .7 6.8 9.6 11.2
Netherlands^^ N/A 1.3 3.4 7.3 7.4 6.4
Belgium 2.1 2.3 4.9 10.7 10.5 12.4
Luxembourg N/A N/A 0.4 1.2 1.5 2.7
U.K 1.6 2.5 3.7 8.1 8.5 8.1
Ireland^^ 4.9 5.4 7.3 10.9 15.9 12.9
Denmark 1.3 1.6 4.6 8.8 8.9 10.0
Spain^^ 2.4 3.0 4.4 14.9 18.9 22.0
Greece 5.2 4.3 1.9 5.0 7.5 9.9
Portugal 2.0 3.9 4.7 7.9 6.3 6.4
Sweden 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.7 2.2 7.5
Finland 1.4 2.7 3.9 5.2 4.9 15.8
Austria 1.9 1.5 1.5 2.7 4.6 6.0
USA 5 .2 4 .6 6 .6 7.9 6 .2 5 .9
C a n a d a 5.1 5 .2 6 .9 9 .5 8 .9 9 .9
J a p a n 1.3 1.2 1.8 2 .3 2 .5 3.1
O E C D
C ou n tries
2 .9 3 .7 6 .3 10.3 7.8 8 .6
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
A point worth noting is that after 1991, the increasing trend in the unemployment 
rate is uniform in most EU countries. Such a behaviour reflects the contractionary stance 
that EU governments took in view of the convergence criteria and their ensuing impact on
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the labour markets. By contrasting this pattern of the unemployment rate in EU member
states to the rates in the other OECD economies, Canada and Japan, we can observe that in 
the USA the picture is different.
More specifically, the US administration’s endeavour to promote job creation bore 
fruit. A spell (1961 - 1984) o f soaring unemployment was superseded by a period of job 
creation. Such an achievement can partly be ascribed to the boost that the volume o f 
investment sustained through the adoption of measures such as the lowering of the interest 
rates. Under the current mandate the USA saw both its unemployment as well as inflation 
rates reaching a record low. Conversely, those countries whose central banks target 
inflation are experiencing double-digit low unemployment. Alan Greenspan (1997b) has 
expressed his opinion on the easing of monetary policy between 1990 1992 to achieve “a 
satisfactory recovery from the recession of that period” and the tightening of policy in the 
1994 and 1995 to circumvent inflationary pressures.
During the 1990’s in the USA the Fed has focused on both inflation and 
unemployment. As a result macroeconomic performance has been outstanding^^. Both 
unemployment and inflation in the 1990s are at their lowest for 30 years. The observed 
economic growth and low inflation have benefited the stock market (see Fisher & Merton 
1984, Boudoukh, Richardson & Whitelaw 1994). It is worth emphasising the 180 percent 
increase of the Dow Jones Industrial Average between January 1995 and August 1999.
Randall Wray (2000) however, sustains that “the U.S. expansion was self limiting 
because it was fuelled by unsustainable private sector deficit spending -  mostly by 
households, which were spending more than their incomes, by a record amount. Earlier this
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year, households began to reduce borrowing and spending, an inevitable retrenchment that 
the fed’s rate hikes hastened by increasing debt service burdens” (p. 1).
2.5 ECB^  ^and Deflation.
The emergence of the European Central Bank (ECB hereafter)^* as an economic 
institution responsible for setting monetary policy within the region is an additional 
feature that is worth probing. Modelled on the German Bundesbank, its principal objective 
is the elimination of inflation^®; hence, the deflationary bias that characterises the 
economies of all EU countries (see Appendix 1 for a more comprehensive analysis).
Over the years a number of economists have attempted to provide some evidence 
regarding the connection between deflation and unemployment^*, and more importantly, the 
connection between the role of an independent central bank^^ and unemployment. In some 
recent empirical studies Hall & Franzese (1998), Cukierman & Lippi (1999) and Kilponen 
(1999a) all provide evidence of a positive correlation between central bank independence 
and unemployment^^. Furthermore, different studies have concluded that a central bank 
with the capacity to set monetary and exchange rate policies separate from governments 
clashes with traditional demand management (Arestis, McCaulley & Sawyer 1999). 
Additionally, Kirshner (1998) underlines the lack o f evidence as to whether central bank 
independence does in fact improve real economic performance^^.
The widely held view that the main role for macroeconomic policy is to control
inflation^^, and that most unemployment is of a structural^^ rather than a cyclical^^ nature,
in view of which demand management policy is of no use, appears to be influencing the
conduct o f economic policy in the EU . Such a belief implies that a potential ECB
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intervention to stimulate demand^* is ruled out. Any disequilibria in the labour markets 
should therefore be corrected by fostering policies that promote changes in regulation or 
reforms in trade union structures or education and training. If these measures fall through, 
then unemployment should be accepted as inevitable. Moreover, conducting monetary and 
fiscal policies independently may well result in cumulative instability^^ (Meade and Weale 
1992).
As can be discerned from table 3, combating inflation"^  ^has been given top priority 
in the agenda of every EU government.
Table 3. CPI, growth rates (averages).
Countries 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germany 2.9 3.2 5.1 4.4 1.8 2.0
France 3.6 5.1 10.1 11.1 3.5 1.4
Italy 4.6 3.8 15.5 15.9 6.2 3.1
Netherlands 3.7 5.6 7.8 4.9 1.3 1.5
Belgium 2.8 3.8 8.9 6.8 2.7 1.6
Luxemboing 2.3 3.6 7.7 7.0 2.3 1.8
U.K 3.5 5.9 15.0 10.0 5.6 2.0
Ireland 4.0 6.9 14.7 14.6 3.6 1.9
Denmark 5.6 6.4 10.1 9.5 3.8 1.5
Spain 6.9 5.9 17.7 13.9 6.7 3.8
Greece 2.1 2.6 15.5 21.4 17.9 10.4
Portugal 2.4 6.0 21.9 22.7 12.5 4.9
Sweden 4.0 4.9 9.7 9.8 6.9 2.1
Finland 5.0 5.5 13.3 9.4 4.9 1.3
Austria 3.6 4.2 6.9 5.0 2.5 2.3
USA 1.5 4 .7 8.1 6 .7 3 .6 2 .0
C a n ada 2 .2 4.3 9 .2 8 .0 3 .0 1.4
J a p a n 4 .6 6 .0 9 .7 2 .6 1.9 0 .3
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
A quick inspection of the growth rates of inflation for different periods suggests that 
for the period 1961-78 the rate of inflation is steadily rising whereas for the period^’ 1979- 
91 and 1992-1998 (after the ratification o f the Maastricht treaty) it is subsiding. The latter 
period is characterized by the deflationary policies that EU member states have adopted so
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that the prescribed target figure of 1.5 per cent is reached on time. This tendency seems to 
be uniform in all EU countries, with the exception only of the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg where the growth rate of inflation for the period 1992-98 has gone up by 0.6 
percent and 0.4 percent respectively.
The deflationary bias of these policies has caused interest rates to go up and remain 
at quite a high level throughout the whole period (see table 4). As a result, the volume of 
investment (see table 5) suffered a major slowdown, which in turn had devastating effects 
on job creation. An identical pattern of an initial inflationary bias during the period 1961- 
1972 and a switch to deflationary policies during the remaining period is prevalent in the 
USA, Canada, Japan and the rest of the OECD countries as well.
Table 4. Interest rates^ ,^ (Averages).
Countries 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germany 6.4 7.5 8.3 8.6 7.2 6.5
France S .l 7.8 10.4 14.1 9.9 7.0
Italy 5.3 6.3 11.2 16.9 12.3 10.0
Netherlands 4.9 7.2 8.5 9.4 7.3 6.5
Belgium 6.0 7.1 8.5 12.1 9.1 7.0
Luxemboiu-g N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
U.K 6.0 7.9 12.6 12.9 10.3 7.8
Ireland 6.1 8.3 13.3 15.5 10.4 7.7
Denmark 7.6 10.5 15.6 18.2 10.3 7 .4
Spain l A 8.7 10.8 15.7 12.9 9.3
Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Portugal 5.5 6.3 11.7 23.3 21.3 11.2
Sweden 5.8 7.1 9.1 12.5 11.7 8.6
Finland 7.8 8.0 9.5 10.6 10.7 7.5
Austria 6.7 7.5 8.9 9.0 7.6 6.2
USA 4.2 6.1 7.6 1 1 .9 8 .6 6 .7
C a n a d a 5 .2 7.1 8 .8 1 2 .7 10 .2 7.5
J apan n/a 7.0 7.7 8 .2 5 .7 3 .5
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
The preceding table shows how interest rates'*  ^ have fluctuated over a span of 38 
years in the EU region, USA, Canada and Japan. The first period 1961- 66 is dominated by
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low interest rates. After that, and more specifically in the three successive periods, interest 
rates have risen inexorably, culminating in an unprecedented period of sky-high interest 
rates. All the policies' '^^ that led to those double-digit figures had a tremendous impact on 
the EU economies as well as the economies o f the USA, Canada and Japan. Workers 
employed in the manufacturing sector were the first to experience the rigor o f being laid off 
due to closures and lack of investment. Potentially, the ensuing chain reaction effects 
ushered in a new era of increasing unemployment and growing inequality that has plagued 
the entire population ever since. What was to follow was a period of spasmodic"*  ^attempts 
to redress the balance by putting a halt to this upward trend. As a result, the following two 
periods 1985-91 and 1992-98, were characterized by interest rates that were lower but not 
low enough to ensure the restoration of the earlier volume of investment.
Table 5. Investment, growth rates (averages).
Countries 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germany 4.7 3.9 -0.7 0.3 6.7 1.2
France 8.8 6.4 1.1 -0.6 4.7 -0.3
Italy 3.2 5.1 0.7 1.3 3.2 -0.1
Netherlands 7.1 4.0 1.0 -1.2 3.7 2.6
Belgium 7.3 2.8 3.1 -3.0 6.7 1.5
Luxembourg 5 .7 3.9 -0.9 -0.5 13.7 2.5
U.K 6.0 3.1 0.8 1.2 3.4 1.8
Ireland 10.3 8.9 6.2 0.5 0.7 5.9
Denmark 7.9 5.4 -0.3 -1.7 1.8 4.3
Spain 14.2 6.7 1.7 -2.2 9.4 4.0
Greece 9.8 11.1 0.5 -2.3 2.8 5.3
Portugal 9.0 6.7 1.7 -1.6 7.2 4.0
Sweden 6.2 2.8 -0.9 1.5 3.4 -0.5
Finland 4.5 4.8 -0.2 3.7 1.1 -0.1
Austria 7.0 7.2 0.7 -0.2 5.1 2.5
USA 5 .9 3 .2 3 .7 2 .6 0 .6 5 .6
C an ada 8 .5 3.1 5 .3 3 .6 5 .0 3 .0
J apan 14 .1 ¡ 4 .7 2 .7 1.8 7.2 -0 .5
O E C D
C ou n tries
6 .9 5 .4 2 .1 1 .9 3 .8 2 .3
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
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2.6 Fiscal policy: Still a policy instrument.
In Europe, despite the flexibility of labour markets that has been achieved as well as 
the significant decline in the bargaining power'*^ of the trade unions, the problem of 
unemployment has persisted (Morgan, 1996).
Arguably, the reduction in the rate of inflation reflected by the economic agenda set 
at Maastricht - which requires the adoption of restrictive monetary policy over a long 
period - has been achieved at the expense of increasing unemployment. The Ricardian 
belief that changes in government borrowing has no effect on aggregate demand has to a 
great extent influenced the way economic policy is formulated within EU member states'^ .^ 
However, while such a development is unfolding, the notion that the alarmingly high levels 
o f EU unemployment as well as the persistent macroeconomic instability necessitate the 
introduction o f other policy instruments is gathering momentum. To this effect, the use of 
fiscal policy (public expenditure and taxation), is perceived as being instrumental in 
affecting economic activity'^*. Holland (1995) proposes a significant increase in government 
spending and greater deficits, while others, such as Dreze and Malinvaud (1994), envisage 
an expansionary monetary policy designed to cut real interest rates to zero in the short term.
Empirical evidence suggests that a rise in final government expenditure of 1 per 
cent of GDP will raise European output by 3.5 per cent after 6 years"^  ^ (Richardson et al 
1994). The prospect, however, of promoting employment through the conduct of the 
aforementioned policies has been discouraged by a number of forces within the European 
circles^®. Nowadays, stabilization through the use of fiscal policy is a time-consuming 
process of consolidation to make governments more creditworthy^'. According to Grahl
(1997), such a process is conducive to good rates of economic growth and low interest
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rates. In other words, the whole philosophy of the Maastricht treaty is in conflict with these 
conditions. Looking upon the convergence criteria not as numbers, but as a policy measure 
to stabilize the EU’s public finances might make sense. However, neglecting the 
macroeconomic impact that the narrowing^^ of public sector deficits will have on EU 
economies could be detrimental. That is because deficit reduction is likely to be tackled by 
major reductions in expenditure rather than increases in revenue; that will lead to weaker 
public sectors.
It could be argued that a major setback in the economies of all EU countries was the 
reduction in capacity for fiscal policy. The decline in the size of the public sector in nearly 
all 15 countries has had an adverse effect on expenditure and economic activity.
Table 6. Public spending, growth rates (averages).
Countries 1961-66 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 1985-91 1992-98
Germany 11.0 11.1 10.3 5.6 4.1 5.0
France 9.9 11.7 17.4 14.3 5.4 4.6
Italy 13.5 11.4 19.8 22.1 11.2 3.5
Netherlands 13.0 13.1 13.7 4.2 2.5 3.7
Belgium 9.2 11.5 15.1 6.5 3.7 4.5
Luxembourg 9.0 10.0 15.5 9.2 8.6 7.9
U.K 7.8 10.4 19.3 13.2 8.3 4.7
Ireland 9.8 16.6 22.6 17.9 5.6 7.0
Denmark 15.9 15.9 15.6 11.5 5.4 3.6
Spain 16.4 15.2 26.3 18.1 13.6 6.9
Greece 11.5 11.8 26.3 26.1 20.5 12.5
Portugal 11.5 13.9 23.7 25.3 23.4 8.9
Sweden 12.5 12.2 16.4 11.2 8.5 1.8
Finland 13.3 14.0 19.6 14.6 10.6 0.1
Austria 9.6 11.4 15.0 7.5 5.6 6.2
USA 4 .6 2 .0 1.0 1 .6 2 .7 0.3
C a n a d a 5 .3 5 .9 4 .3 1 .8 3.1 -0 .3
J a p a n 5 .2 4 .5 5 .2 3 .3 2.1 1.7
O E C D 4.5 3 .0 2 .6 2 .4 2 .6 0 .8
C ou n tries
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
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Table 6 shows how the growth rates of public spending have behaved over various 
periods before, and especially after 1991, when the EU economies entered phase 1, towards 
EMU. As we can see, a substantial squeeze in public spending over the period 1992-98 
was experienced by Finland, Sweden, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, UK, 
Luxembourg, Italy, and France. In the remaining five countries, the picture was slightly 
better, but not good enough to ensure a steady recovery. Public investment has dwindled 
considerably, while social security expenditures have had to rise, in order to deal with the 
pernicious repercussions of rising unemployment. Moreover, a substantial squeeze in 
public spending has been exerted on the economies of the US, Canada, Japan and the 
OECD countries as well.
Following Kurzer(1988), firms’ reaction to a decline in disposable income and 
public spending will be a delay in productive investment. The belief that returns on capital 
in the future will be marginal, (or at least too thin to warrant present investments), makes 
firms use their reserves to acquire financial^^, rather than productive assets.
No one disputes the contention that the unacceptably high levels of public finance 
(debt, deficit^"') should be addressed at once. The salient question, however, is how to go 
about dealing with a situation which, if treated hastily, may have perverse effects on the 
economy.
Mainstream economics seems to overlook the existing connection between the
public and the private sector. As a result, fiscal policies are invariably believed to be bound
up with the public sector. Allsop (1998) argues that when dealing with the private sector, it
is wise to look also at the influence that public policy exerts on the private sector. The
observed increasing figures in European debt should therefore be seen as a rising trend of
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public sector asset holdings by the private sector. In other words, changes in the debt trend 
are possible, provided that either private sector savings decrease, or investment increases.
Policy makers* goal over the last years has been to create the conditions under 
which more investment opportunities will be encouraged. With this in mind, the pursuit of 
policies to generate economic growth got under way. A reduction in public borrowing 
became a principle to which all countries seeking economic growth would have to adhere. 
Inevitably, the dominant view in the mid-1990s appeared to be that fiscal tightening, 
together with 'supply side* measures, would lower interest rates and support the required 
revival of investment spending^^. As it turned out however, the negative short-term effects 
o f fiscal tightening put the economy in a rather precarious position.
In Europe, the looming difficulties of fiscal consolidation were not given the 
appropriate attention by its economic bodies (Allsop and Vines, 1996). A country's policy 
to pursue fiscal adjustment often entails lower interest rates, a lower exchange rate, and a 
positive balance o f payments. In Maastricht's case, however, such a prospect is far from 
realistic^^. The policies envisaged are designed to promote a fiscal policy o f restraint. 
Hence, in view o f the limitations implied by the treaty, a credible strategy to instigate the 
necessary adjustment of investment is conspicuous by its absence.
At both national and European level, the use of fiscal policy is heavily constrained
by the new set of rules embodied in the stability and growth pact. This new set of
regulations sketches the course of action that each member state has to take if it fails to
conform to the pacts’ prescribed targets^^. More specifically, countries about to exceed the
threshold in terms of the permitted deficit ratio will have to take corrective fiscal policy
action in the form of reduced expenditure or increased taxation. Such a measure will have
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an adverse effect on income. If, however, the threshold has yet to be reached, financing the 
deficit by means o f borrowing on EU capital markets will put pressure on the European 
interest rate, which in turn will raise debt-servicing outlays throughout the EU. Gregory 
and Weiserbs (1998), regard the deficit and debt provisions as contradictory^* to the 
objective o f Article 1 of the Treaty of Rome, which aimed at the leveling-up of living 
standards throughout the European Community.
An argument advanced by Emerson et al (1992) is that the creation of a monetary 
union in itself makes problems of excess borrowing more likely, since it will increase the 
perceived likelihood o f bail-out^^. This argument refers to potential taxation levied on the 
citizens of one country to pay the debts of the government o f another. An alternative route 
through which this bail-out could be feasible is in the form of inflation throughout the 
monetary union, which would reduce the real value of debt.
In Europe, following reductions in taxes on companies as well as reductions in 
direct taxation of incomes, taxation systems have become less progressive^. Privatization 
has contributed further to the weakening of the public sector, since public assets have been 
sold at prices that do not compensate for the loss of future revenue from nationalized
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The notion that taxes on employment should be reduced in economies facing high
unemployment has provided the platform on which those tax reforms have been based.
However, this is not a reason to justify reductions of direct taxation on very well-paid jobs.
Despite the fact that EU’s fiscal federalism is not a precondition for EMU, an enhanced
budget would greatly facilitate EMU^^ (Eichengreen 1992: 152). Sala-I-Martin and Sachs
(1992) argue that fiscal federalism is an institutional way of achieving a policy equivalent
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to a high degree of coordination while Allsopp (1998) claims that a coordinated policy 
would be preferable, but if  it is not feasible, perhaps because o f difficulties in achieving 
agreement between policy makers, a centralized policy is preferable to nothing^^.
One of the features of the Community’s budget is that revenue has to equal 
expenditure^ (accounting budget). Therefore, the EU cannot run budget deficits in times 
of slump in order to stabilize the EU economy. Conversely, national budgets have become 
more functional and unbalanced. These economies have followed the legacy of the 
Keynesian revolution, which condoned the practice of governments running budgetary 
deficits (government expenditure exceeds tax intake) to stimulate demand, and in effect, 
reduce unemployment.
2.7 A preliminary attempt to interpret Maastricht's policies. Some evidence.
So far, we have illustrated through descriptive statistics (tables, figures), how some 
significant economic variables have behaved over a period of years and especially after the 
imposition of the Maastricht's convergence criteria, on all EU member states. The 
economic variables under scrutiny appear to have suffered significantly, primarily due to 
the deflationary policies that the EU countries had to implement in view of the qualification 
round to EMU.
The next task will be to generate some simple regressioni^ equations in order to 
establish an indication as to whether and to what extent what has been suggested by the 
analysis above is in line with the econometric evidence. More specifically we will set up 
equations of the form;
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Yit -  y, +5A,+ £/i
For i cross-section units and periods t = 1,2,.
Yit is the dependent variable;
Yi is a constant for each country;
D, is a dummy variable which takes the value zero for the years before the Maastrich and 
the value one for the years after;
Sit is an error term;
This analysis will be carried out by using data”” for all 15 EU countries in series 
from 1961 to 1998. Regression equations have been employed to test the significance of the 
means o f certain variables. The sign as well as the significance of the dummy variables 
will establish the extent to which the policies fostered by EU members, have affected the 
behaviour of the variables in question (see table 7).
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After having regressed government expenditure on a constant and a dummy 
variable, the emerging evidence suggests that the coefficients of the dummy variables of 
eight out o f the 15 EU countries are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Five of them are statistically significant at the 10% level o f significance, and only two (the 
ones corresponding to Germany and Luxembourg) pass the significance test at a higher 
level. The negative sign of the dummy variables suggests that after 1992 government 
expenditure has decreased throughout the EU countries.
As regards the unemployment rate, the results we have obtained are in line with 
those we obtained for government expenditure. The only difference is that this time the 
coefficients o f 13 out o f the 15 countries are found to be statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance, whereas the remaining two (those o f the Netherlands and Portugal) 
are significant at a higher level. The positive sign of the coefficients of the dummy 
variables reinforces the notion that the problem of unemployment has been exacerbated 
after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
Private consumption is another variable that we looked into. We have come up with 
the following evidence. The t-statistics indicate that the coefficients of ten countries are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance and those of five are insignificant 
(Netherlands, UK, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark). As far as the sign is concerned, two 
countries (Ireland and Denmark) have an incorrect sign (positive), while the rest appear to 
bear the right one. In this case, the convergence criteria seem to have a negative impact on 
the consumption pattern of the population of 13 countries while two countries seem to be 
unaffected.
63
Lastly, the preceding regression results indicate that capital formation has decreased 
significantly in a total of 11 countries after 1992. More specifically, the coefficients of 
eleven countries are found to be statistically significant, nine at the 5% level and two at the 
10% level of significance, those of three are insignificant and that o f one (Finland) has the 
incorrect sign.
The overall picture painted by the emergence of the above evidence indicates that 
some key economic variables have been affected negatively by the Maastricht provisions. 
However, only a few countries seem to have maintained some control over their policies 
and their economic performances.
2.8 Concluding remarks.
The impact o f the new economic order, established in Europe by the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty as well as the introduction of the stability and growth pact, on 
European labour markets provided the platform on which chapter 3 unfolded. By 
scrutinizing the behaviour o f some significant economic indicators, it became apparent that 
the current economic situation of most of the European countries is rather dismal. 
Governments within the EU look upon the convergence rules as being the exclusive source 
of economic policy targets as well as the only policy option.
A growing body of literature argues that the current economic situation that 
characterizes most o f the EU member states is far from conducive to nurture a future 
monetary union. The existing criticism, surrounding the nature as well as the credibility of
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the convergence criteria, finds justification in the way these conditions have been defined in 
both quantitative and qualitative sense.
The emergence o f an institution such as the European central bank (ECB), which is 
forbidden to fund any public programs and with exclusive purpose the control of inflation 
raises a number of questions as to what priorities should be given in the pursuit of a sound 
economic policy. Arguably the deflationary bias attached to an independent^^ ECB, is 
expected to exacerbate rather than alleviate the existing economic and social tension.
In the absence o f an EU fiscal policy it was suggested that national governments 
should be allowed to pursue budgets deficits when they feel it s necessary to do so. Ideally, 
this should be seen as a temporary expedient during a period in which a proper EU fiscal 
policy is generated.
Finally, through some preliminary econometric investigation, we sought to 
demonstrate the extent to which the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has affected the 
European economies. In all likelihood, the evidence generated consolidates the notion that 
the deflationary frenzy by which economic policy in the EU is pursued has had an adverse 
effect on a number of significant economic variables across all EU countries.
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Appendix 1
The anti-inflationary bias that characterizes independent central banks can be 
demonstrated as follows:
Let us assume that policy-makers want to minimize the following loss-function:
(1).
where yt is output, y  denoted targeted output and a  is government’s weight on output 
stabilization (a>  0). Equation (2) is a simplified Lucas supply function:
(2).
where Kt is actual inflation, Kt^  is expected inflation, and St is a random shock with zero 
mean and (<^) variances. Provided that the policy-makers want to minimize eq.(l) on a 
period basis, taking the inflation expectations as given, the rational expectations inflation 
can be written as:
(3).
a
.71, =ay, -
a + \  ‘
By browsing at eq.(3) one can infer that the first term at the right hand-side is the 
inflationary bias whereas the second term reflects the degree to which stabilization o f 
output shocks influence inflation. Assuming that the conduct o f  monetary policy has been 
delegated to a more inflation-averse central bank, eq.(4) can be thought o f  as the 
equivalent loss-function o f  the central bank:
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(4).
1 + 0
2
where 6 stands fo r  the inflation aversion o f the central bank. The preferences o f  the central 
bank does not matter, unless it is able to determine monetary policy without much 
government interference. This can simply be modeled as follows (Eijflinger & Hoeberichts 
(1998):
(5). = + (1-5)A ^
where 5 denotes the degree o f central bank independence, i.e. to which extent the central 
bank’s loss-function affects monetary policy-making. I f  5 = 1, the central bank fully 
determines monetary policy M. With rational expectations and minimizing government’s 
loss-function, inflation will be:
(6).
a
"  1 + 50
a
y. - 1 + 50 + OL
By simply comparing equations (3) and (6), one can immediately see that the inflationary 
bias (the first term at the right hand o f the equation) is lower fo r  positive values o f  5 and 6. 
What flows from the above is that the delegation o f monetary policy to an independent 
central bank will yield a lower level o f  inflation.
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Notes:
It was the embodiment of a previous agreement reached in The Hague in 1969 by the 
Council of Ministers. The whole philosophy of this plan was to provide the platform on 
which currencies can be unified.
This was an attempt to narrow currency internal fluctuations precipitated by the 
introduction of earlier wider bands of fluctuation of plus or minus 2.25 per cent 
(Smithsonian agreement).
Exchange rate stabilization among participants was achieved after a few years, although at 
some cost to stability against currencies outside the system. However, it is less clear that 
the ERM promoted greater stability of real exchange rates. Some critics maintain that this 
mechanism ultimately led to unsustainable real rates, especially after 1987 when 
governments unwisely suppressed realignments (Williamson 1993a, p.l95).
It was not until after the massive widening of the ERM fluctuation bands to 15% in 
August 1993 that pressure subsided. For a study which applies several models to the EMS 
crisis see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993.
 ^ In Europe, there is a growing concern regarding the move towards a single currency and 
its impact on employment. In the UK for example, an evaluation of such a move has 
generated a number of questions. An idea of how the financial sector feels about this 
venture can be concisely summarized as follows: the impact o f the single currency on 
banking jobs will be felt first in the area of foreign exchange trading and settlement . 
London is the biggest foreign exchange trading centre in the world so it will feel the 
squeeze hardest. Even if the UK joins the monetary union later , other European countries' 
adoption of the Euro will mean that hundreds of jobs in cross-trading between their 
currencies will disappear with the currencies themselves. These job losses, however, will 
be just a fraction o f the total number of employees in financial services who will face 
redundancy as a result of EMU. FIET, an international trades union body estimates job 
losses in the sector will be at least 200,000 Europe wide, and possibly twice as many. The 
Boston Consulting Group, a firm o f management consultants, has estimated losses of 
revenue to banks from reduced trading in currencies to reach as much as $56bn a year. 
Bifu also fears banks will seek to offset the extra financial costs entailed by introducing the 
Euro by laying off workers. Finally, there are concerns that a single currency could 
revolutionarise the provision o f financial products. It could become possible for customers 
to click on the internet to find the lowest-cost mortgage across Europe (The Guardian 27 
October 1997).
* It should be emphasized that the debt criterion set by the Maastricht treaty is in terms of 
gross rather than net debt, i.e. totally ignoring all assets. In other words, governments are 
forbidden to take account of even their most liquid assets in setting fiscal policy. For 
instance, a government’s decision to sell some of its assets in order to pay debt (for 
example through privatization), is seen as an improvement according to the Maastricht. In 
reality, the government is no better off, since their asset has fallen. What is even more 
absurd is the fact that the government’s performance is thought to have improved even if it 
sells off assets for less than they are worth.
 ^ A number of economists have expressed different opinions as to what these figures 
represent. Amid those, Arrowsmith (1995) believes that the Maastricht Treaty reflects the 
average record o f those member states who pursued prudent fiscal policies in the last two
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decades. A detailed account o f the negotiations behind the treaty is provided by Bini- 
Smaghi et al (1992).
The Economic and Financial Council of European Commission relentlessly reiterates its 
recommendations for more flexibility in both wage-setting and employment 
conditions.(The Guardian, 13 May 2000)
In a nutshell, these are the neoliberal practices that have been practiced for about twenty 
years in most EU countries and which have been proved incapable of checking the growth 
of unemployment, poverty and exclusion.
Arestis and Sawyer (1996), hold that the Maastricht convergence criteria should be 
expanded to include real variables, such as levels of unemployment, productivity growth, 
and low trade deflcits.
The debt and deficit criteria were designed to prevent profligate spending by fiscally 
irresponsible governments (Driffill and Miller 1998).
European economies are believed to suffer from structural differences. Arguably, well 
diversified economies are better able to abandon the exchange rate instrument, since 
microeconomic shifts in demand would be likely to offset each other, thus leaving domestic 
inflation or unemployment broadly unchanged. The opposite will be the case in highly 
specialized economies. Krugman (1993), however, evokes the US experience to argue that 
economies enjoying a substantial amount of product diversification are prone to have this 
diminished should a monetary union takes place. A common currency will lead to 
increased specialisation of member countries, and therefore to greater asymmetric shocks.
This study draws on the economic forecasts described in the May 1995 edition of the 
National Institute Economic Review enriched with updated projections for some smaller 
European countries. Some of their projections suggests that aggregate unemployment, 
which averaged close to 11.5 percent in the EU 1994, is expected to decline modestly by 
about 2 percentage points over the period to 1999, but remain above the low point reached 
at the height of the boom in the late 1980s.
For a more comprehensive analysis see Barrell, Caporale & Shefton (1994) whereby they 
use the NIGEM Macromodel to analyze the policy options available to Europe.
An additional factor contributing to the slow down of global economic growth was the 
oil price shock in the 1970s.
According to this table, Ireland and Denmark are the only exceptions.
It is of some interest to note that even in the OECD countries the growth rate of GDP has 
declined, especially after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. It should be emphasized that 
the exposition of the behaviour of the growth rate of GDP in the OECD countries aims at 
purely providing some additional information as to how this trend compares in both those 
p*oups.
* Giovannini and McKibbin used the MSG model, with the 1991 deficit to GDP ratios 
projected into future.
^In this study a baseline projection was used in which deficit to GDP ratios were held at 
their 1992 levels. Two possible scenarios for convergence of deficit and inflation rates by 
1996 were examined. The first scenario was based on the assumption that interest 
differentials between Germany and other EU members were reduced as convergence 
occurred whereas the second one assumed that interest differentials persisted at their 1992 
levels.
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Despite the rigorous effort by a number of economists to pinpoint the culprit for such an 
economic debacle, the unemployment rate seems to be gathering momentum disrupting the 
economies across the globe. A number o f potential reasons have been put forward in an 
attempt to explain such an unprecedented development, but none of them seems to provide 
a clear cut answer to the persisting problem. Some of the most predominant views on the 
causes of unemployment, revolve around the lack of flexibility in the labour market i.e. 
“sclerosis”, the long lasting effects o f unemployment i.e. “hysteresis”, or the inequality of 
earning power in the labour force.(Britton 1994)
The hysteresis theory find its roots in the notion that the associated sharp rises in 
unemployment were difficult to reverse. Moreover, they suggest that workers made 
redundant in a recession lose contact with the labour market, are regarded with suspicion by 
employers and become demoralized or demotivated. For more on hysterisis see (Blanchard 
and Summers 1986, 1987, Blanchard 1990, Bean 1994).
In France Mitterand’s cunning ploy of firstly outmanoeuvring the Communists and 
secondly of putting in place a mechanism that promoted liberalization and monetary union 
had a profound impact on France’s economic performance in years to come.
France’s economic polices were very much in line with those imposed by Germany on the 
rest of EU countries. The key difference however lies in the fact that Germany were no 
longer threatened with unemployment and under-consumption. As Cotta 1991 maintained, 
the same model may not work for countries such as France, Spain, and Italy, which have 
traditionally relied upon devaluations, fiscal stimulus and some inflation for growth. The 
goal of price stability is particularly injurious to the southern regions where sectoral 
disparities in productivity growth give rise to differential price increases and a structural 
unemployment.
The new era ushered in by Mitterand’s reign caused a structural change in France’s 
economic orientation. Under the impact o f rising unemployment and deindexation the 
average wage per employee dropped to 1.7 percent between 1982 and 1988 (Lecointe et al, 
1989) For the first time wages failed to keep up with productivity(Blanchard & Muet,1993)
. Profit margins after registering 13.13 percent in 1982, recovered considerably reaching
18.4 percent by 1987. The tax burden was shifted from companies to households. By 1994 
the wage share of national income had fallen nine points since when he came in power in 
1981. The end result of this new economic orientation shared by the French administration 
-  competitive deflation -  was growing income inequality, rising unemployment -  reaching 
12.7 percent by 1994 -  high real interest rates -  two points above the Germans -  and low 
growth -  an estimated 1 per cent of GDP annually(Fitoussi, 1995).
In response to a period o f social unrest and public discontent the Socialists moved closer to 
an alliance with the Communists, which was concluded for the surprise election called by 
Chirac in April 1997. The new government led by Jospin pledged a gradual and controlled 
reflation that would benefit labour. His proposed policy mix held a potential for higher 
inflation and budget deficits that diverged from the limits imposed by the EU Stability Pact.
One of the reasons why the Netherlands has the lowest unemployment rate in the euro 
area could be the sharp fall in wages relative to productivity. A deeper explanation could be 
sought in the Wassenaar agreement of 1982 between unions, busisness and government. 
Unions agreed to limit wage demands in exchange for more generous financing of early 
retirement and a shorter work-week. It has to be stressed however that despite the wage
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moderation in all European countries the ratio of labour to capital didi not reaver in these 
countries.
It has to be stressed however that over the last years Ireland have enjoyed significant 
economic stability. It is beyond question that Ireland’s economic success is exceptional. 
Between 1994 and 1999 the Republic of Ireland experienced GDP growth o f over 9 per 
cent per annum. Employment has risen by nearly a third over this period and ILO 
unemployment which stood at 13 per cent in 1994 has fallen to 4.4 per cent. As a result, 
living standards in Ireland, which were traditionally low by western standards, are 
converging rapidly to the EU average.
The short-term effects began with the devaluation of the punt in mmid-1986 and the 
doubling of the EU structural funds As the fiscal position became sustainable, internal and 
external confidence was boosted. Ireland’s success story has been underpinned by two 
long-term strategies which have contributed to sustainable development. The first is its 
industrial policy. In particular its primary focus has been on the developing a high value 
added manufacturing base through foreign direct investment using fiscal policy (low 
corporate tax rates and grants) as an incentive. The second long-term strategy is its 
education policy. The recent emphasis on completing upper secondary and tertiary 
education, educational attainment and skill levels of the Irish workforce have gradually 
improved Ireland’s position in attracting foreign investment.
In Spain the impact of monetary integration is invariably gauged in terms of the 
constraints imposed on welfare expenditure and the extent o f financial restrictions. Spain 
has had to reform the antiquated bureaucratic and dysfunctional economic processes 
inherited from the dictatorship and social intervention to satisfy the convergence criteria. In 
pursuing this objective Spain experienced dismal economic performance with 
unemployment exceeding the 20 percent mark. Despite the considerable effort of the 
incumbent government to provide a policy alternative in the fight against unemployment, 
Spain is still far behind other EU member states in per capita income as ever. Economic 
policy in Spain has been reduced to adopting monetarist policies at the expense of proactive 
industrial policy, making Spain a consumer rather than producer o f high technology as well 
as policies aiming at deregulating the labour markets. The implementation o f such policies 
took their toll on both the role of the state and in industrial development.
From 1990 to 1992 the Fed focused on stimulating the economy. The federal funds rate 
was lowered 23 times to fight inflation. Unemployment, after reaching 7.7 percent in July 
1992 it showed signs of recovery reflected by a drop to 6.5 percent at the end of 1993.
In February 1994, although the inflation rate was below 2.5 percent, the fed raised the funds 
rate target six times in 1994 and one in February 1995. As a result inflation was contained 
staying below 3 percent.
In 1996 and 1997 the unemployment rates of 5.4 and 4.9 respectively, were below most 
estimates of the natural rate of unemployment. Amongst a number of commentators Phelps 
(1996) and Rivlin (1999) thought that the low rates o f unemployment would lead to 
accelerating inflation. Contrary to the emerging speculation inflation remained low.
Not only did the fed allowed the economy to expand but allowed unemployment to 
continue falling. Inflation followed suit as well. Unemployment registered 5 percent in 
early 1997 and fell to 4.2 in May 1999 whilst inflation was below 2 percent. The
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outstanding performance of both unemployment and inflation were the best in almost 30 
years.
 ^ The view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon i.e. there is a causal mechanism 
running from changes in the stock o f money to the rate of inflation, appears to affect the 
way the ECB operates.
According to a report published by the Committee for the Study o f Economic and 
Monetary Union in 1989, ECB will be independent of any political control. However the 
prospect o f the ECB being strongly influenced by the interests o f the flnancial markets is 
more than certain.
According to Arestis, McCauley & Sawyer (1999) the current institutional structure and 
rules of the ECB are responsible for the dominance of monetary over fiscal policy.
One o f the reasons why financial corporations are more concerned about inflation is that 
inflation depreciates the value of their loans and is at odds with the goal o f a strong balance 
of payments and a stable currency. Persistent inflation also leads to various monetary 
imbalances that undermine the effectiveness o f central bank action. Greater mobility of 
financial capital is deflationary, because , ceteris paribus, capital will seek out the highest 
real return, in other words, it will flow to the country with the highest real interest rate. 
States which wish to avoid capital losses or unwanted depreciation must conform their 
interest rate and other macroeconomic policies in line with those o f the "tightest” state.
In a study conducted by Gosta Dahlstrom (1998), policy measures directed to achieving 
price stability leads to an increase in the level o f the 'misery index'. In the same line of 
argument, Meinder (1998) posits that the setting o f new priorities, meaning those targeting 
price stability, are to be held culpable for the unprecedented high levels of Swedish 
unemployment.
Research on inflation targeting suggests that such a mandate has to be reconsidered. 
Inflation targeting has been advovated by distinguished economists such as Bemanke and 
Mishkin (1997). Price stability has topped the agenda of politicians around the world. In 
some cases (for example New Zealand) excessive inflation has even cost the central bank 
heads their job. For an extensive analysis on the politics of an ‘Independent Central Bank’ 
see Epstein and Schor, (1986), Burkitt et al., (1996), Alesina and Summers (1993), Hetzel 
(1990), Levy (1995), Cardim de Carvalho (1995); for a critique see Posen 1993).
The empirical work carried out by Hall & Franzese (1998) provides evidence from a 
pooled time series for inflation and unemployment based on annual as well as average data 
for 1955 to 1990 for 18 OECD countries.
The emergence of the ECB as the sole institution responsible for setting monetary policy 
and in effect controlling inflation has been instructed against financing any public 
programs. One might argue that maintaining low rates o f inflation is a legitimate target. 
There is nothing wrong with such a contention. The question however that can be posed is 
whether economic stability means nothing more than price stabiltiy and therefore economic 
policy can be reduced to disinflationary measures. Amongst a number of academics, as well 
as bankers, Arestis & Sawyer (1999); Eltis (1998); Goodhart (1998); George (1998), have 
all expressed their concern about the potential negative impact of the deflationary bias 
associated with the ECB on employment.
In the enthusiasm of adopting deflationary policies, EU legislators have neglected the 
fact that some EU member states will be more vulnerable to the policy implications that
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that the deflationary policies involve. Arguably, achieving a low rate inflation rate is 
particularly pernicious to the southern European countries, where sectoral disparities give 
rise to acute inflationary pressures. For example, wide differences in productivity growth 
among sectors, combined with a similar rate o f growth of wage rates, lead to much bigger 
price increase in those with limited productivity gains.
Meaning that the general capacity of Euroland to produce goods and employ labour has 
fallen behind labour supply growth.
That is, due to deflationary policies in the run-up to EMU.
Empirical studies as to what the NAIRU is, have proven to be fickle. In the late 1980s, 
EU countries experienced fall a in unemployment due to measures purporting to boost 
aggregate demand.
According to this argument “a damaging spiral might develop in which, for example, an 
initial cost-push stimulus leads to monetary policy tightening by the ECB, which induces 
governments to raise tax rates in an effort to reverse a rise in their budget deficits, which in 
turn generates further cost-push pressure and hence more monetary tightening. This 
instability could be avoided if treasuries and central banks cooperated in pursuit of agreed 
targets for inflation and activity”(Taylor 1995: p.l 19)
The whole philosophy behind price stability lies in the notion that zero inflation is much 
easier to control. Michie (1998) maintains that there is no reason why this should be the 
case. The inflation rate is the average of thousands o f price movements some falling, some 
stable and some rising. Therefore if “zero inflation is achieved it would not be because 
prices are stable but because these movements happen to cancel each other out”(p.41).
During the first half o f the 1980s the average inflation rate among members of the ERM 
was reduced by half Such an achievement has been attributed to the favourable framework 
that the development of ERM provided (Gregory and Weiserbs 1998).
Nominal, long term interest rates have been used for the undertaken analysis.
Barrel and Pain (1996) state that when real interest rates are high, unemployment is high. 
According to Phelps (1992), and Barrel et al (1995), there are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
high real interest rates raise income from non-labour sources(like savings) and reduce the 
value o f discounted future earnings, thereby reducing the costs o f non-employment. 
Secondly, high real interest rates raise the costs to firms o f holding stocks of goods and 
employing under-used workers (as an insurance against a sudden demand upturn). As a 
result they hold smaller stocks and reduce the size of their workforce. They also reduce the 
value o f the returns to be gained in the future from investing in new employees now.
^  Minsky and Whalen (1996-97) argue that the current “monetary-policy goal of zero 
inflation be replaced by a return to the early postwar policy of low and stable interest 
rates” (pp. 165-66).
For Marx and his proponents, economic policies are formed by the ruling class (the 
capitalists) whose sole intention is to maintain their political control over the rest by going 
to any lengths. Reversing the flow of policies tailored to serve the interests of those 
particular groups within a society requires determination and radical measures: in other 
words, the overthrow of the capitalist system.
Margaret Thatcher was renowned for her zeal for weakening the power of British trade 
unions.
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According to the Ricardian theorem any changes in the level o f expenditure makes no 
difference to the level of nominal demand whether the government chooses to finance the 
level of spending wholly through taxation, or through a mix of taxation and public 
borrowing. Therefore, on the assumption that the private sector is rational enough, 
variations in the budget deficit do not affect the spending decision o f the private sector. 
Running a government deficit financed by the sale o f bonds, is looked upon as a 
postponement of the need to raise tax. Holders of bonds will nor be willing to lend large 
amounts to the government so taxes will eventually have to be raised to service bonds. As a 
result, people will react to a rise in budget deficit by saving in order to pay for the expected 
increase in taxes. Total spending therefore remains intact.
For a critique of the Ricardian theorem see for example Davies (1989).
The use of public expenditure-type policies can be observed in countries such as the 
USA, in which, during the 1980s, the Reagan administration used public expenditure to 
stimulate economic activity (Reagan Boom), or in Germany where during the unification 
public expenditures for the reconstruction and modernization of the eastern Lander 
produced very high rates of growth (in Germany as a whole), until they were blocked by 
the restrictive stance of the Bundesbank.
This result was based on the assumption that nominal interest rates remain fixed. 
However, if interest rates respond, so as to maintain low inflation, then the additional 
expenditure will be crowded-out completely.
The dire state that European public finances are now in, makes fiscal expansion a rather 
undesirable prospect (Grahl 1997).
The major attack on active fiscal policy i.e. the use of government spending to influence 
output and employment, came in the 1970s, from the proponents of the ‘monetarist theory’.
Borrowing restriction are not present in existing monetary unions (see for example 
Eichengreen 1997).
Nowadays, the predominant trend that characterizes businesses is speculation in FOREX 
and experimentation with novel financial instruments to expanding productive capital. (See 
Alvater, 1987; Strange 1986; Armstrong a/. 1984; Minsky, 1982).
The most renowned critique of deficit spending came from Barro (1974). His theory, 
known as The Ricardian equivalence', is based on the argument that the impact o f public 
spending will be no greater when it is deficit spending financed by borrowing, than when it 
is immediately financed by additional tax revenues.
The shift in policy was towards the implementation of policies aiming at making labour 
markets more flexible.
Individual countries’ exchange rate type policies have been dismissed as "beggar-thy- 
neighbour" policies.
For more on the rational behind the introduction of the stability pact see chapter 5.
The deficit and debt criteria suggest that deflationary policies should be focused on 
countries about to exceed the threshold. This deflationary bias reflects the asymmetry of 
the deficit rule (Bean 1992; De Grauwe 1992; Gros and Thygersen 1992).
The public debt criterion may seem unnecessary for monetary union if contrasted to the 
Belgium and Luxembourg experience. In 1995, these two countries had the highest and the 
lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios in the EU. Nevertheless, they were successfully sharing a 
common currency, and had done so for decades (The Economist, 23 September 1995).
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60 Governments may look upon switching the tax burden onto lower-income groups as an 
alternative to attract external investment and avoid the delocalisation (Grahl 1997).
The new tendency towards globalization and privatization is a new feature of the global 
economy. The contention that competition from cheap labour in East Asia has resulted in a 
fall in the relative demand for low skilled labour, and in increases in the ratio of earnings 
of the skilled to the unskilled within all countries is pervasive in contemporary economic 
literature.
This is in line with the notion that frscal federalism was not a prerequisite when the 
common currencies in both USA and Canada were created.
Following the same line of argument Dreze et al. (1987); Van der Ploeg (1991), claim 
that a fiscal coordination is conducive to an effective coordination of the fiscal-monetary 
golicy mix at European level.
Harrop (1998) states that the ‘Community budget does not play a stabilization role, and 
lacks flexibility as a result of its multi-annual programming’(pp.l9). Furthermore, Italianer 
and Van Heukelen (1993) suggested that a reserve on top of the budget should exist, with a 
view to helping out economies suffering an exogenous shock which raised their 
unemployment rate.
It should be stressed that all the regression analysis at this stage is purely preliminary and 
aims at providing an indication regarding the behaviour of the variables in question before 
and after a specific period (The ratification of the Maastricht treaty). Therefore the time- 
series properties have not been given any consideration. A more detailed and 
comprehensive econometric analysis will come into existence at a later stage, when dealing 
primarily with the empirical part o f our study.
^  OECD, Economic Outlook is the main source of data collection.
Not unexpectedly, increased central bank independence is associated with lower 
inflation. What is more surprising is that such independence is not associated with 
improved real economic performance (Alesina and Summers 1993; Cukierman 1994).
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Chapter 3
A Post Keynesian Explanation of European 
Unemployment: Econometric Evidence
3.1 Introduction.
Up to now, the main elaboration of the preceding chapters dwelt upon the key role 
that macroeconomic policy plays in alleviating economic ills such as unemployment as well 
as upon the emergence of the new economic orientation, as reflected by the neoliberal 
dogma, whose sole policy objective is the elimination of inflation. More specifically, by 
identifying a significant link between macroeconomic policy - through its effects on 
aggregate demand - and unemployment, it was illustrated that the austere deflationary 
policies implied by the Maastricht’s convergence criteria have exerted enormous pressure 
on key economic indicators and most crucially on unemployment. In this context, the prime 
hypothesis that the contractionary nature o f the Maastricht rules will impact on aggregate 
demand which in turn will affect negatively the unemployment rate, will be the reference 
point for conducting our empirical analysis.
The rest o f this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 touches on the nature, in 
terms of both the variables used and the evidence obtained, of some previously estimated 
unemployment equations. Section 3.3 provides the theoretical framework on which our 
empirical investigation is based. Section 3.4 expands on the econometric methodology that
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has been adopted for the estimation. Section 3.5 elaborates on the results generated while 
section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Previous attempts made to explain variations in the unemployment rate.
Over the last two decades, several theories have emerged in an attempt to explain 
the high and seemingly persistent levels of unemployment in OECD countries, and 
especially in Europe. Econometric models based on these theories have generated 
confusing evidence as to what variables should be held accountable for the upward trend of 
unemployment. The bulk of these theories' regard imperfections in goods and labour 
markets as the major culprit behind the rise in unemployment. One important element that 
these theories seem to have in common is the notion that low frequency movements in 
unemployment, or the NAIRU, are attributable to structural variables, such as 
unemployment benefits, taxes, real interest rates whereas high frequency^ movements in 
unemployment are determined by wage and price changes (Madsen, 1998).
A predominant view as to what extent aggregate demand affects unemployment 
resides in the perception that aggregate demand shocks can only affect unemployment, 
provided that they generate wage and price expectational errors
Amidst numerous attempts by economists to estimate unemployment equations, 
Phelps (1994) developed a reduced form^ which, considering the nature of the variables 
incorporated in it, purported to explain the NAIRU. It is mainly in the so-called 
structuralist models that the interest rate is assumed to be the main component on which 
variations of the unemployment rate are contingent. Such a contention finds roots in the 
notion that an increase in the real interest rate^ has an adverse effect on investment.
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workers, and fixed capital, and therefore increases mark-ups, which in turn lower the 
demand for labour. Moreover if the relative output price o f the investment-producing sector 
increases, the real product wage decreases in the investment-producing sector, but increases 
in the consumption-producing sector^ (Madsen 1998). Thereby, aggregate employment 
increases. The estimation results of Phelps’ model suggest that the increase in the world 
interest rate, over the sample period, had a negative impact on unemployment, whereas the 
variables concerning government activities such as increasing taxes, government 
expenditure and debt, provided an obscure picture as to how and to what extent they affect 
unemployment*.
In pursuing the unravelling of the mystery surrounding labour markets, Layard and 
Nickell (1986) after substituting a real wage equation into a labour demand function 
generated a reduced form unemployment equation which provided some further insight into 
the causes of unemployment. Their main evidence pointed towards a significant 
relationship between direct taxes and unemployment’.
Unlike the mainstream approach to explaining unemployment, an alternative strand 
of thought seeks justifications through analysis of the pressure that demand side factors 
exert on employment*®. In this direction, McCallum (1986) constructed an unemployment 
equation* * in which a change in the unemployment rate depends on a real wage variable, a 
demand related variables, as well as indicators of change in fiscal and monetary policy. His 
estimated equation provided evidence for 14 OECD countries from 1968 to 1984. The 
most interesting feature of the results obtained relates to fiscal and monetary policy. Both 
policies are found to play an important role in the fight against unemployment*^. Not only 
can McCallum’s results be compared to large econometric models but to single equation*^
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estimates for individual countries such as by Layard and Nickell (1985), Sachs (1983), 
Symons and Layard (1984), and Newell and Symons (1985), as well. More specifically, out 
o f all the estimated coefficients presented in these studies, only the ones presented by 
Layard and Nickell appear to be akin to the ones generated by McCallum’s model. In 
contrast, Newell’s and Symons’ (1985) evidence indicates that a significant role for fiscal 
policy exists but nevertheless this is confined only to France’s and USA’s estimates.
In another study, this time by Sarantis (1993), an investigation into the role of 
income distribution in the determination of unemployment was conducted. Developed in a
post Keynesian spirit, his model was applied to ten OECD countries for the 1960-1989 
period.
The theoretical framework of Sarantis’ m o d e l w a s  based on the notion that 
“unemployment is effectively determined by capacity utilisation which in turn depends on 
income distribution and aggregate demand’’(Sarantis 1993: p.461). The main findings of 
his econometric analysis indicate that a shift in income towards labour leads to higher 
unemployment'^. Moreover, strong evidence supporting the importance o f monetary 
policy and the hypothesis that inadequacy o f capital‘^equipment may result in higher 
unemployment were obtained.
As can be discerned by the preceding exposition of econometric studies'*, arriving 
at a uniform conclusion, as to how unemployment can be explained over a period of time, 
remains rather an equivocal issue.
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3.3 Analytical Framework.
In this study an analytical framework, which differs substantially from the orthodox 
neoclassical paradigm, is developed, investigating the notion that the nature of 
macroeconomic policy conditions aggregate demand and therefore unemployment. 
Following the Post Keynesian-Kaleckian tradition, it is argued that the type o f economic 
policy - as reflected by both monetary and fiscal policies - can play a significant role in 
determining the economic conditions that promote full employment, and therefore 
economic and social stability. Consequently, the view that economic activity is galvanised 
through the adoption of policies tailored to stimulate private, as well as public investment, 
is of paramount significance throughout this analysis'^.
The anti-inflationary^® spirit through which economic policy is conveyed in EU 
region, has circumscribed the autonomy of macroeconomic policy, and in effect, the 
viability o f expansionary policies. Demand-stimulating economic policies have been 
severely criticised and inevitably rejected^* on the grounds that the ensuing economic 
expansions will be breached, since the financing of deficits will lead to an explosive and 
unsustainable growth in the ratio of public debt to GDP.
In our analysis, despite the scathing criticism public deficits^^ have come in for, it is 
strongly believed that their inherent expansionary attributes'^ are conducive to economic 
progress and therefore, constitute a necessary implement with which contemporary 
economies will be able to surmount their economic impasse. In this sense, restrictive 
macroeconomic policies cause unemployment via their effect on aggregate demand.
In addition, income policies are also central to this analysis, in so far as income 
distribution is inextricably linked with aggregate demand, and therefore, with
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unemployment. The reasoning behind it draws heavily on the notion that an increase in 
profits will shift income distribution away from wage earners, and therefore reduce 
aggregate demand^"*. Such a mechanism can be represented by the following set of 
equations (see glossary in table 1 for explanation o f mathematical symbols):
The share o f profits and the wage share are given by (see Appendix I for 
derivations):
(6PK) / (PY) (p / (J + q>) 0 )
and
IS
(W N)/(PY) = 1 / ( 1 +ip) (2)
respectively; where Q is the profit rate, P is price, K  is capital stock, Y is real output, W i 
wages, N  is employment, and q> is the mark-up^^
Following the pricing rule we can obtain the share o f profits in the value of output 
which is given by equation (1), and the wage share which is given by equation (2). Both 
equations suggest that increases in the realized mark-up leads to an increase in profit share
at the expense o f wage share^^. In other words, income distribution^^ is basically 
determined by the mark-up.
Since our main theoretical framework is predicated on the contention that the 
components of aggregate demand condition the level o f employment, our econometric 
model uses the following goods market equilibrium condition (see Appendix II):
C + (Xo + x,0 -  x^i + XjO)) + G + (go -  g,<^  -  g,(o) = (1 -  )A,0. (3)
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Therefore equation (3) equates the aggregate demand injections to national savings. 
The left hand-side comprises (i)consumption C, (ii)investment, which depends positively 
on the profit rate 0, negatively on interest rates /*, and positively on capacity utilization co; 
(iii) net government expenditure G; and (iv) net exports which depend negatively on both 
exchange rates and capacity utilization^* «. The right hand-side represents the total 
national savings from profits; where stands for tax rates on profit, and A,/ is the marginal 
propensity to save out o f profits; where x ‘s and g ’s are positive parameters.
Having demonstrated the way the wage as well as the profit share are affected by 
the mark-up rate, we now proceed to the next step which is to relate unemployment to a 
number of demand-side variables. In particular, the following model purports to explain 
variations in the unemployment rate through a number of variables which according to the 
post Keynesian tradition, play an instrumental role in determining aggregate demand. In 
this context, income distribution, fiscal and monetary policy, as well as international 
competitiveness are potential factors that, through aggregate demand, affect employment 
creation.
U = U (L ,B ,r ,M ) (4)
-  + + +
Equation (4)^  ^states that the unemployment rate (U) depends negatively on income 
distribution which is measured by the actual labour share o f output fl/® ; positively on 
government budget surplus (B)\ positively on the interest rate and positively on 
imports^^ (M).
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In this particular model, the interest rate r, rather than money supply as in mainstream 
economics, has been used as the monetary instrumenté^. Our initial objective to construct, 
and ultimately estimate a model which will provide further insight into the factors 
responsible for inducing variations in labour demand, has to a large extent been fulfilled. 
Note that in the above model both the monetary and the fiscal variables are sufficient to 
capture the effects of contractionary policies such as the ones implied by the Maastricht 
Treaty. However, we introduce a dummy variable D in an attempt to capture the effect of 
the ratification of the Maastricht treaty on EU unemployment. In our case the sign of the 
dummy variable is expected to be of a positive nature since the platform on which our 
initial hypothesis has been expounded suggests that the convergence criteria might have 
had an adverse effect on employment in the EU region. Taking into account the latter the 
revised version o f equation (4) takes the following form.
U = Po-PiL+P2B + Psr + IÌ4M+ PsD, (5) 
where /3’s are positive constants.
Inherently, what distinguishes our model from a neoclassical one is the notion that 
in an effective demand determined equilibrium, the level o f output adjusts so as to 
equilibrate with the level of aggregate demand. In other words, there is a sequence of 
possible equilibrium outcomes, the selection of which depends on the factors determining 
effective demand. This contrasts with the neoclassical supply constrained version of 
equilibrium, in that the level of output is supply constrained and the role o f aggregate 
demand is purely confined to that of the determination of the interest rate.
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Unlike the Post Keynesian approach, neoclassical theory has become synonymous 
with price theor/"^ where distribution and growth were relegated to secondary concerns. If 
there was any unemployment, then the causes were rigid wages, preventing the clearing 
price to be reached. Moreover, neoclassical economic theory places the determination of 
the interest rate in the goods market, serving as a means of ensuring goods market 
equilibrium.
In our model money is determined by the actions o f the banking system and 
financial intermediaries.
As far as price deflation is concerned, we regard it as ineffective^^ when dealing 
with unemployment. Such a contention derives from firstly, the belief that deflation 
impacts on debt burdens, which in turn affects aggregate demand, and secondly, from the 
time-consuming nature of production, which means that firms are unable to recover their 
costs in a deflationary environment. Additionally, in neoclassical models the real wage is 
looked upon as being the result of bargaining between workers and firms. This contrasts 
with the Post Keynesian approach in which nominal wages are bargained over by workers, 
while real wages are determined by a process^^ over which workers have no control.
On the whole, the fundamental difference of our model in relation to a neoclassical 
one is that, in principle we are trying to explain variations in unemployment by putting 
more emphasis on the factors affecting the components o f aggregate demand, such as fiscal 
and monetary policies. In neoclassical models the presence o f the aforementioned factors 
are very often conspicuous by their absence, reflecting the secondary importance given to 
them. Therefore comparing our model to a neoclassical one in terms o f the technical
90
aspects such as the expected signs o f the parameters would not provide a better 
understanding as to what the real differences between the two models are.
3.4 Econometric methodology: Panel data analysis.
For conducting our econometric investigation panel data analysis has been adopted. 
In a nutshell, the term "panel data" refers to the pooling of observations of countries, or 
groups over several time periods (Baltagi 1995). Prior to estimating our model it is 
important that we stipulate the reasons why panel data analysis can be beneficial, as well as 
distinguish between the models involved in panel data analysis and the concomitant 
variations peculiar to them.
Amongst a number of econometricians, Hsiao (1985, 1986), Klevmarken (1989) 
and Solon (1989) maintain that the use o f panel data analysis can be very beneficial^* in a 
number of ways such: (i) panel data suggest that individual countries are heterogeneous^^; 
(ii) panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity'*® among other 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; (iii) panel data are well suited to 
study duration of economic states like unemployment, and poverty; (iv) panel data can 
capture and measure effects that are not detectable in cross-section time-series analysis as 
well as provide a platform on which panel data models allows us to test more complicated 
behavioural models.
Models o f  Panel Data:
For the estimation of our model we use a data-set which consists of N  cross- 
sectional units, denoted i = observed at each of T  time periods, denoted t =
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We have a total o f TN observations and y is a (TNxl) vector of endogenous 
variables and X is a (TNxk) matrix of exogenous variables which does not include a column 
o f units for the constant term. In our context, we use annual data for 13 EU'*' countries 
from 1961 to 1998 (so N  = 13; T  = 37).
The generalized regression model provides our basic framework:
yit = ai +^i'xit + Eit. (6)
Eu^i.i.d. ( O.a,  ^).
where a, is a scalar, and /3, is 2l (k x 1) vector of slope coefficients. We assume similar 
variances between countries, i.e. .cr/ = cr/ Vi, and zero covariances between countries i.e. 
Cov ( Sit, Sjt ) = 0 fori ^  j.
We distinguish three cases of (6):
(i) The pooled model
When both a  and P are common between regions, we get the pooled model:
y  = la + X p  + e. (7)
where i is a (TN x 1) column vector of ones. For this simple model, the Generalized Least 
Squares estimator reduces to pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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(ii)The fixed effects model
The fixed effects (or least squares dummy variables model, or within model) is 
based on the notion that differences across countries can be captured in differences in the
constant term4 2 .
yi, = ai + ffxit + e , 7 .  (8)
The fixed effects model is a reasonable approach when we can be confident that the 
differences between countries can be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function.
Relationships and tests between models:
Equations (7) and (8) are restricted versions of (6), whereas (7) is a restricted form 
of (8). Under the assumption that the e„ are independently normally distributed over i and t 
with mean zero and variance , F- statistics'^ can be used to test the linear restrictions 
postulated by (7) and (8).
(Hi) The Random effects model
If we believe that sampled cross sectional units are drawn from a large population, it 
may be more appropriate to use the random effects model (or variance components model), 
in which individual constant terms are randomly distributed across cross sectional units^^:
yi, = a  + ffxit + Pi + Sit, (9)
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where £(ju, = 0), = g^ ,  E(^ifj.j) = Ofor i^ j, and E(SitHj) ~ O,for all i, t, andj. Thus
Hi is a random disturbance which characterizes the ith observation and is constant through 
time; it can be regarded as a collection of factors that are specific to region i and are not 
included in the regression. The above model can be estimated by Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS).
Following Hsiao (1986)," Whether to treat the effects as fixed or random is not an 
easy question to answer...It appears that one way to unify the fixed effects and random 
effects model is to assume from the outset that the effects are random. The fixed effects 
model is viewed as one in which investigators make inferences conditional on the effects 
that are in the sample. The random effects model is viewed as one in which investigators 
make unconditional or marginal inferences with respect to the population of all effects", 
(pp. 41-42).
The random effects model has been criticized because it neglects the possible 
correlation between the individual effects (pi ) and the explanatory variables. If such 
correlation exists then the random effects treatment suffers from inconsistency. As 
Hsiao(1986) puts it, "...the issue is not whether pi is fixed or random. The issue is 
whether or not the conditional distribution of pi given Xi is equal to the unconditional 
distribution of pi.
However in the linear regression framework, when pi is correlated with Xi,, treating 
Pi as fixed leads to the identical estimators of p as are obtained when such correlation is 
explicitly allowed for", (p.48).
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Hausman (1978) devised a specification test"*^  which can be used to test the 
orthogonality o f the random effects and the regressors. It is based on the idea that under 
null hypothesis (Ho) of no correlation, the GLS for (9) is consistent and achieves the 
Cramer - Rao lower bounds, and OLS for (3) is consistent and inefficient, while under the 
alternative hypothesis (Hi) OLS remains consistent, but GLS is not.
3.5 Estimation and Testing.
In an endeavour to model the unemployment rate, t// as a function of a number of 
demand side exogenous variables, several estimated specifications of equations (7) - (9) 
following a general to specific approach, were estimated (see Table la  for Data 
definitions). What follows, is a presentation of the equation that was selected on the basis 
of the Schwarz (S.LC) and Akaike (A.LC) Information criteria''^
Fixed Effects Model
Uit = -1.2E-05 Mit + 0.21 A5it + 0.26 + 4.9E-06 AA/„ + 4.49 D,+ Sa,
(2.8E-06) (0.08) (0.06) (2.3E-06) (0.43)
(standard errors in parentheses).
= 0.61
5.7. C. =-2.65, A/. C. = -2 .84 .
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The individual effects and their standard errors (see Appendix III) are reported in the 
following table:
Country Ger. Fra. Ita. Neth Bel. Ire. Den.
Intercept 3.39 5.89 3.20 2.59 6.19 6.51 4.61
S.E. 0.77 0.95 0.81 0.75 0.91 0.83 1.05
Country Spa. Por. Swe. Fin. A us. U.K.
Intercept 11.8 3.15 -0.4 3.66 0.66 2.62
S.E. 1.04 1.54 0.95 0.91 0.77 0.81
Random Effects Model
Uit = 4 .0 4 -1.2E-05 AZ,/, + 0.21 + 0.26 A r„ + 4.9E-06 AM„ + 4.50 Z), + .
(1.39) (2.8E-06) (0.86) (0.06) (2.2E-06) (0.43)
(standard errors in parentheses)
= 0.61
S.I.C. = ■ 2.87, A.I.C. = -2.77
Pooled Model
Ui, = 2.66 - 1.5E-05 AL„ + 0.21 A^u + 0.39 Ar/, + 6.3E-06 AA/„ + 4.90 A  + Su, 
(0.70) (3.1E-06) (0.12) (0.06) (2.8E-06) (0.57)
(standard errors in parentheses)
= 0.25
5.7.0. =-2.85, AZ.C. =-2.81
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The following test statistics were calculated:
F(12,455) = 23.69, \p - value = O m ] ,
Hausman - test = 16.75, \p - value = 0.00] .
The F-test suggests that the fixed effects model is preferred to the pooled model. 
Moreover, since the Hausman -test cannot accept the orthogonality o f the individual effects 
and the regressors (at any reasonable size of the test), the fixed effects model is preferred to 
the random effects one. Additionally, the Akaike Information Criterion favours the fixed 
effects model whereas the Schwarz Information Criterion ranks the fixed effects model 
below both random effects and pooled models.
3.5.4. Interpretation of the fixed effects estimates.
As we can discern from the preceding empirical results, the fixed effects estimates 
will be our reference point. The relatively high suggests that variations in the dependent 
variable are explained rather satisfactorily by variations in the explanatory ones. The 
estimated parameters display the anticipated signs and all pass the significance test at the 
5% level of significance.
Our findings show that a shift in distribution towards labour will in fact have a 
positive impact on European employment'*^. In our model such a contention is reflected by 
the negative and statistically significant coefficient of {¿ if Corroborating evidence 
concerning our prime hypothesis that the contractionary stance taken by nearly all 
European member states in order to meet the Maastricht rules and therefore proceeding to 
EMU, will have an adverse effect on European employment, is another point worth 
emphasizing. More specifically, the estimates of the fiscal (Bit) as well as the monetary (n,)
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parameters - both positive and significant - indicate that in the short run^^ any fiscal or 
monetary contraction such as the one implied by the convergence rules will be pernicious 
for the working population of Europe. Therefore the austere economic policies that have 
been put in place, since 1992, to arguably facilitate the transition to EMU, might have put 
an additional strain on policies aimed at sustaining economic growth as well as generating 
jobs. The next estimated parameter (MiJ is a measure o f international competitiveness 
which in this model is reflected by the volume of imports. The estimated coefficient 
corresponding to this particular proxy suggests that an increase in the volume of imports 
will cause unemployment to follow suit. Finally, the fact that the dummy^® variable was 
consistently positive and significant throughout all estimated models indicates the extent to 
which variations in unemployment could be well justified after the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty.
By and large, the underlying significance of the results obtained suggests that in 
Europe a mix o f policies designed to affect aggregate demand might be a policy alternative 
worth looking at should unemployment be contained once and for all.
Some further experimentation with various equations resulted in an equation that 
purported to translate output effects into unemployment effects as well as test the 
hypothesis o f structural differences across countries. In this direction, we pre-multiplied 
each variable o f equation (5) by the ratio o f the Okim’s Law^' coefficients (oki) of each 
country to their mean (ok^.
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Uit = (okj^k^[Po + P2 A5 it + /3i  Ar/, + ^ 4 ^ it + PsD ¡J
(See Appendix IV for estimation results.)
Despite the fact that the undertaken F-tests failed to accept the introduction o f the 
structural coefficient (oki/ok^, it is worth noting that the influence on the parameters 
reflecting the fiscal as well as the monetary stance has remained intact in all estimated 
models (pooled, fixed effects, and random effect) in terms o f both sign and significance.
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3.6 Concluding remarks.
It is beyond question that econometric models purporting to investigate the issue 
concerning unemployment have produced conflicting evidence as to what factors should be 
held accountable for variations in unemployment. In models such as those of Layard et al 
(1991) or Phelps (1994) there has been a rather cavalier dismissal of the role of the 
aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is seen as being totally unrelated to the distribution 
of income or the real wage. This paper, however, has produced some significant results, 
which once interpreted, reinforce the belief that aggregate-demand policies can have 
profound effects on the employed population of a country/region.
More specifically, by unveiling the mechanism through which changes in the wage 
share could affect aggregate demand and thus, unemployment, we generated evidence on 
the basis of which, a shift in income distribution towards labour leads to lower 
unemployment in euroland. Moreover, evidence regarding the way fiscal as well as 
monetary policies are conducted suggests that in the EU region expansionary type policies 
should be adopted to alleviate the current problem of unemployment. Throughout our 
empirical investigation, the deflationary policies that have been fostered after the 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty are found to add to the existing problem, exerting more 
pressure on the EU economies.
In essence, what is suggested, is in line with Sawyers (1998) view that if there is a 
level of unemployment which would be consistent with constant unemployment, then it is 
imperative that steps to look into the determinants of the level of unemployment as well as 
the degree to which it can be shifted over time with appropriate demand, income 
distributional and supply-side policies, must be taken.
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Table 2a.
Unemployment rate - OECD, Economic Outlook.
Compensation of employees paid by resident producers / Gross domestic product - 
OECD, National Accounts.
General government budget balance as a percentage of GDP - OECD, Economic 
Outlook.
r Real long-run interest rate. OECD, Main Economic Indicators.
M Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP - OECD. Economic Outlook. 
D Dummy variable - It takes the value 0 for the years prior to 1992 (ratification of 
the Maastricht treaty) and the value 1 for the years after.
B
Table 2b.
oki
ok,
Estimated Okun's Law coefficient obtained from a regression of the unemployment 
rate on current and lagged GDP and time, time squared, and time cubed over the 
period 1961-1998 (one regression equation for each member state), 
is the 13-country mean Okun's coefficient.
Estimated Okun's Law coefficients are as follows: Germany 0.14, France 0.18, 
Italy 0.47, Netherlands 0.51, Belgium 0.02, Ireland 0.29, Denmark 0.31,
Spain 0.44, Portugal 0.06, Sweden 0.11, Finland 0.07, Austria 0.10, UK 0.51.
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Appendix II
Equation (3) is based on the following set o f  equations:
y  = C + /  + G +A"............................................................{IIX)
C = (1 -  r J (1  -  A, ){OPK) + { \ - x J { W N !  PY) ..............{II.2)
G = x„PK + r^WY ............................................................{II.3)
I  = {Xq+ x^O -  x^r + Xy(o).................................................(//-4)
^  = { g o - ...................................................... ( / / i )
Equation (II. 1) is the aggregate demand function; where C is real consumption, I  is 
real investment, G is real government expenditure, and X  real net exports. Equation (II.2) 
is the consumption function; it is based on the assumption that savings come only from
profits^^ (Xi). Equation (II. 3) is the balanced government budget; in equation (II.4)
investment depends on the profit rate 6, the real interest rate r, and the rate o f  capacity 
utilization ox Finally, equation (II. 5) assumes that net exports X  depend on both the 
exchange rate ^ and capacity utilization ox
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Appendix III
Equation (c) can be estimated by OLS, after the transformation 
y u - y i  = -  j,.) + £,.,, ( i i L i )
where y^and x ¡are the sample means o f yi andxi respectively, i.e
Y !  y- Y "  X.-  Lut=\-yu _
yi = ,x,. = . This implies that fo r  each country (i) the intercept and its
variance can be derived from:
a, = X -  P'Xi,andVar(di) = —  + x; Var[p)x^. ( III.2)
Let Si denote the residual sum o f  squares o f  (6) 5, = RSS , where RSSi is the
residual sum o f  squares o f  the ith group). Let S2 and S3 denote the residual o f  sum o f 
squares o f  models (7) and (8) respectively.
Testing the pooled model (7) against the fixed effects model (8):
Ho ct/ =0.2 -  ...= a s  .(homogeneous intercepts conditional on homogeneous
slopes),
( 5 , - S , ) l { N - \ )
^ = s n m - N - k )
The transformation o f  the variables for GLS is given by:
yu -yi* =  a *  -  a  +  p f x i t  -  X i ) .
106
^ 2
where y] = (l -  , a * = (l “  y[o\x,x] = (l - ,andO = . .
To compute 6, we use the variance o f the fixed effects model (  8 ) as an estimate o f gJ  ; the 
difference between the variances o f  the pooled regression (7) and the fixed effects model 
(8), is taken as an estimate o f  c r/ . When 6 = 0, the random effects model (9) is reduced 
to the fixed effects model (8). When 6 = 1, model (9) reduces to the pooled model (7).
The Hausman test is a chi- squared test based on the Wald criterion:
» ' = { A  - f t )  ( i )
A A
where S  = j -  jandp^, are the estimators o f  equation ( 8 )  and (9)
respectively.
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Appendix IV
Pooled Fixed Effects Random Effects
c 6.09 6.26
(0.45) (1.04)
(ok/okJALit -1.2E-05 -3.9E-06 -5.6E-06
(8.5E-06) (9.9E-06) (9.5E-06)
(ok/okJABi, 0.21 0.19 0.18
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
(ok/okJArn 0.12 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
(ok/okJAMi, 8.4E-06 1.3E-05 1.3E-05
(l.lE-05) (8.7E-06) (8.7E-06)
(standard errors in parenthesis)
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Notes:
' Some o f  the most prominent general equilibrium models are the ones o f Phelps fl994)
Layard and Nickell (1986) and Layard, et al. (1991). ^  ^ ’
 ^Hence, the name "structuralist theories of unemployment" (Phelps 1994)
An additional factor that contributes to the high frequency movements can also be the 
cyclical mark-ups (Layard and Nickell 1986). ’ °
"’6 labour demand schedule. The 
neoclassical condition that determines employment is given by:
W ^/P ' = (M /ti)MP^
elasticity of demand facing the firms , is the marginal productivity o f
M X i T l 9 9 8 ? l ‘,!^h r  ^  ^  ''»‘“«-added price deflator(Madsen, 1998). Such a relationship suggests that employment is a negative function o f
expected real wages (Phelps 1994, Layard and Nickell 1986).
equilibrium models o f Hoon and 
Phelps (1992), Phelps (1992) and Fitoussi and Phelps (1988).
'■“'® «°">pnses a world real interest rate, and a
m v,m m  T h r .  i f  »‘° “' '  determined. An increase in
government debt will cause unemployment to rise as it puts an upward pressure on the real
interest rate. However, this is not the case when government spending is bond-financed 
Phelps bases his reasoning on three fundamental assumptions: i) the government initially 
purchases goods from the capital-producing sector and not from the consumption- 
p i^ucm g  sector, 11) wages are indexed to a sector wide price index and iii) the investaent- 
jiroducmg sm o r is more labour intensive than the consumption-producing sector.
h  this study Phelps used pooled time-series data for OECD countries over a period 1960- 
1993. Amidst a number o f emerging evidence, the one worth bringing to our attention 
concerns the positive effect that government expenditure had on lowering unemployment 
P«"°d 1973 to 1993. More specifically, the real government expenditi^ha^ 
lowered the rate of imemployment by 1.43 percentage points over the specified period.
As a matter of fact, both Phelps’ (1994) and Layard and Nickell’s (1986) models
i “ ng"of
‘he result o f substituting a combined IS/LM relationship into an 
M c C ^ u r i ^  w " "® “"employment to output. For a more comprehensive analysis
The combined impact o f fiscal and monetary policy was to reduce the 1979-84 chanee in
imemployment by 2.0 percentage points in the USA, by 2.3 points in Finland, by 1.1 points 
in Germany and Canada. ^
All the aforementioned studies estimating employment or unemployment equations for a
number of countries over the period 1955-81, incorporate a real wage variable as well as 
one or more aggregate demand variables. as wen as
of economists Palley (1996), Dutt (1984), Lustig (1980), Taylor 
(1985), Sawyer (1989), and Sarantis (1991) have all identified the im p o r té e  that in c L e
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distribution has in affecting economic activity. In another study purported to investigate 
the issue o f distribution and growth, Alesina and Rodrik (1991) produced evidence 
indicating that "inequality in income and land distribution is negatively associated with 
subsequent growth”(p.485).
A further insight into the exposition concerning the exact derivation o f the model as well 
as the estimates can be sought in Sarantis (1991) and (1993) respectively..
This finding undermines the “underconsumption” theory o f Post Keynesianism.
Otherwise known as the “Kaleckian hypothesis”. See Kalecki (1971).
Econometric models are exposed to different forms of criticism. Mispecification 
problems or problems of endogeneity among variables provide often the platform on which 
such a criticism is based.
According to Kalecki even if private investments were completely under control, it 
would still be impossible to ensure a state o f prolonged full employment by means of 
investment alone because, no matter how they are maneuvered, excess productive capacity 
would in any case emerge. Given these circumstances, the basic cause of unemployment 
can only be found in under-consumption. “Private investment must be pushed up to the 
level sufficient to expand the productive capacity of capital equipment pari passu with the
increase in population and productivity of labour....  Government expenditure on public
investment and subsidies to mass consumption (financed by income tax or borrowing) must 
be such as to create full employment in combination with this level of private investment. 
The division of public spending between public investment and subsidizing consumption 
should be based on the principle of social priorities”(Kalecki, 1994, pp57-58).
It is worth stressing Keynes’s scepticism about the possibility of relying on private 
investments entirely, which led him to believe in the necessity o f “ a somewhat 
comprehensive socialisation of investment” as the only means of securing an 
approximation to full employment” (Keynes, 1936a p.378).
Despite their association with deficits, publicly funded investment programmes can 
contribute immensely to job-creation.
Kirshner (1998) points out that the deflationary bias that characterizes capitalist 
economies "represents the interest of some elements of society at the expense of others. 
Specifically, it trades off some inflation for some economic growth, a trade-off which is 
preferred by powerful sectors of society but which leads to slower growth and higher 
unemployment"(p. 55).
The maintenance of full employment through government spending financed by loans 
has been widely discussed in recent years. According to Kalecki the whole debate has been 
revolving around economic aspects without paying due consideration to political ^ e c ts .  
He asserts that the maintenance of full employment in a capitalist economy is fall^ious. In 
the same line of argument he states that the misgivings o f big business about maintenance 
o f full employment by government spending are of a paramount importance. This attitude 
is not easy to explain. Clearly, higher output and full employment benefits both workers, 
and businessmen since profits grow. Moreover, a full employment policy based on loan 
financed government spending does not encroach upon profits because it does not involve 
additional taxation. The big question that follows is why do not businessmen accept a 
synthetic boom which the Government is able to offer them?
110
Kalecki ascribes this opposition o f the industrial leaders to full employment through 
government spending to firstly, the dislike of Government’s interference in the problem of 
employment as such, secondly, the dislike of the direction o f government spending (public 
investment and subsidising consumption) and thirdly, the dislike o f the social and political 
changes resulting from the maintenance of full employment.
Cripps and Ward (1994) ascribe the unprecedented high levels of budget deficits, 
observed in the EU region, to the ineffectual neoliberal policies adopted in the past, rather 
than policies aimed to boost aggregate demand. They therefore, propose that the budget
deficit ceilings imposed on EU member states by the Maaastrich treaty should be 
abandoned.
It h ^  been widely acknowledged that Keynesian fiscal expedients are ultimately self­
financing because o f their profound expansionary influence on output and national income 
and therefore tax revenue. (Glyn and Rowthom, 1994). It should be noted however, that 
their analysis concerns demand constrained economies. (For more on the effectiveness of 
expMsionary policies see also Grieve-Smith 1994, Kirshner 1998, Grahl 1997).
Sidney Weintraub was one of the first scholars to elaborate on issues concerning the 
effects of the wage share on aggregate demand. (For a more comprehensive analysis on the 
wage share as well as on price theories o f distribution see Weintraub 1958, 1961, 1963).
A similar procedure is fostered by Taylor (1985), and Sarantis (1991).
Under different circumstances equation 2 (see Sarantis 1991) could have accounted for the 
negative effect -highlighted by Kalecki (1971: p.64) - that the share of imported
intermediates has on the labour share.
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Mark-up is defined as price over average cost rather than marginal cost. According to 
Rowthom (1977) however, mark-ups can be far from exogenous in a sense that the 
determination of income distribution is the result o f class conflicts.
According to Kalecki (1942) — Kaldor (1955/56) the level o f aggregate demand is 
adversely affected by shifts in the distribution of income that favour profits over wages. 
Their economic explanation behind such a contention is that marginal propensity to save 
out of profits exceeds the marginal propensity to save out of wage income. In other words, 
capitalists have a lower propensity to consume. See also Sawyer (1989), Kuznets (1965)! 
Asimakopoulos (1980-1).
It has to be stressed that the assumption of capacity utilization influencing net exports is 
far from a mainstream one. Thirlwall (1986) provides a framework according to which 
insufficient capacity to supply exports is ascribed to the notion that by boosting domestic 
demand businesses become more profitable.
Equation (4) is in line with Sarantis’ 'stagnationist' model of which the mathematical 
solutions can be found in Sarantis's (1991). The term stagnationist refers to models which 
assume that "both the growth rate and the level of capacity utilisation can be different under 
different conditions of income distribution and/or macroeconomic policy...." (Taylor 
1985).
The expected negative sign suggests that a shift in income distribution towards labour, 
will have a positive effect on capacity utilization (see Dutt 1984, and Sawyer, 1989) and 
hence, employment.
I l l
Due to unprecedented high levels o f interest rates, investment rates in the 1980s and 90s
countries (Rowthom
1996) Such a downward trend in investment rates may be translated into higher 
unem plo^en t if the elasticity o f substitution between capital and labour is below unity. A 
allure of capital to keep up with the growth of labour supply will result in falling wage 
share, and therefore higher unemployment.
Unlike S^antis we have employed imports rather than exchange rates as a measure of 
international competitiveness. An increase in the volume of imports will have adverse 
eitect on effective demand and thus, employment, mainly, due to the pressure that a shift in 
gcpenditure from home-produced goods to foreign commodities entails.
This is in line with the Post Keynesian approach to money and credit, according to which 
the conviction regarding the mechanism of the creation o f loans has been reversed i.e. it is 
the bank lending that creates deposits. For further analysis see Palley (1991) Moore 
0  983), Goodhart (1989), Pollin ( 1991 ), Harcourt et al. ( 1998), Kirshner (1998).
According to the tenets o f neoclassical economics, employment, saving, investment, the 
rate of interest and relative prices were all determined within the real sector. The price 
level was seen as being a monetary variable determined within the monetary sector, through 
the quantity theory. In the long run, the price level was perceived as exogenous to the real 
sector, being determined by the supply and demand for money. As a result in the long run 
monetary variables could not affect real variables (neutrality of money).
As we saw in chapter 1, according to Keynes deflation may stimulate employment via its 
influence on the interest rate (Ke>mes effect). However, such a contention is subject to
crucially to marginal efficiency of capital schedule being 
stable. This mechanism is the same as using monetary policy to expand money supply 
which IS a more preferable option.
Since debt is endogenously produced and its nominal price is fixed (denominated in 
money) any changes m the general price level change the real value o f debts and debt 
service burdens which in turn impacts on aggregate demand (Fisher debt effect).
It should be stressed that within the Post Keynesian community, there is no fixed 
agreement, as to how this process comes about. For those who adopt the Sraffian (1960) 
approach, the determination o f real wage depends on the determination o f the profit rate, 
whereas for those who share Keynes’ approach, the real wage is determined by the 
equilibrium level of output and employment.
"  However, as in every discipline that deals with this kind o f inferences, a number of
limitations should always be taken into account before arriving at any conclusions. For an
extensive discussion on problems that arise when using panel data see Kapspizvk 119891 
Bailar (1989). r  7 v
”  Such a heterogeneity that is not controlled in time series and cross-section studies may 
result in biased outcome (see Moulton 1986, 1987).
It is widely held that time-series studies suffer from multicollinearity.
Due to unavailability of data Luxembourg and Greece are not included in our data set 
See Appendix III.
See Appendix III.
^  See Appendix III.
112
See Appendix IV.
^  We minimize the Schwarz (S.I.C) and Akaike (A.I.C) Information criteria given by:
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where k, T, and (u u) refer to the number o f parameters, number of observations and the 
sum of squared residuals of the estimated equations, respectively. Note that Schwarz 
criterion penalizes more any loss in the degrees of freedom than the Akaike one.
This finding is in line with the traditional under-consumption theory of Post 
Keynesianism whilst in conflict with what Sarantis' model predicted.
Similar results were obtained by McCallum (1986), Layard and Nickell (1985) and Sachs 
(1983). The mechanism through which the adoption of restrictive policies affect 
unemployment has been touched upon in the preceding chapters.
The estimated equation reflects short run effects since we have taken the first difference. 
A point however, that has to be stressed is that even when we excluded the dummy variable 
from the model, and used levels for our estimation, the coefficients o f the policy and 
monetary parameters were found to exhibit the same consistency in terms of the sign and 
significance.
The consistency regarding the sign as well as the level o f significance of the dummy was 
uniform throughout all models that we estimated.
The relationship between real growth and changes in the unemployment rate is known as 
Okun’s Law. It states that the unemployment rate declines when growth is above the trend 
rate of 2.25 per cent. According to Galbraith (1997) Okun’s Law is a more reliable 
empirical rule than the Philips curve. For every percentage point of growth in real GDP 
above the trend rate that is sustained for a year, the unemployment rate declines by one-half 
percentage point.
The estimated Okun's coefficients for every country are presented in Table 2b.
Such a contention reflects the Marxian-Kaleckian nature of our framework (for more on 
this see Taylor 1985, Dutt 1984, Pitelis 1994-95).
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Chapter 4
Capital Shortages and European 
Unemployment: Some Empirical evidence
4.1 Introduction.
The neoliberal spirit by which economic policy has been conducted in the EU 
region over the past 20 years might have disrupted the way labour markets have 
functioned. Unemployment has gathered momentum reaching alarming proportions. 
The uniformity of the unemployment experience throughout the EU outweighs the 
particular economic situations and domestic economic structures of individual 
countries. The common experience suggests that the causes and the persistence' of high 
unemployment are related to factors that have influenced all EU countries in a broadly 
similar manner, rather than in the individual circumstances of each country. Many 
possible sources for this common problem have been cited and investigated in the 
contemporary literature.^ A growing body of research focuses on the relationship 
between capital shortages and unemployment, as well as on the adverse impact the 
macroeconomic policies that have been implemented in Europe since the late 1970s 
have had on capital accumulation.
Essentially, the main objective of this chapter is to investigate the underlying 
issue and ultimately provide an insight into the empirically under-investigated 
relationship between capital stock and unemployment. The rest o f the chapter is
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organized as follows: section 4.2 dwells upon the existing theoretical approaches that 
link the two variables in question, whilst section 4.3 offers a substantive review of the 
various channels through which macroeconomic policy might have led to the erosion of 
capacity, and most significantly, to the destruction of an economic environment that 
was conducive to job-creation. Section 4.4 attempts to provide some empirical evidence 
o f the extent to which demand side variables and most importantly capital stock affect 
unemployment, as well as to shed some light on the degree to which the shift in 
macroeconomic policy, as reflected by the both the collapse o f Bretton Woods and the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, has affected European unemployment. Finally, 
section 4.5 provides some policy conclusions.
4.2 Capital stock: A neglected issue.
Arguably, much o f the contemporary investigation into the causes of 
unemployment revolves around the notion that the rate of unanticipated inflation is 
inversely related to the level of unemployment^ (NAIRU). In other words, if 
unemployment is below its natural rate, unanticipated inflation will accelerate causing 
prices to explode. Unemployment was seen as a transitory phenomenon, which could be 
dealt with once inflation was curbed and markets began to clear"*. Conversely, later 
writers maintain that market imperfections permeate contemporary economies and 
fiirther highlight the failure o f markets to clear and the resulting persistence of high 
unemployment^.
Amid numerous studies seeking to identify the possible causes of 
unemployment, only a handful highlight the important role that capital stock plays in 
conditioning the way labour markets function (Giersch 1981; Malinvaud^ 1980, 1985;
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Sneessens & Dreze 1986; Carling & Soskice 1990). Within the EU region, the 
prolonged period o f high and persistent unemployment over the last decades has taken 
its toll. The resulting erosion in industrial capacity has cast considerable doubts as to 
whether the remaining capacity is sufficient to provide job opportunities to the whole of 
the potential labour force (Rowthom, 1995; Grieve-Smith, 1996; Kitson and Michie, 
1996; Arestis and Sawyer, 1998).
Arguably, effective capacity is far from adequate to employ the work-force 
fully, and the institutional arrangements that prevent a high demand for labour leading 
to a wage/price spiral have been dismantled. Rebuilding o f lost capacity is therefore a 
key requirement for restoring full employment (Grieve-Smith 1996).
Potentially, decisions to invest in new capacity are influenced by the cost and 
availability of capital and the target rates o f return sought by firms and financial 
institutions. The contemporary practice of manipulating interest rates both to combat 
inflation and to bolster weak currencies creates a bias towards higher real interest rates.
Michie and Grieve-Smith (1996) explain how the dependence of so many 
businesses on bank loans rather than equity holdings is an important factor limiting 
expansion, particularly in high-technology or high-risk sectors. They go on to state that 
industrial capital is clearly not a market where the needs o f the customer have been 
matched by the development o f the appropriate products^.
Overvalued exchange rates and high interest rates have dominated Europe’s 
macroeconomic* policy over the past thirty years^. The current exchange rate regime 
uses the Deutschmark as a reference point around which the rest of the currencies are 
floating. Any devaluation concomitant to expansionary policies that are pursued by 
different countries will result in stealing jobs from the others. A regime that creates
116
such an environment, “in which member states compete over the allocation of 
employment between them is hardly conducive to fiscal coordination”(Eatwell 1995, 
pp. 282-3).
The repercussions of such policies have been pernicious to manufacturing, while 
industrial policy has been ineffectual, with little attempt to use the public sector as a 
modernizing force*®. In addition, the steady upward trend of interest rates in 
conjunction with their unprecedented volatility has contributed to impeding investment 
and business confidence* *.
A number of studies conducted across EU have identified interest rate policy
during the 1980s as the main government policy which has inhibited the growth of
12firms . Since 1979, EU’s governments main preoccupation has been the targeting of 
nominal variables (inflation and interest rates) rather than real variables (jobs and 
output). The extent o f the post-1979 recession forced a number of firms to reduce 
capacity in order to minimize short-term costs and maximize the possibility of survival.
In the 1990s, job security for middle-class workers was impaired by cuts in 
social security provision and higher manual unemployment, while their bargaining 
power has been weakened considerably*^. The view that wage demands had been 
excessive means that the capital share of income and rates of return to capital should 
have fallen, or at least remained constant, over the 1980s and 1990s. The large increase 
in almost every European nation since 1979 in both the capital share of corporate 
income and in the return to capital (see Table, Appendix I,) argues against the view that 
excessive worker demands have generated high unemployment. Instead, the profit data 
suggest that workers, in aggregate, have made significant concessions to capital over the
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last two decades, casting significant doubt on the belief that excessive labor power lies 
at the root o f European unemployment.
Despite the profit recovery of the 1980s and 1990s, the rate o f growth of capital 
stock has slowed down in most of OECD c o u n tr ie s (se e  Tables, Appendix II). 
Companies prefer remaining liquid or investing in less risky forms o f outlay to building 
in expansionary capacity (Driver 1994). In other words, companies have adopted a 
tighter capacity stance.
It is worth stressing that amongst all economic surveys of European 
unemployment the existing relationship between capital stock and employment remains 
under-investigated. Among a number of economists working on this area. Bean (1989) 
identifies uncertainty as a key issue for the investment decisions and also puts capacity 
utilization at centre-stage in the debate'^. On the other hand, Rowthom (1995) builds on 
this by arguing that it is the lack of capital stock and not the utilization of a given 
capacity that qualifies as a potential culprit for the unemployment problem in Europe'^.
Arguably, capital formation has declined in Europe since the ‘Golden Age’. The 
fact that interest rates are at historically high levels together with low profitability 
constitutes a reason why capital formation has declined. According to Rowthom (1995) 
the capacity problem is rejected by neoliberal economists, who regard the problem of 
job creation as being mainly a matter of encouraging more employment on existing 
capital stock and not to increase the amount o f this stock.
Private investment can only increase to the extent required if expected’  ^ sales and
1 fiprofits follow an upward trend; in other words, if  there is expanding demand. A 
solution to such a ‘chicken and egg’ problem resides in the willingness of the public
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sector to take the risk that the private sector is not capable of carrying, perhaps by 
indulging in some innovative public-private partnership.
4.3 Macroeconomic policy, capital formation and unemployment: A 
theoretical framework.
Since the 1970s deflationary measures have been taken by all major European 
economies’^ . Initially, the inflationary pressures exerted by the two oil-price shocks 
were addressed through the adoption of demand-oriented policies. As time went on, 
however, changes in the international flnancial environment, as well as the dominance 
of monetarism and free-market orientation, caused a significant shift in macroeconomic 
policy.
In Europe, the new policy consensus, strongly influenced by the free-market 
approach, has established a set o f rules (Maastricht Treaty) and regulations (Stability 
Pact), which are tailored to enable the EU countries to integrate their economies. Such a 
process makes monetarism and neoliberalism distinct features of the policy framework 
in the EU in the 1990s.
The dominance of ffee-market doctrines has caused a structural change in the 
model of economic development in the EU. Neoliberalism asserts that there is no 
essential role that the state^ ® or the public sector can play in galvanising economic 
activity. In this sense, the state should step aside and let market forces create the 
economic conditions conducive to economic growth. In this theoretical context, there is 
no essential role for active macro-policies in stimulating employment and output. At 
present, the EU’s policy agenda is closely aligned with what it is proposed by
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neoliberalism and conforms to its priorities: deregulation, privatisation, balanced 
budgets and disinflation by means of monetary restriction.
More specifically, in the field of economic policy, the dogmatic implementation 
of doctrines of a purely monetarist nature has paralysed macroeconomic policy. 
Restrictive money and credit policies in conjunction with tight fiscal policies have been 
put in place to suppress inflation^’. Choosing the control o f inflation as the main policy 
objective implies that there is no room for an explicit employment policy. According to 
the dominant view, persistence in unemployment is put down to labour market 
rigidities, which together with poor education and motivation are preventing the 
unemployed from getting work on existing capital stock (Layard & Nickell, 1986; 
Layard & Jackman, 1991).^^
In other words, the neoliberal tradition considers unemployment to be totally 
unaffected by the amount of capital stock. In spite o f the recognition by those authors 
that, under certain conditions, capital stock might have some influence on inflation and 
unemployment, they never argue in favour of such a possibility, particularly in their 
policy suggestions.^^ The aforementioned argument is rather pervasive in reports such 
as the OECD, Jobs study (1994a) and the OECD, Economic outlook (1994b). Any 
policy choice is reduced to recommendations for more flexibility in the labour market, 
wage austerity and lower social standards as means to reduce the cost of labour (CEPR, 
1995).
This perspective of unemployment as well as its policy implications may be 
coherent from a free-market standpoint. However, it overlooks the possibility that the 
new restrictive policy regime, which has been established in Europe since the 1970s, 
may have negatively affected unemployment.
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One possible channel for such a development is through the effects that the 
prevalent neoliberal dogma has had on capital stock. A growing body of literature has 
observed that the reliance on deflationary macroeconomic policies to combat inflation is 
likely to have led to an erosion of industrial capacity in many countries in the EU (e.g, 
Rowthom, 1995; Grieve-Smith, 1996; Kitson & Michie, 1996; Michie & Grieve-Smith 
1996; Carling & Soskice 1990). Capacity deficiencies may have operated as a 
significant constraint on full employment in these countries.
The importance of capital stock for employment has been stressed by many 
scholars (e.g. Malinvaud 1985; Bean, 1989, 1994; Rowthom, 1995, 1999; Grieve- 
Smith, 1996), who have pointed out that low investment in manufacturing in many 
European countries has been a significant factor behind the dramatic rise in European 
unemployment^"*. In this perspective, education and training programmes attract 
concern, but they are considered to be inadequate to tackle unemployment. The lack of 
job opportunities is more cmcial. A major reduction in unemployment requires
»S c
additional investment in productive capacity that will create jobs. Rowthom (1995) 
maintains that this aspect to the unemployment problem has been neglected in the 
enthusiasm for labour-market issues.
Arguably, in capitalist economies entrepreneurs’ decisions to advance money 
and effectively engage in investment activities depends on expectations of future 
profitability. Policies tailored to boost the components o f aggregate demand might be 
characterised as congenial to expectations for future profitability since the budget 
surplus they generate is sufficient to finance future investment. However, in a world of 
uncertainty, the existing conflict between the industrial and financial sector is a 
destabilising factor that leads the economy to impasse mainly due to the constraints
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imposed by the rentiers on the liquidity funds available for financing investment 
undertaken in the industrial sector as well as due to the proclivity of the financial sector 
to speculate in FOREX markets. A potential measure to deal with a situation where 
vested interests play a pivotal role in determining the growth o f investment would be to 
socialise investment (Keynes 1936).
The ability of the state to withstand pressures for speculative financial gains can 
contribute immensely to channelling funds and effort into projects purported to preserve 
stability o f aggregate investment. In addition, within the current financial regime short­
term monetary flows undermine serious attempts to stimulate employment and growth. 
Therefore, a reform of the rules of the existing financial markets must take precedence 
over short-term speculation or arbitrage driven capital flows.
Demand-side considerations.
Let us now try and specify the channels through which the restrictive 
macroeconomic policy regime might have affected negatively productive capacity and 
unemployment. On the demand side, the long implementation of restrictive^^ 
macroeconomic policies is likely to have contributed to a productive investment failure 
in the EU. Lack of investment, in turn, has constrained technological progress and the 
expansion of demand to the levels required to restore full employment. As Scott (1992) 
has argued, any type of investment creates new investment opportunities and visa versa. 
The cumulative effect o f this process has caused capacity problems.
Keynesianism asserts that investment responds to demand as well as to expected 
growth of demand.^^ Grieve-Smith (1996) advances this argument by stating that there 
is a distinct danger in the current economic situation that an increase in demand will
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lead to shortages in capacity and to inflationary price increases, while unemployment 
might still remain high^*. The rebuilding of lost capacity is therefore a key requirement 
for restoring full employment.
Firms’ decisions to expand capacity are based on their expectations of future 
sales and their perception of risk (Grieve-Smith, 1996; Driver, 1996) in relation to the 
policy objectives set by governments. In so far as demand does not expand sufficiently 
to meet the capacity’s expansion, such a risk becomes evident. Over the last two 
decades, and especially in the 1990s, expectations have been formed predominantly 
through the implementation of deflationary policies across the EU. The restrictive 
nature of macroeconomic policy has had an adverse effect on aggregate demand, sales 
and in effect on firms’ investment decision. Grieve-Smith (1996) points out that firms 
need to be confident that demand will grow at such a rate as to validate any expansion 
of their capacity. Negative experiences and information about the stance of 
macroeconomic policy and the growth rate of demand make managers cautious about 
overestimating future sales, since the penalties associated with such practices tend to be 
much greater than for losing potential business by failing to expand.
The risk of investing in capacity that will not be fully utilised is related to the 
possibility o f sales’ failure and the consequent fall in firms’ profits, as well as the ability 
of firms to absorb it. The latter links the demand with the supply side factors that lie 
behind the capacity limits on employment. In so far as the cost of expanding capacity is 
capital costs, the crucial factors that influence decisions to invest in new capacity are the 
cost and availability of capital (Rowthom, 1995; Grieve-Smith, 1996).
The implementation of a restrictive monetary policy to combat inflation has 
created a bias towards high real interest rates. In addition, the higher interest rates^’
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could be partially attributed to the global, monetary and financial environment that 
emerged after the collapse o f Bretton Woods. Globalization of financial markets and 
international financial competition, in conjunction with highly mobile and speculative 
capital has increased volatility in government bond prices, which, together with 
exchange rate instability and currency speculation, have increased the risk premium on 
lending. High interest rates may have inhibited start-up projects and further discouraged 
investment and business confidence. Interest rate policies since the 1980s have been 
identified as the main government policy that has impeded the growth of firms (Kitson 
and Michie, 1996).
Amid a number of channels through which changes in aggregate demand may 
bring about changes in the equilibrium rate of unemployment, the role of capacity 
scrapping, within a ‘hysteresis^®’ framework, is given considerable prominence 
(Sneessens & Dreze 1986; van der Klundert & van Syhaik 1989). More specifically, a 
fall in aggregate demand will affect capacity utilisation and, through this, investment^’. 
The resulting lower investment induced by lower rates of capacity utilisation causes the 
size of the capital stock to shrink, which in turn, at least in the medium run, causes the 
rates of capacity utilisation to rise again. At high rates of capacity utilisation there are 
reasons to believe that profit margins are widened. “If each firm is aware that its 
competitors will be unable to take advantage of the price rise by holding their own price 
unchanged and expanding output because they lack capacity to do so, then price 
increases at high rates of capacity utilisation may occur” (Carling & Soskice (1990, 
p.447). The resulting price increase due to shortages in capacity will induce upward 
movements to the equilibrium rate of unemployment. In short, higher demand would
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have a positive effect on capacity utilisation and through this on investment, which in 
turn would lower the equilibrium rate o f unemployment at least in the medium-run^^.
4.4 Capital stock and unemployment: An empirical investigation.
Prior to embarking on the econometric analysis it is essential that we trace the 
movements of both variables in question over the last four decades. Table 1. and chart 
(a), illustrate the extent to which the unemployment rate, as well as the growth rate of 
capital stock have fluctuated in the EU over the period 1961 ^ "*-1998.
Table 1. Unemployment Rate and Capital Stock (averages).
Period Unemployment Rate 
(EU-15)
Capital Stock (Growth 
Rates, EU-15)
1961-1966 - 6.2
1967-1972 2.5 4.8
1973-1978 3.8 0.5
1979-1984 7.7 0.1
1985-1991 9.2 4.6
1992-1998 10.9 0.8
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, OECD Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital.
Chart (a). Unemployment Rate Vs. Capital Stock
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As can be discerned, the variables exhibit inverse patterns. More specifically, the 
unemployment rate in all EU countries has been gathering momentum reaching 
alarming proportions in the last two decades. As for the growth rate o f capital stock the 
preceding chart suggests that the underlying pattern is characterised by a declining and 
very unstable trend. On the basis of the preceding analysis, the observed behaviour of 
the variables in question could, to a certain extent, be attributed to the emerging 
neoliberal economic environment that has prevailed in the EU region since the demise 
of Bretton Woods and most importantly since the ratification o f the Maastrich Treaty.
4.4.1 Econometric analysis.
Having exposed the way economic policy affects capital stock and through this 
unemployment (see Appendix IV for causality tests^^), it would be appropriate to set up 
a model reflecting the post Keynesian nature o f the framework within which the main 
hypothesis has been expounded. It should be emphasized that in this model the log of 
capital stock Ki rather than investment 7, has been used. In other words, we define /, =
AKt. 36
U = U ( L . C . G , K . N X ) 0)
Equation (1) states that unemployment (U) depends negatively on all 
explanatory vjuiables i.e. income distribution (L), private consumption fQ , government 
expenditure (G), capital stock (K), and net exports (NX). In other words, the 
unemployment rate is a function of the components of aggregate demand and a variable 
the inclusion of which is to capture effects in income distribution.
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Further, in an attempt to investigate this relationship in a more comprehensive 
way, the inclusion of two dummy variables was deemed necessary.^^ Such a practice 
will seek to capture the effect of the shift in economic policy - fueled by the emergence 
of the neoliberal consensus and reflected by two signiflcant historically economic 
developments: the collapse of Bretton Woods, and the ratiflcation o f the Maastricht 
Treaty - on job creation. A revised version of equation (I) could therefore be expressed 
as follows:
Uit =  Po -  PiLit -  P2CU -P 3 G- P4Kit -  PsNXu +  PéD, + PjDt* (2)
where p ’s are positive constants.
4.4.2 Estimation results.
For the econometric investigation, panel^* data analysis has been adopted. The 
data-set used for the empirical analysis consists o f N  cross-sectional units, denoted i = 
observed at each of T time periods, denoted t = In this context, annual
data for 12 EU countries^^ from 1961 to 1998, (so N  = 12; T = 37) has been collated.
On the methodological front, a general to specific approach was used to estimate 
our model. Initially, we set out by estimating a general model o f the following form:
Git -  Po- PiLit - P2Cit - P3 G -P 4 KU - PiXit + PóMit + PrDt + PsDt* (3)
where p s are positive constants.
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Essentially, equation (3) differs from equation (2) in that, in equation (3) both 
exports (X) and imports (M) were included instead o f net exports (NX). The reason for 
this was to establish the extent to which the estimation results allows us to use the 
difference of both variables i.e. net exports (NX). On the basis o f the results obtained 
(see Appendix I I I ) both variables were found to be insignificant and o f the same sign. 
Moreover, the Wald test (F-statistic = 0.084, Prob.= 0.9143; X^ = 0.168, Prob.= 0.9142) 
failed to reject the Null hypothesis i.e. that the slope coefficients were zero. Thus, both 
exports (X) and imports (M) were dropped form the equation. The new equation 
therefore has taken the following form:
Ui, -  Po- P/ Lit - P2 Cii - PsG - P4 KU + PsDi + PsDi* (4)
where p ’s are positive constants.
What follows is the presentation of the equation that was selected on the basis of the 
Schwarz (S.I.C) and Akaike (A.I.C) Information criteria as well on a number of 
selection tests'^ ®, [F-test.- F(11,420) = 21.34, p-value = 0.00, Hausman-test: (X^) =17.51, 
p-value = 0.00]. According to these test the fixed effects model is preferred to both 
pooled model and random effects model (see Appendix III):
Fixed Effects model
Uit = - 0.23 Lit - 0.13 Cit - 0.08 Git - 0.49Ku + 0.01 A  + 0.04 A *  + £// 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.004) (0.003)
(standard errors in parentheses).
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R" = 0.78
5./.C = -2.73,A /.C  = -2.91,
The individual effects and their standard errors are presented in the table 2:
Table 2. Individual Effects (Fixed Effects Model).
Country Fra. Ita. Net Bel Ire. Den.
Intercept .10 .11 .06 .09 .13 .09
S.E. .007 .006 .005 .005 .005 .005
Country Spa. Swe. Fin. Aus. U.K Ger.
Intercept .17 .05 .07 .06 .07 .07
S .E . .008 .006 .005 .006 .005 .006
4.4.3 Interpretation o f the fixed effects estimates.
On the basis of the results obtained it can be discerned that the individual effects 
have the anticipated signs and all pass the significance test at the 5 percent level. As for 
the rest of the parameters of the equation estimated, all bear the expected sign and are 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance with only exception of the coefficient of 
the Maastricht dummy (A ) variable which is significant at the 11 percent significance 
level.
Since the main elaboration of this chapter has been with regard to capital stock it 
would make sense if we started the interpretation of the estimation results with this 
variable. In particular, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of capital
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stock buttresses our hypothesis that capital stock plays a significant role in influencing 
unemployment. A 1 percent increase in capital stock {Ku) will result in 0.5 percent 
decrease in European unemployment. Bearing in mind that the investigation undertaken 
revolves around capital stock in the manufacturing sector, it could be argued that an 
increase in capital stock in all sectors will provide additional stimulus in the process of 
employment creation. Moreover, the estimated coefficient o f the labour share of output 
government expenditure (G,/), and private consumption (C„) suggest that a 1 per 
cent increase in these variables will cause European unemployment to decline by 0.23 
%, 0.07 %, and 0.12 % respectively. The positive and statistically signiflcant 
coefficients of both dummy variables reflect the adverse effects that the emergence of 
the new policy consensus within the EU area -  as reflected by both the emergence of the 
new orthodoxy and the deflationary bias of the Maastricht rules - had on European 
employment.
In a nutshell, it could be argued that capital stock is a key factor which in 
conjunction with appropriate demand and incomes policies can provide answers to the 
question regarding measures to tackle EU unemployment.
4.5 Supply-side issues.
Having indulged in an exploration of the channels through which demand side 
policies affect capital formation and through this economic growth it would be more 
appropriate if  we gave a more complete picture of the current economic situation by 
touching on a number o f supply-side issues as well. The pace at which the current 
economic environment evolves has raised a number of question relating to the industrial
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strategies and the role o f the institutions needed to deal with contemporary economic 
issues such as employment, international trade, convergence.
In the 1990’s the emergence of the Washington Consensus"** which was 
perceived to be the embodiment of the counter-revolution in development economics 
(Toye, 1993) that itself grew out of the successful neoliberal attack against 
Keynesianism in the 1970’s, proposed a set o f instruments (liberalised trade, 
macroeconomic stability and privatisation) for achieving good economic performance. 
What in other words was suggested was that the only way for private markets to 
produce efficient allocations and growth was through free-market type policies and 
deregulation. Stiglitz (1998) maintained that the policies implied by the Washington 
Consensus are far from conducive to promoting economic stability. He very 
characteristically maintained that “making markets work requires more than just low 
inflation"* ,^ it requires sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to 
facilitate the transfer of technology, and transparency” (Stiglitz 1998, p.l).
Within the EU region the new emerging feature is the growing concern 
regarding the relationship between capacity utilization and inflation. Bearing in mind 
the general proclivity to avoid inflation, it would appear that capacity has become a 
significant constraint on the achievement of lower European unemployment. Various 
commentators (see for example Rowthom"*^ 1995a) attribute such a development to the 
decline in the rate o f investment since the 1960’s and the squeeze on the profit share"*^  in 
the 1970’s. Whilst it might be legitimate to assume that the latter reasoning explains the 
current situation, does it however, follow that as the economic position is rectified 
investment rates will revert to their initial levels.
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In answering this question the new element namely the ‘transnational system of 
production’ has to be taken into account. Currently, however this new element appears 
to be missing from the ongoing debate concerning industrial policy"*  ^ (Cowling & 
Sugden 1996). It is worth noting that the late 1960’s, the late 1970’s and the late 1980’s 
were periods of dramatic growth in foreign investment flows. It has in fact been 
estimated that by 1988 the total value of the capital stock of transnationals were 
amounted to $5,000 billion, approximately 35 percent o f the combined GDP of 
industrial market economies and developing countries (Dunning 1993).
Within the academic community the notion that foreign direct investment is 
beneficial to home countries has been vigorously debated. Whilst on the one hand some 
authors (see for example Porter 1990) would go to any lengths to identify outward 
investment as a key measure for industrial competitiveness others, such as Coates and 
Hillard (1986); Cowling and Sudgen (1992); Dunning (1992) would brand outward 
investment a key contributor to deindustrialisation.
By the same token inward investment is regarded as a generator of jobs having a 
tremendous impact on productivity and balance of payments (Dicken, 1992). On the 
other hand however inward investment is reckoned to have adverse effects on the host 
economy. More specifically, Dunning, (1992) posits that in the short run there might be 
benefits to be reaped by the host country but in the longer run the story might be totally 
different. Pitelis, (1998) maintains that “the problems o f potential long-term effects 
from foreign direct investment may be accentuated by the increasing bargaining power 
of transnational corporations vis-a-vis states, related in part to the locational flexibility 
of their operations” (p.5).
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Hymer (1972) argued that the structure and organisation of the international 
economic system would reflect the structure and organisation o f transnationals should 
such firms dominate the world economy. “Whilst the development of transnational 
investment within and between the advanced industrial countries can have a major 
impact on their evolution, resulting in the systematic development of the forces of 
deindustrialization (see Cowling & Sudgen 1994a), the recent substantial shift of the 
flow of foreign direct investment towards the developing countries adds a dramatic new 
dimension'*^ (Cowling & Sudgen 1996, p.293). The new emerging pattern is thought to 
have contributed to the inexorable rise in unemployment in the developed world. 
Moreover, Pitelis (1998) argues that “international trade and foreign direct investment 
by transnational corporations need not automatically lead to increased competitiveness 
and convergence’Xp.l). According to his analysis competitiveness and convergence will 
be facilitated by the introduction of supply-side, notably industrial policies^^.
Setting appropriate industrial policies that promote growth through international 
trade is a task that incumbent governments should take seriously. Experience has taught 
us that pursuing policies that improve the trade position of one country at the expense of 
another is a zero-sum game. It is therefore imperative that EU countries establish 
common strategies through which economic growth is achieved.
Traditional (Thatcher-Reagan-type) supply-side policies have been proved 
ineffectual in providing a solution to the existing problem of unemployment. “Genuine 
supply-side policies -  that is, policies which really lead to an increased and more 
efficient supply of goods and services, rather than the deflationay and deregulatory 
policies which are so often as mis-termed ‘supply-side’, simply because they are being
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promoted in the context o f a disregard for demand conditions -  require an expansion of 
industrial capacity, and economic capacity more generally” (Michie, 1996, p.5).
Providing a stable macroeconomic environment in conjunction with measures to 
enhance the skills and education of workers is of paramount importance for the 
development o f a modem and dynamic economy'**. It has to be stressed however that 
the state should assign equal weight to both investment in physical as well as human 
capital. “Promoting human capital is one example of complementary policy, one that 
can help promote economic development, equality, participation, and democracy” 
(Stiglitz 1998, p.lO). Instead of trying to attract investment and jobs by holding down 
wages and working conditions for the transnational corporations, a country can reduce 
the cost of acquiring skills. This will add a new dimension to the existing competition 
for investment and jobs resulting in an upward pressure on investment subsidies.
Addressing the issue of unemployment without taking into consideration the 
observed imbalance between corporation and community would be a great mistake. 
Crafting measures to act means that corporate strategies of transnationals have to be 
challenged. In response, a set of new policies have to be put in place to serve and 
protect the interest o f the community. Thus, “we need to develop an industrial economic 
strategy reflecting the ambitions of the community, whether local, regional, national or 
supranational. The focus of such a strategy therefore will centre on converting a free 
market economy to a democratic market economy” (Cowling & Sugden, 1996, p.301).
Nowadays, the development of new technology, to a large extent, determines the 
direction and form of industrial development. It is therefore imperative that 
governments develop appropriate policies targeting technology, for instance plans to 
subsidize R&D activities. In addition, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that
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automatic grants and tax incentives are administered to all firms regardless o f their size. 
Currently, large firms (accounting for most R&D) have been treated on much 
favourable terms than smaller ones (Geroski 1990). It is only through the latter channel 
that the rate of innovation is raised enabling more individuals pursue their own and their 
firm’s development and thus encourage innovative activity. Scherer & Ross (1990) 
maintain that “very high concentration has a positive effect only in rare cases, and more 
often it is apt to retard progress by restricting the number of independent sources of 
initiative”.
In the sketch o f the above arguments, it has been suggested that the bias towards 
adopting restrictive macroeconomic policies is likely to have exerted enormous pressure 
on businesses in terms of both demand expectations and supply-side strategies to 
undertake new productive investment. As a results the decreasing rate o f growth of 
productive capacity, might have inhibited the creation of new job opportunities in the 
EU area, contributing to the very high levels of unemployment. Within the existing 
system investment and jobs will be forthcoming only if profit taxes and wages are held 
down. Crafting a coherent set of policies for moving away from the existing system is 
therefore needed should steps towards a more stable economic environment are taken.
4.6 Concluding remarks.
Achieving economic conditions that promote full employment requires an 
investment strategy that will enable Europe to increase the quality and quantity of both 
equipment and structure. Within the EU region, the current policy orientation of relying 
on interest policy jeopardises future investment as well as the creation o f productive
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capacity. Training as such might be perceived as being an important tool to enhance 
industrial performance, but giving the unemployed skills when they do not have many 
opportunities to use them is rather ineffectual.
The empirical findings generated suggest that one of the potential factors behind 
the inexorable rise in European unemployment is insufficient growth of capital stock 
and most importantly, inadequate aggregate demand. On the basis of the evidence 
obtained, the emergence of the neoliberal consensus as the prevalent dogma may be 
held culpable for the economic instability permeating the EU economies. The fact that 
both dummy variables were found to be positively-signed as well as statistically 
discernible suggests that the economic environment that has dominated the EU 
countries since the collapse of Bretton Woods and most crucially, since the ratifícation 
o f the Maastricht Treaty, has added to the existing problem o f unemployment and has 
caused industrial capacity to shrink considerably.
The existing low levels of demand within the EU area might be attributable to 
the monetarist and restrictive economic policies fostered by the EU member states. The 
immediate effect o f such policies manifests itself in the erosion o f the capacity to 
produce: plant capacity, sales organisation, skilled and experienced labour, and the 
number of firms have all settled down at a level consistent with high unemployment. It 
is therefore imperative that policies designed to increase and, most importantly, to 
sustain demand so that capacity is restored to full employment levels. Nonetheless, for 
such a prospect to be realised, it is necessary that significant changes in the current 
neoliberal macroeconomic structure take place.
In essence, what is needed is the implementation o f a macroeconomic and 
industrial strategy directed towards achieving sustainable economic growth as well as
136
towards focusing on other structural issues, such the distribution of income; the 
productive nature o f investment and more precisely the fact that its impact on 
productive capacity tends to overcome its influence on aggregate demand. Finally, 
measures to create conditions where a new efficient, system of small and medium-sized
enterprises is capable o f evolving into a more significant force in the economy, need to 
be taken.
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Data Appendix
Definitions o f  Variahles
U Unemployment rate, OECD, Economic Outlook.
K Capital stock, (manufacturing, growth rates). OECD Flows and Stocks of Fixed 
Capital.
L Compensation of employees paid by resident producers (growth rates). OECD, 
National Accounts.
G Government expenditure (growth rates). OECD, Economic Outlook.
C Private consumption (growth rates). OECD, Economic Outlook.
X Exports (growth rates). OECD, Economic Outlook.
M Imports (growth rates). OECD, Economic Outlook.
Dt* Dummy Variable. Takes 0 for 1961 to 1972 and 1 for 1973 to 1998 (captures the 
effect o f the new policy regime after the collapse of Bretton Woods).
Dt Dummy Variable. Takes 0 for 1961 to 1991 and 1 for 1992 to 1998 (captures the 
effect o f Maastricht Treaty).
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Appendix I
Tablel. Capital Income Shares (%).
Country
Peak
Years r ‘ Peak 2"** Peak 1997
C.o.c*
1980s
C.o.c*
Present
Germany 1980,1992 28.5 34.5 39.1 6.0 4.6
France 1982,1992 31.2 40.2 41.0 9.0 0.8
Italy 1980,1991 35.4 36.1 41.5 0.7 5.4
UK 1979,1989 31.3 29.4 31.3 -1.9 1.9
Austria 1980,1992 - 37.4 42.8 - 5.4
Belgium 1980,1992 28.7 35.3 37.7 6.6 2.4
Denmark 1979,1991 - 34.8 35.8 - 1.0
Finland 1980,1989 30.4 29.9 34.5 -0.5 4.6
Ireland 1982,1990 21.6 30.4 35.5 8.8 5.1
Neth/ands 1980,1992 - 38.6 40.4 - 1.8
Portugal 1982,1992 35.5 33.6 35.4 -1.9 1.8
Spain 1980,1991 30.8 37.9 39.5 7.1 1.6
Sweden 1980,1990 26.4 27.4 32.3 1.0 4.9
Note: Figures for 1997 are OECD projections as of December 1997. C.o.c*J980s and 
C.o.c* Present stand for change over cycle in the 1980s and at present respectively. 
Source: Schmitt & Mishel (1998).
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Table 1: Dependent Var able is Uu
Pooled Fixed Effects Random Effects I
c 0.05 0.11
(0.006) (0.01)
Lit -0.12 -0.23 -0.23
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Git -0.06 -0.08 -0.10
(0.5) (0.03) (0.04)
Kit -0.24 -0.49 -0.67
(0.1) (0.08) (0.02)
Cit -0.02 -0.13 -0.16
1 (0.5) (0.003) (0.04)
Dt 0.02 0.006 0.0008
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Dt* 0.04 0.04 0.02
1 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
A.LC -2.86 -2.91 -2.78
\ S.LC -2.69 -2.73 -2.64
(Standarc errors in parenthesis)
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Appendix IV
Table 1. Granger Causality Tests on Capital stock and Unemployment.
Null Hypothesis F-stat. Prob.
U.K
U does not Granger Cause K 2.70 0.09
K does not Granger Cause U 8.90 0.00
FRANCE
U does not Granger Cause K 0.00 0.98
K does not Granger Cause U 22.5 0.00
NETHERLANDS
U does not Granger Cause K 3.10 0.08
K does not Granger Cause U 11.4 0.00
BELGIUM
U does not Granger Cause K 0.59 0.45
K does not Granger Cause U 8.91 0.01
IRELAND
U does not Granger Cause K 2.17 0.13
K does not Granger Cause U 4.90 0.01
DENMARK
U does not Granger Cause K 0.02 0.88
K does not Granger Cause U 47.1 0.00
SPAIN
U does not Granger Cause K 1.13 0.29
K does not Granger Cause U 28.7 0.00
SWEDEN
U does not Granger Cause K 2.58 0.12
K does not Granger Cause U 9.49 0.00
FINLAND
U does not Granger Cause K 1.07 0.31
K does not Granger Cause U 32.9 0.00
AUSTRIA
U does not Granger Cause K 0.01 0.98
K does not Granger Cause U 15.1 0.00
GERMANY
U does not Granger Cause K 2.66 0.11
K does not Granger Cause U 0.73 0.40
ITALY
U does not Granger Cause K 0.11 0.74
K does not Granger Cause U 23.5 0.00
Note: Where U and K stand for unemployment rate and capital stock (growth 
respectively. The test has been conducted at the 5% level of significance.
rate)
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Notes:
' For a more comprehensive analysis on the persistence of unemployment see for 
example Alogoskoufis & Manning (1988).
 ^An extensive survey of this literature is provided by Bean (1994).
 ^According to this approach, unanticipated inflation is inherently prone to acceleration 
(Rowthom 1995).
 ^Such a belief is predominantly shared by the proponents of Monetarism.
 ^“As a general rule, later writers use the term NAIRU to designate the equilibrium rate 
of unemployment, although their theories are not radically different from those of 
certain self-avowed monetarists, such as Minford & Riley (1994), who continue to use 
the old terminology” (Rowthom 1995, p.27).
 ^ Malinvaud (1985) embarked on the task of analyzing different types of Keynesian 
unemployment. Instead of assuming clearing markets (new-classical approach), he 
assumed that money wages and prices are fixed. He was preoccupied with the 
theoretical developments mainly emerging from the reinterpreters o f Keynes to provide 
solid arguments as to whether there are temporary equilibria away from full-market 
clearing. With this in mind he set out to identify the circumstances under which a rise in 
real wages would raise (classical unemployment) or lower (Keynesian unemployment) 
unemployment.
 ^ Banks’ new products have mostly been directed at personal customers where, in the 
case of mortgages at any rate, the supply of capital was always adequate.
* In the UK for instance, the most obvious cases of sterling being overvalued as a result 
o f macroeconomic policy were firstly, the effects of the Thatcher Government initial 
monetarist policies in 1979-1980 and secondly, the membership of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism at an overvalued rate.
 ^A devaluation of the currency can be effective provided that industry is competitive. 
Economic policies that rely heavily on devaluing currencies are incapable of addressing 
the problem of productive capacity and, in effect, are unable to sustain full employment.
Insufficient public sector investment has contributed to the short-fall in labour 
productivity. (For a more comprehensive analysis on this see DTI Monthly Economic 
Assessment -  February 2000).
' '  This was particularly apparent during the early 1980s when high interest rates created 
cash-flow problems for many companies leading to bankruptcies and plant closures as 
well as contributing to the appreciation of sterling and the squeeze on exports.
See for example the Cambridge survey (SBRC 1992).
The notion that rising labour costs due to the bargaining power o f the trade unions 
have an adverse effect on employment, provided the platform on which European 
governments shaped their policies to combat unemployment. A case in point is Mrs. 
Thatcher’ policy to weaken the bargaining power of the unions in U.K. The results of 
such a course of action exacerbated rather than alleviated unemployment. Freeman 
(1988) provides evidence on whether unemployment is higher and economic growth 
lower in highly unionized states. Moreover, Manning (1992) maintains that 
microeconomic models of trade union activity are not particularly robust.
Glyn (1997), looks into the issue of profitability by carrying out a cross-section 
analysis o f the post-war experience of manufacturing in OECD economies. He draws 
attention to the significant role that the profit squeeze played in contributing to the 
drama of post-1973 growth slowdown. His conclusions, however, suggest that “whilst
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profits do appear to be important in explaining post-war accumulation, they do not of 
course tell the whole story”(Centre for Economic Performance, discussion paper. No. 
17).
I>reze and Malinvaud (1994) called for greater funding for infrastructure and 
construction investment of up to ECU 250 billion over three years. They argue that 
sums o f this magnitude would be feasible without compromising other tight economic 
constraints if there were a combination o f public and private funding. Inevitably, 
however, these proposals came up against political obstacles and the prevailing 
macroeconomic climate in Europe.
His argument revolves around the ‘capital gap’.
The proponents o f Post-Keynesianism contend that economic growth involves capital 
accumulation and technological innovation, and this is achieved through investment 
spending on both physical capital and research and development. Investment spending 
is itself determined by anticipated future demand conditions, and demand growth is 
influenced by the capacity of the financial system to expand so as to finance greater 
level o f demand: hence the importance of endogenous finance for the growth process.
For a discussion on this see Pitelis (1987).
The aversion to inflation can be detected in Mr. Lawson’s 1984 lecture, in which by 
denying that macroeconomic policy could affect employment, he argued that it is the 
‘conquest of inflation, and not the pursuit o f growth and employment which should be 
the objective of macroeconomic policy’.
On the opposite side of the debate, Sebastiani (1994) maintains that systematic 
intervention by the state becomes necessary in order to integrate and stabilize private 
investment at the pace set by the growth in population and in the productivity of labour 
and to raise overall demand to a full-employment level. Moreover Kalecki (1943a) 
argues that the main obstacle to full employment is entrepreneurs’ deep aversion to state 
intervention in this field, in spite of the advantages they would gain in the economic 
ground. The underlying reluctance of the captains of industry to accept government 
intervention is attributed to the fact that every widening o f state activity is looked upon 
by ‘business’ with suspicion, and that the creation o f employment by government 
spending has a special aspect which makes the opposition particularly intense. 
Kalecki’s analysis is based on the so-called state of confidence. If this deteriorates, 
private investment declines, which results in a fall of output and employment (both 
directly and through the secondary effect o f the fall in incomes upon consumption and 
investment).
“Under a laissez-faire the level o f employment depends to a greater extent on the so 
called state of confidence. This gives the capitalists a powerfiil indirect control over 
Government policy everything which may shake the state of confidence must be 
carefully avoided because it would cause an economic crisis” (Kalecki, 1943a, p.350).
Arestis, McCauley & Sawyer (1999) posit that the neoliberal spirit by which 
economic policy is pursued within the European Union is based on the notion that the 
formulation of economic policy cannot be entrusted to the democratic process i.e. 
politicians. The reason behind it lies in the view that politicians form inflationary 
policies that target short-term effects such as unemployment.
“  The importance of education and training has recently been emphasised by 
endogenous growth models where the growth rate of productivity is associated with the 
level o f education. An educated and motivated work-force is able to facilitate the
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development of, adapt more easily to, and exploit more fully new processes and 
techniques of production (Römer, 1986; 1990, Lucas, 1988).
Capital accumulation has no effect on unemployment only under the empirically 
doubtful assumption that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is 
equal to unity (see Malinvaud 1982; Rowthom, 1999). According to this view, “the 
demand for labour is so elastic, that the wage increase generated by investment in new 
capital stock leads to a loss of employment on existing equipment which is enough to 
offset entirely the extra jobs created on new equipment” (Rowthom 1999, p.414.)
The erosion of physical capital stock can be thought of as a hysteresis mechanism 
through which low investment from the mid-1970s has meant that there is insufficient 
capital to employ all of the labour force at current wages.
Kalecki saw investment as “the central piece de resistance of economics”. He 
focused on the determinants of investment through a more dynamic approach. He 
regarded investment as the least stable part of national income, and the main cause of 
cycles. He saw as the main determinants of investment, the ability of firms to finance 
investment internally, the size of the capital stock and profits, which in turn, were 
determined by both the level of economic activity. In Kalecki’s view, innovation plays 
a leading role for the long mn perspectives of capitalism. However, in the same way 
that they constitute the predominant factor of growth they are also decisive in bringing 
about its halt. For Kalecki the course of stagnation in the long run is destined to prevail 
under laissez-faire conditions.
^  A As Arestis, McCauley & Sawyer (1999) point out the current tight monetary policy 
can be seen as an attempt to establish credibility o f the ECB in the eyes of the financial 
markets.
The important relationship between investment and demand is overlooked in many 
recent discussions of economic growth, which ignore demand constraints on the level of 
economic activity. Investment can increase, as well as respond to, the level of demand, 
affecting the scale o f production as well as its structure, organisation and technological 
efficiency (see Scott, 1992).
^*Smith 0996) points out that “in the short-term, keeping demand well in check will 
lead to a low rate of inflation; but in the longer term limiting the growth rate o f capacity 
by limiting expectations o f the growth rate of demand accentuates the danger of 
inflation. Keeping down the growth rate of capacity perpetuates not only high 
unemployment, but also the vulnerability of the economy to upturns in demand even if 
(as the ‘Lawson boom’) the economy is still operating way below full capacity” (p i6).
We refer to long-term interest rates. According to Kalecki (1990) it was the long term 
rate of interest which might influence investment decisions, and this did not exhibit 
market cyclical fluctuations.
Additional factors within the hysteresis framework that purport to explain persistence 
in unemployment are the insider-outsider approach (see for e.g. Lindbeck & Snower 
1986; Blanchard & Summers 1986) as well as the relationship between short-term and 
long-term unemployed in the pool of unemployed (see for e.g. Layard & Nickell 1986).
For a more comprehensive analysis on the effects o f aggregate demand on capacity 
utilization and investment see Soskice & Carling (1989).
The maintenance of a sufficiently high level o f aggregate demand can contribute 
towards improving the expectation of future profitability, whilst at the same time
146
facilitating a current budget surplus capable o f financing a considerable proportion of 
future investment.
Keynes’ analysis is thought to be of significant importance only for the short run. 
However, through this hysteresis mechanism, Keynesian policies may have medium run 
effect in shifting the equilibrium rate of unemployment itself.
It has to be emphasized that due to unavailability o f data, the first period 
corresponding to the unemployment rate has been left blank.
The pair-wise Granger causality tests carried out for nearly all EU countries 
reinforces the belief that the causality runs form capital stock to unemployment rather 
than the other way round. It has to be stressed however that Germany is the only 
country where the test is inconclusive.
It should be noted that It is the growth rate o f capital stock (in levels) under the 
simplifying assumption that there is no depreciation. According to Karanassou & 
Snower (2001) the growth rate of capital stock is given by:
K .
t - \
= = K, -  K,_, since....In^, = K,.
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where K, = + 7, -  ,
5 denotes the depreciation rate.
When the depreciation rate is positive the factor -5 / 5 has to be added to the constant 
term of the equation.
See Data Appendix for definitions of variables.
For a more comprehensive analysis on panel data see Chapter 3.
Due to the unavailability of data Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal were not included 
in the estimation.
For a more comprehensive analysis on the equations applied to calculate these tests 
see equations T-T3, Appendix fV, in Chapter 3.
The term Washington consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1990 in an effort 
to identify a specific formula through which Latin American countries would reform 
their economies and effectively enhance their position in the world market. Some of the 
most important features of the proscribed package can be summarized as follows: fiscal 
discipline, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation etc.
According to various studies (see for example, (Stiglitz 1997, Bruno & Easterly 1996, 
Barro 1997, Fisher 1993) inflation is costly when running at considerably high levels. 
There is hardly any evidence however, to suggest that the costs o f low levels of inflation 
are deleterious for growth.
According to Rowthom the deflationary policies adopted by governments in the 
1970’s to presumably fend off the distributional conflict instigated by rising inflation, 
resulted in a profit squeeze as capacity utilization fell.
Mainly due to the impact of powerfiil unions.
For a more extensive analysis on the increasing activities o f transnationals see Dicken 
(1992), Dunning (1993).
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Recent studies suggest that while over the period 1987-94 inward investment to the 
developed world hardly changed, that to the developing world has tripled (UNCTAD 
1995).
It has to be noted that “government measures may impact differently on different 
groups within and between countries and that they may have different short-, medium- 
and long-term effects.... In the context of a model o f the determinants of productivity 
and competitiveness, productivity-enhancing measures are the best available for this 
j)urpose.” (Pitelis 1998, p.l).
Ireland s success story owes a great deal to the educational programme undertaken. 
Clearly, highly skilled workforce is instrumental in attracting foreign direct investment. 
Ireland undoubtedly benefited by raising educational attainment but it has also ensured 
that education and training programmes have been introduced to meet the needs of 
employers. This requires regional government and development agencies not only to 
advise, contribute and provide education and training programmes but also to identify 
what skills are required in the economy, where the skills shortages / gaps are and how 
they can be addressed. It is also important to tie in skills strategies with sector or cluster 
strategies, business development and regeneration strategies.
Training as well as counselling programmes have been perceived as potential 
measures to deal with the unemployed. A case in point is the recommendations by the 
European Commission (Council Resolution of 29 May 1990) that counselling 
interviews in conjunction with training programmes be made available to all long-term 
unemployed people.
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Chapter 5
Making Sense of The Stability Pact: Test for 
Interest Rate Spillovers Across EU Countries 
and Econometric Investigation of The 
Relationship Between Investment and Saving
5.1. Introduction.
In the EU region, the prevalence of the neoliberal consensus, as reflected by both 
the Maastricht criteria and the stability pact, has been the subject of intense debate within 
the academic community. Despite the heavy criticism of the deflationary nature of the 
convergence rules, the architects of the EMU were swift to reassert their authority, by 
introducing a new, more stringent set of rules, and procedures (the stabiltiy pact) as means 
of promoting fiscal discipline inside EMU. Arguably, the primary aim of the stability pact 
is to clarify and reinforce the deficit rule laid out in the Maastricht Treaty.
In this chapter, an investigation into the rationale behind the stability pact's 
enactment, will provide the platform on which a more rigorous and insightful analysis will 
be conducted. The organisation of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 dwells upon the 
central features of the stability pact. By analysing the main reasons for its introduction, we
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expose a number of different views, and show that the Pact lacks valid theoretical 
foundations, and thus, its application may result in a deflationary spiral with detrimental 
consequences to the entire EU region. Section 5.3 explores the issues concerning the 
possibility of cross-country interest rate spillovers, by conducting Granger causality tests 
for six EU member states. Section 5.4, using econometric analysis, challenges the widely 
held neoliberal view that public deficits absorb national saving, raise interest rates, which in 
turn crowds out investment. In this context, further econometric investigation sheds some 
light on the macroeconomic relationship between investment and saving. Section 5.5 
provides some conclusions.
5.2. Making Sense of the Stability Pact.
Following the preceding analysis on the effects o f macroeconomic policy on 
employment, it has emerged that tight economic policies might contribute to the destruction 
of the economic environment responsible for nurturing the propagation o f new jobs in the 
system. In the EU region, the new policy mix fostered by the European governments, 
especially after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’, has been directed to ensuring 
price stability and sound government finances^ The emerging feature o f this new state of
affairs is the new framework (EMU^) within which macroeconomic policies in Europe will 
be pursued.
According to the principles of EMU^, at national level, monetary autonomy is 
transferred to a supranational, independent authority, the European central bank, whereas 
budgetary policy autonomy is maintained at the national level. However, it is interesting to 
note that the co-ordination of the budgetary policy within the EU region will be subject to
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the rules enshrined in the stability and growth pact. According to Keller (1999), the 
existing economic interdependence between member states necessitates the introduction of 
a set o f rules - such as the ones embodied in the stability pact’ - that provides the platform 
on which the co-ordination o f budgetary policies will be conducted. In principle, the 
primary objective of the stability pact’ is twofold; firstly, it sets the disciplinary budgetary 
boundary within which budget deficits are allowed to fluctuate, hence its preventative 
element, and secondly it lays out the rules for comection pu^mses, should any member state 
exceed the proscribed deficit threshold. In other words, its chief focus will be on 
safeguarding the credibility o f monetary policy both in the short and long runl
Prior to embarking on any further exploration o f  the pact’s provisions let us very 
succinctly, identify the main elements that this set o f regulations and procedures consists 
of: (i) the budgetary positions of member states should be close to balance or in suiplus; (ii) 
member states should ensure that the deficit criterion, 3 per cent o f GDP, is met unless
there are special cimumstances; (iii) fines will be levied on any EU country that bleaches 
the 3 per cent o f GDP deficit ceiling.
The interesting aspect, however, o f the above set o f mles that deserves attention is 
the allowances that the pact makes with regard to the member states that fail to conform to 
its principles. The pact states that a country’s qualification for automatic exemption will be 
subject to its economic performance. More specifically, exemption will be granted to those 
countries in which GDP has decreased by 2 per cent and its excess budget deficit is 
transitory and o f a small magnitude. Those in which GDP decreases by between 0.75 per 
cent and 2 per cent, could also qualify for exemption provided that the Council o f Ministers 
have agreed. As for those member states which experience an even milder recession, a
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correction directive will be delivered to them in order to eliminate excessive deficits within 
two years. Any failure to do so will result in the imposition o f fines®.
Evidently, putting together a set of regulations and procedures, by which the member 
states have to abide, is a practice that aims at achieving certain objectives. What are these 
objectives?
• To prevent inflationary pressures within the EU region (debt bailouts)^,
• To avoid spillovers from irresponsible budgetary policies inside EMU,
• To encourage policy co-ordination.
• To increase national saving
Arguably, monetary and budgetary policies should work in the same direction so that 
low inflation and sustainable growth can be achieved. A bad concoction o f policies'® may 
lead to high real interest rates", low investment and slow economic growth (Debrun 1997). 
According to the stability pact it is important that EU's economies are safeguarded against 
potential debt-bailouts; this scenario involves a country that has accumulated an obscene 
amount o f debt which it finds impossible to service. As a result the pressure is either on the 
monetary authority (ECB) to accommodate the debt‘s or on the rest of the member states to 
bailout'^ the country in distress. "Under these circumstances, the central bank would find it 
difficult to credibly commit itself to price stability and other members would find their own 
incentives for implementing sound fiscal policies distorted" (Goldstein and Woglom 1992; 
p.228). Giavazzi et al. (1995) maintain that large deficits undermine the effectiveness of 
monetary policy and make public finances more fragile'"'. Therefore, balanced or in surplus
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budgets will enable the entire region to reduce the dead-weight cost of taxation and make 
funding social security liabilities a lot easier'^.
Fundamentally, in neoclassical economics economic growth is contingent on 
savings (Cesaratto 1999). Thereby, the current economic practice of targeting balanced 
budgets’ ,^ is based on the very notion that budget deficits absorb national saving, raise 
interest rates which in turn crowd out private investment’ .^
Recently, within the European circles there has been much speculation regarding the 
possibility of negative spillovers flowing from irresponsible national budgetary policies’*. 
Admittedly, uncontrollably large budget deficits within the EU region can affect interest as 
well as exchange rates, which in turn can result in cross-border spillovers. Co-ordination of 
national budgetary policy is therefore needed to ensure that such spillovers are kept at bay 
as well as to provide a safety margin that allows automatic stabilisers to operate effectively 
when the economy is in recession (Keller 1999).
Despite the multitude of reasons put forward by the pioneers of the stability pact to 
justify its introduction, some scepticism’  ^regarding its effectiveness has started to emerge. 
A case in point is Suiter's (1999) qualms regarding the degree o f co-ordination between
“ycimonetary and fiscal policy in the EU region. Invoking the mistrust rooted within the 
different groups in the ECB's top independent agents, he contends that co-ordination 
between the ECB and the 11 national finance ministers will be an interesting challenge, the 
impact of which is yet to be felt . Artis and Winkler (1997) maintain the main inspiration 
for the fiscal criteria is to assist the ECB in the pursuit of price stability. However, 
monetary policy will be unable to deal with intra-Union asymmetric shocks. Moreover, 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) argue that in a region such as EU, where capital is
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mobile, and EU member states borrow on global capital markets, there is little reason why 
it should result in cross-border interest rate spillovers^^. Externalities such as fiscal 
spillovers are conditional on whether the sum of national investment and the deficit 
exceeds national saving (Pisani-Ferry 1996). In addition, it has been argued that at 
national level the stability pact^ "* could have an adverse effect on the operation of automatic 
stabilisers^^, especially when they are most needed, as well as on output^^.
Taking the preceding analysis into account, it can be very confidently argued that 
the rationale behind the implementation of the stability pact has been far from lucid. In the 
following sections an attempt to put some of the aforementioned convictions to the test in 
order to gain some further insight into the ongoing debate, regarding this new set of 
regulations and procedures, will be made.
5.3. Testing the Likelihood of Interest Rate Spillovers within EU.
The prospect o f interest rate spillovers within the EU region has been central to 
much of the debate that favours the safeguarding attributes of the Stabiltiy Pact. Recently, 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) attempted to provide some evidence^^ with regard to the 
likelihood that such spillovers are to occur within the EU area.
In pursuing the unravelling of this issue it is imperative that econometric analysis is 
summoned. More specifically, a reduced form relationship between interest rates will be 
estimated, in order to see if and to what extent interest rates in a particular EU member state 
are influenced by its own values, rest of Europe values and rest of the world values. The 
standard econometric technique for testing hypotheses o f this sort is the Granger causality 
test (see Appendix I). For this analysis, we used current and lagged^* up to 15 months data
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on long-term interest rates for Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, UK, Greece,
and the rest of the World” , ranging from 1970:01 to 1999:02.
Table 1. Granger Causality Tests on Long-Term Interest Rates
Europe,
Prob.
0.52
0.39
0.89
0.08
UK does not Granger Cause Europe 
Europe does not Granger Cause UK 
UK does not Granger Cause World 
World does not Granger Cause UI^
Denmark does not Granger Cause Europe 
Europe does not Granger Cause Denmark 
Denmark does not Granger Cause World 
World does not Granger Cause Denmark
Greece does not Granger Cause Europe 
Europe does not Granger Cause Greece 
Greece does not Granger Cause World 
World does not Granger Cause Greece
Europe does not Granger Cause World
World does not Granger Cause Europe------------------- -—  --------
Note: The test has been conducted at the 5% level of significance.
1.12
1.41
0.41
0.55
0.05
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.34
0.15
0.91
0.97
0.34
0.00
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The most interesting aspect of the Granger causality tests presented in the above 
table is that while one would expect the null hypothesis corresponding to a strong economy 
such as Germany, i.e. Germany does not Granger cause Europe, to be rejected this not the 
case^®. What is even striking however is the rejection of the null hypothesis i.e. UK does 
not Granger cause Europe. Furthermore, at the 5% level of significance in nearly all cases 
the null hypothesis that the rest of the world does not Granger cause the individual 
countries as well as Europe, is strongly rejected, with the only exception of Germany which 
appears to be significant at the 8% level and Greece where all tests are statistically 
insignificant. An additional feature that is worth mentioning, however, is the impact of the 
rest of Europe on both France and UK; both tests are statistically significant.
The undertaken tests per se, reinforce the argument of those, for example Buiter 
(1999), who propound that EU member states borrow on global capital markets and 
therefore there is little need to put in place an entire mechanism presumably to avert cross- 
border interest rate spillovers. Furthermore, the seemingly profound impact of the EU 
interest rates on France and the UK suggests that the causality runs from countries/groups 
of considerable economic magnitude to those with relatively small economies.
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5.4 Gaining an Insight into the Macroeconomic Relationship Between 
Investment and Saving.
5,4.1 An investigation into their relationship.
Arguably, one o f the fundamental reasons why current macroeconomic policy has 
shifted towards the elimination of budget defícits, is the emerging neoliberal consensus on 
how to revitalise investment. Summers and Carroll (1987) emphasise the need to augment 
private as well as government saving^' in order to expand investment. To this effect the 
proponents o f this consensus posit that public and private consumption must be contained^^ 
(Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers 1998). In the USA such a belief is rather pervasive 
in Clinton s vow to cut the federal budget deficit^^. In Europe the new policy consensus, as 
implied by both the convergence criteria and the Stability pact, appears to be in line with 
the tenets of the neoliberal orthodoxy.
By and large, it is beyond any question that sound government finances may indeed 
be an important factor that conditions economic progress. Nonetheless, the notion that 
saving must be boosted in order to expand investment, is a contention that has to be taken 
with a 'pinch o f salt'.
Prior to engaging in an econometric investigation, it would be helpful if the 
national-income accounting identity, that relates savings to investment, is reproduced.
I  = PS + G S -N X
Where /  is investment, PS  is private saving GS is net government saving^"*, and N X  is net 
exports. Following this identity, investment increases only when either or both private and 
government savings increase^^. The, by implication, close relationship between the two
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vanables, identified by a number of economists (see Summers 1988), has provided the 
platform on which the mainstream tradition has expounded its theoretical approach^^.
Arguably, the essence of this national-income accounting identity is purely 
informative, m that all it tells us is that investment must equal private and public saving ex 
posP \ Therefore, the causal dimension between the two variables given by the mainstream 
economists may very well be regarded as unfounded^*. Gordon (1995) argues that 'if 
investment must equal savings ex post, it could obviously be the case ex ante that 
investment changes first, and that saving comes subsequently into balance with investment, 
rather than the other way around' (p.58). The causality in effect -  as maintained by both 
Keynes and Kalecki^’ - may run from investment to saving rather than vice versa (Harcourt 
& Spajic 1998). In the same line of argument, Skott (1989), following the Keynesian^® 
tradition, regards "investment as a key variable Firms decide the level o f investment,
and income and saving then adapt to bring about the ex-post identity between saving and 
investment"(p.ll5).
Assuming that gross saving is composed of undistributed corporate profits, capital 
consumption allowances, personal saving and government surplus, whereas gross 
investment is the sum of gross private domestic investment and net foreign investment, 
how can we be sure that by increasing one component o f saving the rest will remain 
unchanged? For instance, an increase in taxes intended to boost government’s saving will
cause reductions in both undistributed profits, and disposable income, i.e. reducing personal 
saving.
The discernible ambiguity between the macroeconomic relationship o f those two 
variables has provided the impetus for conducting some further investigation.
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Table 2. Net Investment and Net National Saving rates for EU-15 and OECD economies.
Time
Periods
Net Investment 
as % o f  GDP 
EU
N. N. Saving as 
% o f  GDP 
EU
Net Investment 
as % o f  GDP 
OECD
N. N  Saving as 
% o f GDP 
OECD
1961-1966 8.3 7.2 10.2 9.3
1967-1972 8.9 9.8 9.8 10.6
1973-1978 1.2 6.9 10.4 9.6
1979-1984 4.6 4.1 5.4 4.9
1985-1991 10.8 9.0 6.1 5.8
1992-1998 7.0 6.0 17.6 17.2
Fig. 1.
------ INVEU
........INVOECD
------ SAVEU
------ SAVOECD
61-66 67-72 73-78 79-84 85-91 92-98
Table 2, and Fig.l, illustrate the pattern as well as the trend followed by the average 
of both net investment and net national saving rates, for all European and OECD economies 
over the period 1961 to 1998. Following the post-war boom, net investment and net saving 
rates were at rather high levels during the periods 1961 to 1966 and 1967 to 1972. In the 
following two periods, the European economies experienced a steady but substantial 
decline in net investment and net saving rates, whereas in the OECD economies the lowest
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points were reached during the period 1985-1991. The short-lived sanguine picture 
observed in Europe during the following period (1985-1991), gave way to a more 
disappointing spell o f lower investment and saving rates over the last time-span. As 
regards the OECD economies however, the picture painted over the last period has changed 
dramatically, in that both net investment and net saving have recovered quite considerably.
5.4.2, Net Investment Vs. Net Personal Saving,
Building on the preceding discussion regarding the relationship between net 
investment and net saving, an exposition of some additional aspects o f the existing 
relationship will be sought. The proponents of the mainstream"*^ approach would argue that 
it is the decisions made by private households about personal saving that that the public 
authorities (the government) have to respond to. In other words, personal saving"*  ^ is 
regarded as a major factor responsible for conditioning the relationship between investment 
and saving. In the analysis to follow, our main concern will be to investigate the 
relationship between investment and personal savings, since the latter has provided the 
platform on which the bulk of the current debate has been based. Our investigation has been 
confined to what some may call the core EU countries: France, the UK, Belgium Germany 
and the Netherlands. Throughout, the quantitative analysis annual time series data^ 
ranging from 1972-1998, has been used.
Table 3, below, shows how net investment, personal saving and private saving (all 
normalised on potential output) behaved over the period 1972 to 1998. As can be 
discerned, net investment in the UK, France and the Netherlands peaked during the period 
1985-91, whereas in both Germany and Belgium it peaked during the last period. Personal
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savings, in the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands reached a peak in the last period 
whereas in Germany a downward trend is observed throughout all periods. As regards 
private savings, the pattern exhibited seems to be shared by all five countries, since in all 
cases it peaks over the last period.
Country Periods
Net investment 
(% of potential 
output)
Net personal
45saving
(% of potential 
output)
Net private
46saving
(% of potential 
output)
France 1972 -1978 19.2 7.3 18.0
1979 -1984 15.4 7.2 16.8
1985 - 1991 16.2 2.6 15.5
1992 -1998 11.7 4.9 17.7
UK 1972 -1978 12.1 2.6 14.0
1979 -1984 11.9 2.5 17.1
1985 - 1991 13.3 1.6 12.6
1992 -1998 10.2 3.4 15.1
Belgium 1972 - 1978 18.6 8.1 19.4
1979 -1984 15.2 9.1 17.4
1985 -1991 13.0 7.2 19.7
1992 -1998 13.5 7.7 20.5
Germany 1972 -1978 19.4 6.5 n/a
1979 -1984 14.0 6.3 21.2
1985 -1991 13.2 6.1 22.1
1992 -1998 14.7 5.3 22.7
Netherlands 1972 -1978 23.3 7.1 n/a
1979 -1984 15.8 7.3 n/a
1985 -1991 16.6 2.6 26.2
1992 -1998 14.3 4.9 26.8
Source'. European Economy.
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5.4,3 Where does the causality run from ? Some evidence.
When we tested for cross-border interest rate spillovers at an earlier stage in this 
chapter, the Granger causality test approach was adopted. The pairwise Granger causality 
test (see Appendix I) is a legitimate way of testing formal hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between two variables as well as provide inferences about their temporal 
priority^^ i.e. which one leads which over time.
Table 4 Pairwise Granger causality test on the temporal relationship between net 
investment and personal saving as well as between net investment and private saving.
Country
France
UK
Null hypothesis: 
Personal saving /[ private 
saving] does not Granger 
cause net investment 
1.85 (0.18)2/W  
0.18 (0.67)3/[ ^ ]
1.93(0.17)2 /[N] 
0.92 (0.44)3
Null hypothesis:
Net investment does not 
Granger cause personal 
saving /[ private saving 
5.00^0.05)2/[4.51(0.03] 
3.11 (0.06h / [4.30(0.04)
3.80 (0.02)U \ 3.53 (0.04)
Germany
Netherlands
2.64 (0.10)2 
1.20 (0.34)3/[ ^ ]
2.31(0.15)2/W  
1.63 r0.25)i/[N]
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The striking feature of the Granger causality tests presented in table 4, is the 
overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis - that net investment does not Granger cause 
personal saving at the 5% level o f significance, in all five countries"^^ involved in our 
testing. Technically speaking, information in ascertaining the time-series pattern of 
personal saving will be lost, unless we take stock of personal saving's covariation with past 
values of net investment. Conversely, the fact that the null hypothesis that personal saving 
does not Granger cause net investment is accepted in all five cases, suggests that even if we 
exclude personal saving from the regression no statistical information will be lost.
As regards the Granger causality tests on the relationship between net investment 
and private saving, on the basis of the results obtained the hypothesis that net investment 
does not Granger cause private saving is strongly rejected at the 5% level of significance in 
all five countries.
Following the preceding empirical analysis it can be argued that the emerging 
evidence points towards a macroeconomic relationship according to which investment leads 
personal saving and therefore the determination of investment precedes the one of personal 
saving.
5,4.4 A Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach.
As it has become clear from the preceding analysis, descriptive statistics as well as 
single equations provided the major tools with which we tried to investigate the investment­
saving relationship. Arguably, the determination of both investment and saving involves a 
string of other factors, that can have a profound impact on both variables, such as the real 
interest rate^°, or the profitability^\ It is necessary, therefore, to take the investigation one
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step further so that a more lucid picture emerges. To this effect, we develop a VAR52
model that consists of four endogenous variables: net investment, net personal saving, a 
measure of profitability^^, and interest rates. In our context, we use annual data^ "^  for 
France, the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands from 1972 to 1998.
Our primary focus while dealing with the VAR approach will be on discussing the 
decomposition of the variance of the variables in the system, at various horizons. By 
subjecting all endogenous variables in the VAR model to standard deviation shocks we can 
obtain information about the relative significance of each random innovation to the variable 
in the VAR. In other words, for each period the resulting simulated error, in each 
endogenous variable, is decomposed into the error due to its own innovations, and the 
error^^ due to innovations in the endogenous variables. The significance o f this task rests in 
the magnitude of the percentage of the variance of each endogenous variable. High 
percentage of variance over a long period implies that the variable is largely exogenous to 
the system. In contrast, a high percentage of variance that declines fairly quickly with time, 
implies that the variable is significantly conditioned by the variables in the system^^.
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Table 5. Variance decomposition of responses to innovations in a 
four-variable VAR system. %
UK % Variance Decomposition Sav. % Variance decomposition Inv.
Periods Sav. Inv. Others Sav. Inv. Others
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0 .5 99.5 0.0
2 34.9 50.2 14.9 20 .9 78.2 0.9
3 24.9 47.4 27.7 23 .8 63.5 12.7
4 21.9 51.6 26.5 19.9 53.0 27.1
5 18.4 50.1 31.5 19.3 48.8 31.9
France % Variance Decomposition Sav. % Variance decomposition Inv.
Periods Sav. Inv. Others Sav. Inv. Others
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 92.6 0.1
2 94.7 5.0 0.3 12.5 85.7 1.8
3 93.1 6.0 0.9 12.7 84.7 2.6
4 82.9 7.1 10.0 10.7 86.3 3.0
5 78.8 12.1 9.1 15.7 80.6 3.7
Belgium % Variance Decomposition Sav. % Variance decomposition Inv.
Periods Sav. Inv. Others Sav. Inv. Others
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 4 .3 95.7 0.0
2 98.4 0.1 1.5 4 .4 83.0 12.6
3 94.1 3.7 2.2 3 .6 81.8 14.6
4 84.2 9.7 6.1 3 .5 77.8 18.7
5 76.0 16.8 7.2 3 .7 65.4 30.9
Germany % Variance Decomposition Sav. % Variance decomposition Inv.
Periods Sav. Inv. Others Sav. Inv. Others
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 94.6 0.0
2 89.5 8.6 1.9 3 .5 94.5 2.0
3 85.5 12.0 2.5 6 .8 88.8 4.4
4 81.4 14.0 4.6 11.5 82.4 6.1
5 78.8 14.0 7.2 15.5 76.7 7.8
Netherla, % Variance Decomposition Sav. % Variance decomposition Inv.
Periods Sav. Inv. Others Sav. Inv. Others
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 3 .3 96.7 0.0
2 83.8 8.1 8.1 6 .4 71.0 22.6
3 74.1 8.8 17.1 3 .6 40 .0 56.4
4 73.3 7.0 19.7 4 .2 26.0 69.8
5 75.4 6.0 18.6 7 .9 20.0 72.1
Notes: Due to the limited space we have added up the rest o f the variables which, in this 
case, is reflected by 'others'.
166
Table 5 provides a summary of the variance decomposition of both saving and 
investment, conditioned by the rest o f the endogenous variables, for periods from one to 
five lags. An inspection of the columns corresponding to the UK, reveals the following:
The portion of saving's variance due to its own innovations after reaching 100 percent in 
the first period, has declined considerably over the next periods, down to only 18.4 percent 
after five periods, whereas the portion of variance, due to investment has remained 
relatively high over all five periods, before it gives way to the rest of the variables in the 
system. Conversely, the portion of investment's variance due to its own innovations 
displays a smoother pattern, remaining relatively high throughout all periods. Further 
more, the portion of its variance due to saving, rises to 23.8 per cent before it declines 
again. The above evidence suggests that the relative contribution of investment's 
innovation to saving's variance is much greater than the relative contribution o f the saving's 
innovation to investment' variance through out the entire period.
In France, unlike the UK, the portion of saving's variance due to its own innovation 
has remained relatively high over all five periods, whereas the portion due to investment, 
after a sluggish start, has only risen to 12.1 per cent. The story concerning the portion of 
investment's variance due to its own as well as saving's innovations appears to be unfolding 
in a rather similar fashion. The only difference is that, this time, the portion of investment's 
variance due to saving exhibits a more stable pattern before it reaches 15.7 per cent. The 
emerging evidence indicates that the relative contribution o f saving's innovation to 
investment's variance dominates, not by much, the relative contribution of investment's 
innovation to saving's variance.
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In Belgium, the picture appears to be rather ambiguous. Over the first two periods, 
the contribution of saving's innovation to investment's variance is distinctly greater than the 
contribution of investment's innovation to saving' variance. In the remaining three periods 
however, the story changes with investment dominating saving.
As regards Germany, the evidence obtained points to a more balanced picture since 
both the contribution of saving's innovation to investment's variance, as well as the 
contribution of investment's innovation to saving's variance, are o f the same magnitude.
Finally, in the Netherlands' case, the portion o f savings due to its own innovation 
has remained quite high during all periods, whereas the portion of savings due to 
innovation in investment has not exceeded the 6 per cent mark. Furthermore, the portion of 
investment due to innovation in savings has remained rather low, whereas the portion of 
investment due to its own innovation, despite the high percentages in the first two periods, 
has declined substantially over the last three periods. Such a development can be put down 
to the influence (72 per cent in the last period) of the remaining variables -  the profit share, 
and interest rate -  on the portion of investment.
On the basis of the evidence generated serious doubts are cast on the existing 
relationship between investment and saving. In particular, it could be argued that the 
macroeconomic relationship between personal saving and investment has to be carefully re­
investigated.
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5.5 Concluding remarks.
On the basis o f the evidence obtained, the implementation of a stringent set of rules, 
and procedures, such as the ones implied by both the Maastricht convergence criteria, as 
well as the Stability Pact, to presumably fend off debt-bailouts, and cross-border interest 
rate spillovers within the EU region, have to be carefully reconsidered. Subjecting all EU 
member states to austere economic policies without taking into consideration the economic 
situation these countries are in, not only may prove pernicious to these economies but to the 
ones in the vicinity as well.
As regards the likelihood of cross-border interest rate spillovers, the generated 
evidence, concerning six EU member states, points towards a causality that runs from the 
large economies to the small ones, rather than the other way round. Therefore the fears for 
interest rate spillovers within the EU region can hardly be justified.
Amidst a number of findings, the ones regarding the relationship between investment 
and saving were of great importance. The impetus for investigating this relationship was 
given by the prevailing policy consensus, in the so-called developed countries, that large 
budget deficits absorb national saving, and therefore impede investment, in which case, 
consumption has to be curbed and budget deficits have to be eliminated. Our effort sought 
to establish the way the causality between net personal saving and net investment runs.
The empirical investigation that was carried out for six countries cast considerable 
doubt upon the notion that increases in saving will boost investment. The Granger 
causality test pointed to a relationship, on the basis of which, investment leads saving. In 
pursuing a deeper understanding of the existing relationship a four-variable VAR model 
was set up for each country individually. By decomposing the variance of each variable, the
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Appendix
According to the Granger (1969) approach, the question o f  whether x causes y, is to 
see how much o f the current y  can be explained by past values o f  y  and then to see whether 
adding lagged values o f  x can improve the explanation. Y is said to be Granger-caused by 
X i f  it helps in the prediction o f y, or equivalently i f  the coefficients on the lagged x's are 
statistically significant. It is important to note that the statement "x Granger causes y" 
does not imply that y  is the effect or the result o f  x. Granger causality measures 
precedence and information content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more 
common use o f  the term.
The test is carried out by running bivariate regressions o f the form
yt = OLo-^  OLiyt-i +......+ OLiyt-i + Pix,.i + ..... + ^¡x,.i
X t =  o o  +  a jX t - i  + ....... +  a iX t - i  +  P i y i . j  + .......+  P iy t - i
fo r  all possible pairs o f  (x,y) series in the group. The reported F-statistics are the Wald 
statistics fo r  the joint hypothesis
P i  = .....= P i  =  0
fo r  each equation. The null hypothesis is therefore that x does not Granger-causey in the 
first regression and that y  does not Granger-cause x  in the second regression.
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Notes:
Lamfalussy (1997) contends that the Maastricht treaty will enable countries to "exercise
concerted discipline in the conduct of their fiscal management....... to minimize the risk of
an adverse policy mix and an excessive burden on monetary policy".
 ^As Eisner (1995) points out such as a deflationary bias should be put down to the growing 
perception that policies purporting to reduce unemployment through increased deficit 
spending or increased money supply will cause inflation to accelerate. Within the NAIRU 
framework trying to reduce unemployment by policies designed to boost aggregate demand 
may work for a while but then hi^ier inflation will cancel out the effects o f the stimulus.
 ^ In some recent studies purporting to compare and contrast the emerging edifice of EMU 
to the already established one in the USA, a number of major differences have been 
identified which allegedly may pose some serious threat to the viability o f the European 
Monetary Union. For a more comprehensive analysis on this see: Eichengreen (1990), 
Goldstein and Woglom (1992)
 ^ The nature of the convergence rules enacted in Maastricht provides the institutional 
framework of EMU.
 ^ The fact that the Maastricht Treaty offers less guarantees for solid budgetary policies 
prompted, Theo Waigel, the German Finance Minister to put forward the idea of a Stability 
and Growth Pact in 1995. However, it was not until June 1997 that this new element was 
finalized. Prior to its final settlement, the French government called for a better balance 
between budgetary discipline and employment policy. The resulting Resolution simply 
stated that employment policy should be coordinated at the EU level.
 ^ Arestis & Sawyer (1998b) argue that the Stability and Growth Pact is based on the 
prevailing new-monetarist doctrines, i.e. since inflation is a monetary phenomenon, 
monetary policy is the only way it can be controlled; the level o f unemployment fluctuated 
around a supply-determined equilibrium unemployment (NAIRU); fiscal policy is impotent 
in its impact on real variables, therefore it should serve as an auxiliary tool to monetary 
policy in achieving price stability.
 ^ The existing literature on the credibility of monetary policy proposes the delegation of 
policy to an independent central bank, which is either more conservative than the 
population (Rogoff 1985a), or subject to an inflation performance contract (Walsh 1995) as 
a solution to time-inconsistency problems of monetary policy in isolation. It does not 
however say much on the effects of fiscal policy on the behaviour o f central bank and the 
inflation process (Artis and Winkler 1997).
* It should be stressed that the fines for the first three years will take the form of a 
returnable deposit (non interest bearing). It will not be until this time period has elapsed 
that the fine will be collected. Sawyer (1999) argues that the imposition of penalties is 
likely to add to the deficit problem.
 ^The recent Mexican crisis (1994-5) shook the foundations o f financial markets throughout 
Latin America, with repercussions even in countries as far away as Italy, Spain Sweden, 
(for a more comprehensive analysis on the Mexican crisis see Sachs et al, (1995)). 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998, p.79) believe that 'the most compelling rationale for the 
Stability Pact rests on the need to buttress the no-bailout rule o f the Maastricht Treaty*. 
Referring to a policy mix of loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy.
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II Sawyer (1999) maintains that the real “route through which interest rates influence 
inflation are rarely spelt out” (p.4).
Growing nominal debt can subvert the central bank's anti-inflationary stance, in that it 
might be tempted to inflate away the stock of debt (De Grauwe 1996).
The prospect o f passing the cost over to the entire EMU region will undermine EMU's 
objectives, by allowing EU member states to run riskier economic policies.
Such a contention is predominantly shared by those who have been very critical of the 
efficiency of fiscal policy intervention, as well as o f the role of the state.
According to the post-Keynesian analysis limits imposed on national budget deficits will 
undermine the positive role that deficits play in stabilizing demand over the business cycle 
(Sawyer 1999).
Three of the most prominent principles of the new macroeconomic orthodoxy are: the 
government's orientation towards balanced budgets, the notion that government 
intervention in product, financial, and product markets is economically inefficient, and 
finally, government interference in financial movements has to be curtailed (Epstein and 
Gintis, 1995).
The ‘cowding out’ concept has been ingrained in the heads of many academic and City 
economists for many years now. The argument that fiscal policy is ineffective in 
influencing demand because its effects will be crowded out by the impact of higher interest 
rates and possibly by higher exchange rate. Such a belief however is based on the implicit 
assumption that monetary policy will be left unchanged as fiscal policy is eased. 
Simulations carried out by the Warwick University Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau 
(Wallis 1984) as well as the London Business School and National Institute models suggest 
that if a monetary policy is allowed to accommodate the shift in fiscal policy (by fixing 
interest rates and allowing the money supply to grow more rapidly), then a large increase in 
demand and output will occur. It is worth noting that even with a non-accomodating 
monetary policy, aggregate demand still responds to a fiscal injection in most simulations,
but by a smaller amount.
18Thygesen (1996) sustains that actual deficits are 'an expression of the burden on financial 
markets'.
Arestis & Sawyer (1999) propose the introduction of a new “Stability and Growth Pact, 
the focus of which will be a common fiscal policy, along with the ECB monetary 
policy”(p.l 1).
® "The Germano-Dutch wing of the ECB mistrusts the Euro XI as an attempt to undermine 
the operational independence o f the central bank" (Buiter 1999, p.205)
The British experience has proved that balancing monetary and fiscal policies, when 
there is a single fiscal and monetary authority can be a dreadful task.
It should be stressed however, that fluctuations in interest rates can have cross-border 
effects on the level of output and employment (this is conditional on a scenario in which 
wages are rigid). According to Oudiz and Sachs (1984) such effects are unlikely to be 
significant since deficit spending at home stimulates imports and hence output and 
employment abroad; it also causes interest rates to go up which in turn impedes output and 
employment abroad. In other words the two effects offset one another.
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von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) maintain that fiscal spillovers depend on the degree 
of trade or financial integration rather on monetary union.
On the political front additional scepticism regarding the economic viability o f the 
Stability Pact can be detected in the announcement, prior to the Amsterdam summit, made 
by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Jospin’s finance minister, in which he stated that he would 
not sign a Stability pact devoid of measures to stimulate employment.
The major concern is that during a recession member states will be expected to undertake 
measures in order to avoid exceeding the 3% deficit threshold. With such a prospect 
looming, Eichengreen (1997) recommends a new deficit target, formulated in terms of 
structural deficits or ’constant employment budget balance* rather that actual deficits.
For more on the effects of the restrictions imposed by the Stability pact on automatic 
stabilizers as well as on output volatility see Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1995); von Hagen & 
Eichengreen (1996).
In their study they only provided evidence for one EU member state, Germany. 
Following their own model we will try and extent it to include a larger number of EU 
countries.
In general it is better to use more rather than fewer lags, since the theory is couched in 
terms of the relevance of all past information.
Europe is a weighted average of Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, UK, and Greece, 
whereas the rest o f the world is a weighted average of the USA, Canada, and Japan. 
OECD was our main source for our collection of data.
The results obtained here are at odds with the conventional wisdom that wants German 
interest rates to play a significant role in the determination of European interest rates (see 
Keller 1999).
"....... neoclassical growth models have, again with little irony, cast a dark cloud on the
effectiveness of saving as a positive force on the rate of economic growth" (Hamberg, 
1971:pp.l41-2).
Eisner (1995) maintains that such an antiquated reasoning is totally absurd.
In a rather characteristic manner. President Clinton attributed the low growth rate in 
domestic investment to the crippling large budget deficits.
This is equal to government revenue minus government spending (government surplus).
Such a contention is predicated on the condition that net exports does not affect the 
determination of the investment-savings equilibrium.
The view that by changing one component o f saving, we can achieve major changes in 
the components on investment, might be the case, provided that we assume all other things 
constant (Eisner 1995).
Asimakopoulos (1983) posits that neither Keynes nor Kalecki envisaged the time 
required that takes for the multiplier effects of a higher level of investment to be worked 
out. He goes on to argue that "Keynes even appeared at times to confuse the definitional 
equality between saving and investment with the equilibrium relation between 
them"(p.222).
‘Keynes’ intellectual revolution was to shift economists from thinking normally in terms 
of a model of reality in which a dog called savings wagged his tail labeled investment to
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thinking in terms of a model in which a dog called investment wags his tail called saving’. 
Meade (1975; p.62)
They both looked upon investment as the causal determinant of saving in the short-term, 
since it affects the level of output (Keynesian view) as well as the distribution of income 
(Kalecki’s view).
Keynes (1964) regarded saving as a passive 'determinant' o f the system (p.l83).40
Both Keynes and Kalecki regarded investment as the key determinant o f the level of 
economic activity. According to Kalecki (1971: p. 13) "...capitalists, as a whole, determine 
their own profits by the extent o f their investment and personal consumption. In a way they 
are 'masters of their fate'; but how they 'master' it is determined by objective factors, so that 
fluctuations of profits appear after all to be unavoidable". In the same spirit, Keynes' 
(1973: p.l21) argued that the "level of output and employment as a whole depends on the 
amount of investment. I put it this way, not because this is the only factor on which 
aggregate output depends, but because it is usual in a complex system to regard as the 
causa causans that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation. More 
comprehensively, aggregate output depends on the propensity to hoard, on the policy of the 
monetary authority as it affects the quantity of money, on the state of confidence 
concerning the prospective yield of capital assets, on the propensity to spend and on the 
social factors which influence the level of money wage. But of these several factors it is 
those which determine the rate of investment which are most unreliable, since it is they 
which are influenced by our views of the future about which we know so little." 
Asimakipoulos (1983) points out that for both Keynes and Kalecki banks liquidity 
determines the rate o f investment. "For both it was the subsequent changes in income (as 
well as the distribution of income for Kalecki) that brought desired saving into equality 
with the increase in investment."(p.233).
According to the neoclassical approach the main determinants o f investment decisions 
are: the aggregate income, and the interest rate. On the other hand, personal saving 
decisions, according to the life cycle - permanent income hypothesis o f consumption, are 
believed to depend on fluctuations in income, the interest rate and wealth.
It should be stressed that within the neoclassical tradition total private saving is also 
being given some consideration. Arguably, households optimize total private saving.
We normalized our data by dividing by potential output in order to control for increases 
in the scale of the economy.
By net personal savings we refer to net savings of households.
Private savings is the sum of personal and private sector savings.
This becomes feasible, by regressing X on its own values as well as lags of Y and then 
reversing the test with Y this time your dependent variable.
It should be emphasised that our intention is to focus on long-term effects between 
investment and saving. Hence, the lags employed in our analysis.
It should be noted, however, that in the Netherlands the Granger causality test involving 
two lags is found to be insignificant either way.
The proponents of the neoclassical approach would argue that the real interest rate should 
be included in an equation involving the two variables in question.
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According to those sharing the Keynesian, Kaleckian, as well as Marxian perspecitve, 
profitability can have a profound impact on both investing and saving decisions. It should 
be pointed out that the proponents of the neoclassical theory regard the before-tax profit 
rate or profit share as a variable of no analytical significance, and therefore ignore its 
impact on net national saving ( Desai, 1987).
For more on VAR models see Sims (1980), Campbell (1991).
The profit share, which has been used as a measure o f profitability, attempts to capture 
the effects o f distribution as well as the cost of capital services on investment. (Gordon 
1995). In addition, the three-month treasury bill rate was used as a proxy for interest rates 
since according to the neoclassical theory serves as means of equilibrating saving and 
investment.
OECD, as well as European Economy were the main providers of our data.
The sum of the variances of all endogenous variables must add up to 100.
We should emphasize that the order according to which all variables have been included 
in the VAR system is of great importance. For the first variable the only one period ahead 
variation is its own innovation; hence the high percentage (100%). In our experiment 
saving has been chosen as the first variable.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In the EU region the dogmatic implementation o f economic policies of purely 
monetarist nature has established a contractionary regime in which restrictive, supposedly 
disinflationary, money and credit policies and a drastic, almost panic-stricken, tightening of 
flscal policies have combined to obstruct development and to suppress employment. 
Arguably, the new era ushered in by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as well as its 
successor the Stability Pact have thrown the EU economies into a deflationary bias possibly 
with disastrous repercussions for the employed population o f the EU member states. The 
prevalence of the neoliberal consensus appears to be dictating the nature of economic 
policy as well as the pace at which this has to be implemented. The Keynesian view that 
active government intervention in the economy is conducive to securing a simultaneous 
internal and external balance in the economy has been superseded by the neoliberal 
dogmatic approach of an automatic tendency towards market clearing.
Throughout the preceding chapters it was vigorously argued that government 
intervention might be instrumental in maintaining high levels o f aggregate demand so that 
the full employment of all resources is achieved. Aggregate demand has a positive effect on 
capacity utilisation and employment in both the short and long run. A positive feedback 
mechanism, following policies to stimulate investment, facilitates full employment as well
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as generates additional capacity for future expansion of production. Insufficient future 
capacity hampers the whole process to full employment since the economy will be too 
small to employ all resources and therefore reach its pinnacle.
The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate the existing problem of 
European unemployment within the new neoliberal environment that emerged particularly 
after the demise of the economic regime established at Bretton Woods and most crucially 
after the ratiftcation o f the Maastricht Treaty as well as to develop an alternative - demand- 
management based -  framework through which the current, arguably, dismal economic 
situation, could be addressed. It further, in view of the introduction o f the Stability pact, 
sought to gain an insight into the main arguments put forward in defence of the pact, 
namely the fear for interest rate spillovers across EU economies and the widely held 
neoliberal notion that defícit spending absorbs national saving which through its negative 
effect on interest rates, it crowds out investment.
More specifically, an elaboration on the policy ramifications flowing from the 
prevalence of the neoliberal consensus within the Euroland was attempted. Currently, in the 
EU region sound economic policies have given way to satisfying criteria and meeting 
deadlines; industrial competitiveness has been sacrificed to ineffective exchange rate 
policies, while a race against time intensifies as time goes by. Furthermore, the 
unprecedented high cost of capital has acted as a deterrent to long term industrial 
investment, whilst increased volatility, and speculative behaviour in the financial markets 
has transformed the entire economy into a 'casino', where the commercial interest revolves 
around short term gains. In addition, the ability of financial markets to restrict the 
availability of finance is perceived as being of invaluable importance, since investment is
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contingent on them. Changes in the level o f income lead to changes in the transactions 
demand for money, which in turn influences the rate of interest.
Further, it was argued that economic policy in Europe might have been heavily 
constrained by the stringent rules that the Maastrich treaty, and its successor, the Stability 
Pact, put in place to facilitate the transition to EMU. National budgets are limited by deficit 
and debt restrictions; on the other hand no mechanism has been envisaged to deal with the 
resulting contractionary effects within the EU region. The emergence of the ECB as an 
institution endowed with powers to set monetary policy with a view to controlling inflation, 
has spawned the belief that that expansionary policies are antiquated, and therefore, 
unsuitable means of conducting economic policy. In this context, the hardship that 
deflationary policies imply, are thought to be only transitory. Contentions of this sort 
however fail to account for the long-term rigor inflicted upon the unemployed population 
through the hysteresis mechanism. By scrutinising a number o f economic indicators, the 
extent to which the EU economies have suffered in view of the unfounded economic 
venture established in Maastricht, was illustrated. The emergence of preliminary 
econometric results buttresses the hypothesis that the deflationary bias of the convergence 
rules might have dampened economic performance and most crucially job-creation within 
the European Union.
Additionally, after exposing the conflicting evidence generated by past econometric 
attempts made to explain variations in the unemployment rate, an analytical framework was 
developed. In a post Keynesian spirit, a model, comprising a number o f equations, 
illustrated how the inherent attributes of economic policy, as reflected by fiscal, monetary 
as well as income policies, could contribute immensely to the expansion of the economy
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per se. For the estimation o f this model, panel data analysis was adopted for 13 EU member 
states. The econometric evidence generated suggests that the adoption o f income policies, 
designed to boost the wage share o f labour and in effect, the components of effective 
demand, as well as expansionary-type policies might prove instrumental in ameliorating the 
employment situation in the EU region. Further to this point, it was sustained that the 
contactionary economic stance, adopted by all EU member states, is likely to have added to 
the persisting problem of unemployment, by depriving EU citizens of one of their 
democratic rights, crucial to their survival, the right to ’work’.
In view of the little attention that the relationship between capital stock and 
unemployment has been given by contemporary economic nexuses, it was deemed 
necessary that an investigation into the underlying relationship is to take place. In 
particular, it was suggested that within the existing neoliberal literature the positive effects 
o f capital formation on unemployment has been played down, often suggesting that either, 
due to unfounded assumptions, any changes in investment leave unemployment intact or 
that employment has to be encouraged on the existing capital stock. Essentially, within this 
tradition, measures that promote the expansion of productive capacity are conspicuous by 
their absence. Moreover, by expanding on the notion that Keynesian-type policies, 
purporting to expand productive investment, could alleviate unemployment, an econometric 
analysis went under way. The evidence obtained suggested that the relationship between 
capital stock and unemployment offer possible channels through which European 
unemployment could be explained as well as indicated that the neoliberal era heralded by 
both the demise of the Bretton Woods as well as the ratification of the Maastricht treaty
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might have contributed immensely to the inexorable upward trend that European 
unemployment has followed over the past two decades.
Finally, an investigation into the rationale behind the fundamentals of the neoliberal 
dogma as reflected by both the Maastricht Treaty and the consequent introduction of the 
Stability Pact was conducted. Yielding evidence suggested that some of the key arguments 
put forward in defence of the pact might have to be seriously reconsidered. More 
specifically, when testing for cross-border interest rate spillovers within the EU region, the 
uniformity of the results, indicate that there is hardly any scope for such a concern. On the 
basis of the evidence obtained, the causality runs from the large economies to the small 
ones, rather than the other way round. Moreover, when the widely held notion that public 
deficits absorb national savings, which in turn dampen investment, was put to the test, the 
resulting findings suggest that such a contention may be flawed. It is of great interest to 
note that when econometric techniques were applied to gain some further insight into the 
relationship between investment and saving, the evidence generated not only did it point 
towards a causality that runs from investment to saving, but cast serious doubts on the 
believed relationship as well.
In essence, the contribution o f this thesis is of great significance as it advances our 
understanding of the channels through which macroeconomic policy, and more specifically 
income as well as demand management policies, could be instrumental in influencing 
European unemployment. In addition, it provides a constructive criticism on the current 
neoliberal environment in which economic policy is pursued within the EU region. The 
crucial point made in this thesis is that European unemployment may continue to affect the 
lives o f the EU population, unless a strategy to increase aggregate demand is crafted.
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Expanding demand, combined with proper targeting o f policies, may reverse the 
deteriorating job situation in Europe, as well as improve the living standards for the poor. 
For such a potential to be realised however, it is necessary that private investment is 
galvanised. It is only then that income and tax revenue will grow enough to eliminate the 
budget deficit produced by the initial rise in government spending. Keeping inflation 
within bounds may be conducive to economic stability, but imposing the same 
contractionary policies on EU economies characterised by different economic structures 
may well prove much more damaging.
Inherently, capitalistic economies are characterised by inequalities in the 
distribution of market power, income and wealth. Therefore, any attempts to deregulate the 
markets might further exacerbate these inequalities leading to a more unstable economic 
environment. It is therefore important that the government is given another dimension, 
being an apparatus of controlling the implementation of economic policies. One of its roles 
would be to initiate appropriate policies to deal with demand side (insufficient demand, 
instability of investment) as well as supply side issues (planning of prices and incomes, 
training).
Additional factors that have to be considered are the re-introduction of credit 
controls and the co-ordination of wage bargaining. It is essential that economies insulate 
themselves from international financial markets through exchange rate controls or ‘Tobin 
taxes’. Moreover, Kalecki’s view that income should be redistributed from the wealthy 
members of the society to the ones at subsistence level is another factor that can contribute 
to the eradication of poverty and creation of an equitable system. In this direction, a co-
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ordinateci harmonised tax system has to be introduced so that income is redistributed fairly 
across all levels of society.
In short, we feel that challenging the neoliberal strategy in the EU is a task that 
requires a great deal of patience, determination and optimism. Turning to Keynesian 
policies may not be an adequate response to the mutated patterns o f neoliberal policies and 
to the interests they represent. It is therefore essential that a comprehensive counter-strategy 
backed by theoretical work and research in a number o f closely interrelated fields is 
developed in the immediate future. It should be emphasized however, that when 
researching controversial areas such as the one undertaken in this study, a number of 
complicated and complex structures have to be taken into consideration. There is a need for 
further research which may lead to more comprehensive answers and new practical steps.
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